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Abstract
Financial integration has progressively increased over the past decade. Following
the global financial crisis and the turmoil that ensued, external financing conditions
changed. The global financial architecture went through significant adjustments con-
sequently affecting global financing conditions. Emergent issues in response to the
evolving global financial conditions included changes to monetary and financial sector
regulation which had consequences for the capacity of banks to extend credit. Ac-
cordingly, the availability of credit is likely to have adversely affected the investment
activity of firms, with potentially a more pronounced effect on for multinational corpo-
rations exposed to greater risk and information asymmetry associated with investing
in foreign countries.
In advanced economies, central banks pursued expansionary monetary policies to
stimulate domestic economies by lowering the short-term policy interest rates. The
central banks lowered the policy rate to the effective lower bound and resorted to
unconventional tools of monetary policy in efforts to revive domestic economic activity.
However, as a result of greater financial integration across countries, the unconventional
monetary policies adopted by major economies also generated unintended consequences
for countries abroad. International financial institutions which play a critical role in
the intermediation and allocation of capital across countries also facilitated this cross-
border transmission. Accordingly, the unconventional monetary policies pursued by
the United States, United Kingdom, Japan and the European Central Bank instigated
debate pertaining to the consequences of the spillover effects. Moreover, the evolving
global financing conditions and low interest rate environment that ensued subsequent
to the global financial crisis also catalysed the surge in capital flows going to emerging
market and developing economies.
Furthermore, a period of slow growth ensued in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis. This slow global growth has been largely attributed to greater uncertainty
which has been observed to have had a detrimental on real economic activity. Firms
are more inclined to postpone large investment activities when uncertainty is high.
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Moreover, various types of uncertainty will probably influence firms and households’
decisions differently. It is within this context that there has been a rise in prominence
of policy debates on the role of different types of uncertainty for economic activity and
most recently capital flows. Therefore, the focus of this thesis is the role of external
financing conditions and uncertainty on multinational corporations’ cross-border direct
invest and the consequences of unconventional monetary policies implemented by major
advanced economies on the portfolio allocation of institutional investors. The thesis
presents three chapters in macroeconomics with an emphasis on cross-border capital
flows and the role credit constraints and uncertainty and cross-border asset allocation
of institutional investors in response to monetary policies in developed economies.
The first empirical chapter examines the effects of country-specific financial mar-
ket development on cross-border direct investment. It examines the extent to which
financial development in source and host countries affects bilateral foreign direct in-
vestment(FDI). Using the gravity model, the effects of financial market development
on outward foreign direct investment to emerging market and developing economies
is investigated. Furthermore, it examines the role of the global financial crisis and
idiosyncratic systemic banking crises on outward bilateral foreign direct investment.
The main finding is that greater financial development in both origin and destination
countries enhances outward bilateral foreign direct investment. The results confirm
the volume of outward foreign direct investment to emerging market and developing
economies declined with the global financial crisis. Furthermore, in source countries
experiencing a systemic banking crisis, there is evidence that financial constraints re-
duced aggregate outward foreign direct investment.
The second empirical chapter examines the international transmission of monetary
policy through financial institutions. International financial institutions have a critical
role in intermediating and allocating capital across countries and therefore facilitating
cross-border transmission of monetary policy. Using quarterly data on individual in-
stitutional investors, this chapter studies the international transmission of monetary
policy conducted by major advanced economies on the cross-border portfolio allocation
of large institutional investors. The results reveal that in response to unconventional
monetary policies, large institutional investors contributed to the surge in capital in-
flows to emerging markets and developing countries. While institutional investors con-
tributed to the international transmission of monetary policy, the results also reveal
that these policies prompted institutional investors to increase allocation at home. The
results show cross-border transmission effects supportive of the portfolio balance and
risk-taking channels of monetary policy transmission.
The third empirical chapter examines whether foreign direct investment responds
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symmetrically to domestic and foreign uncertainty. The response of foreign direct in-
vestment to different types of uncertainty is empirically examined using the gravity
model technique. Using bilateral foreign direct investment flows, the results reveal
that multinational corporations respond heterogeneously to different types of uncer-
tainty. Furthermore, this response is distinct between advanced economies and emerg-
ing markets economies recipients. Greater uncertainty regarding financial markets in
the destination country deters foreign direct investment into the economy. However,
this effect is only relevant for outward foreign direct investment going to advanced
economies and is not relevant for emerging market and developing host countries. Po-
litical uncertainty in the host country reduces foreign direct investment to developed
country destinations with no significant effects found for developing host countries.
Similarly, macroeconomic uncertainty is only relevant in driving foreign direct invest-
ment flows to advanced economies. The empirical findings suggest that multinational
corporations will respond to this aspect of uncertainty regarding economic activity in
advanced economies and not in emerging market and developing economies. Generally,
economic policy uncertainty in in both source and host countries discourages multina-
tional corporations undertaking foreign direct investment activity. This negative effect
is stronger for host country economic policy uncertainty. Nevertheless, there are dis-
tinct effects when country groups are considered. For foreign direct investment going
into developed countries, higher economic policy uncertainty in the host country deters
foreign direct investment inflows into the economy. Therefore, from the perspective of
advanced economies, greater economic policy uncertainty is detrimental for attract-
ing foreign direct investment in inflows. In contrast, for emerging market economies,
economic policy uncertainty in the home country of the multinational corporation is
found to be more important. This finding suggests that heightened economic policy
uncertainty in the home country of the multinational corporation discourages outward
foreign direct investment. This corroborates prior evidence in the empirical literature
highlighting the relevance of the role of external supply-side factors in driving inflows
to emerging market and developing host countries.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Financial integration among countries has increased over time. Total global outward
foreign direct investment flows have progressively increased with emerging and de-
veloping countries (EMDEs) constituting the major recipients of world foreign direct
investment. Although, most foreign direct investment activity emanates from advanced
countries with the highest volume of cross border activity occurring between advanced
economies, cross-border direct investment activity in emerging and developing coun-
tries has been steadily increasing. Accordingly, the volume of foreign direct investment
inflows to developing countries, reached a historically high level, and surpassed cross
border investment to developed countries, accounting for 52 per cent of world foreign
direct investment inflows in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013) and 54 per cent by 2013 (UNC-
TAD, 2014). This was on the backdrop of the global economic turmoil following the
global financial crisis, corroborating the enhanced financial integration that has taken
place as well as the growing importance of these countries as destinations for foreign
direct investment.
Analogously, multinational corporations (MNCs) from emerging market and de-
veloping economies have increasingly become investors pursuing growth opportuni-
ties abroad particularly in other developing countries, elevating the portion of world
outward foreign direct investment originating from emerging market and developing
economies (Cai et al., 2019). Major source countries of this enhanced magnitude in
South-South foreign direct investment flows (investment from developing countries to
developing countries) include major emerging market economies of Brazil, Russia, In-
dia, China and South Africa (BRICS). These countries have considerably increased
their share in global outward foreign direct investment to other developing nations in
recent years. Similarly, by 2012 the volume of outward investment arising from devel-
oping countries as financiers to other countries represented one third of world outflows
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(UNCTAD, 2013). This subsequently rose to 39 per cent by 2013 a substantial increase
from 12 per cent registered in the early 2000s, (UNCTAD, 2014).
The increased financial integration among countries and the unique positioning of
emerging market and developing economies has coincided with the improving financial
markets in various regions across the world. Accordingly, access to stock and debt
markets as sources of finance will influence firm investment decisions. However, firm
access to capital markets across countries varies and this will influence the degree with
which firms choose to use either internal or external sources of capital to facilitate
production and expansion. Specifically, for the multinational corporation, the role
of credit conditions in both source and host country may influence the incentive for
foreign direct investment decision. At home, growing capital markets will ameliorate
credit constraints and facilitate the multinational corporations’ expansion into foreign
markets (Di Giovanni, 2005). Whereas, it has been shown that destination countries’
credit conditions may either encourage or deter the incentive of the multinational cor-
porations to pursue foreign direct investment and the type of foreign direct investment
multinational corporations chooses to engage in (Desbordes and Wei, 2017; Alfaro and
Chauvin, 2016). In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the demand for foreign
direct investment and goods produced by foreign affiliates was adversely affected by
demand shocks arising as a result of lower global GDP. Furthermore, as a consequence
of the global financial crisis, credit conditions became constrained, negatively impact-
ing the capacity of firms to finance foreign direct investment activities abroad (Sauvant
et al., 2010). Chapter 2 of this thesis analyses how external financing conditions affect
foreign direct investment. It examines the role of financial development in both the
source and host country in sequencing the cross-border direct investment activity of
multinational corporations. The thesis also considers how changes in credit conditions
during the global financial crisis and in countries that experienced a domestic systemic
banking crisis affected bilateral foreign direct investment.
The negative repercussions of the global financial crisis on financial markets and
real economic activity compelled the use of expansionary monetary policies by cen-
tral banks in major advanced economies in efforts to revive economic activity. Major
central banks lowered policy rate until they reached the zero-lower bound. Conse-
quently, the major central banks shifted from using conventional monetary policy tools
to unconventional monetary policy tools. One such tool was the large-scale outright
purchase of assets or quantitative easing by central banks in advanced economies. This
increased the size of the central bank balance sheets and altered the volume of assets
to the public for investment. While a low interest rate environment aids economic re-
covery, it also alters the risk-taking behaviour of households, banks and other investors
(Ammer et al., 2018). The low interest rate environment in advanced economies has
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been shown to have influenced a shift toward allocation to riskier assets by investors
searching for high yield. For example, this search for yield investment behaviour has
resulted in cross-border investors allocating more assets to emerging markets (Bonizzi,
2017). While the enhanced appeal of emerging markets and developing economies as
attractive destinations for investment from abroad is beneficial for the recipients it also
comes with costs. With increased integration between economies through both real and
financial channels, unconventional monetary policies adopted by major systemic coun-
tries generated unintended consequences for other economies. Moreover, it has been
shown that the spillovers from the international transmission of unconventional mon-
etary policies conducted by central bank in advanced economies have been large for
emerging and developing countries (Ahmed, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Neely, 2015).
Risks identified include the anticipation of the normalisation or reversal of expansion-
ary monetary policy being associated with the depreciation of nominal currencies and
reductions in stock market prices in emerging markets (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015).
Chapter 3 of this thesis examines the international transmission of monetary policy
through the cross-border portfolio allocation of global institutional investors. Cap-
ital flows have been closely linked to movements in the business cycle. The global
financial cycle or co-movements of capital inflows, asset prices and credit growth are
not attuned to domestic macroeconomic fundamentals (Rey, 2015). This is an impor-
tant policy concern for emerging market and developing countries as been recipients of
large volumes of capital inflows from abroad in recent times. Furthermore, the global
financial cycle is also linked to co-movement with uncertainty or global risk aversion.
This implies that shifting external financial conditions, investor sentiment and the ac-
companying fluctuations in external financial flows pose significant risks of generating
macroeconomic instability for these countries, through sudden stops and retrenchment
of capital flows. This has induced investigation into the determinants of capital flows
(Ahmed and Zlate, 2014) and the sensitivity of capital flows to evolving external finan-
cial conditions such as the global financial crisis, (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2011) and
the role of financial flows as conduits in magnifying the effects of shocks.
Evidence on the movement of gross capital flows suggests that capital inflows and
capital outflows have become increasingly correlated. A sudden stop or decline in
capital inflows occurs alongside of a retrenchment or decline in capital outflows (Davis,
2015). Furthermore, it has also been found that this unidirectional movement of capital
inflows and outflows is largely driven by the business cycle. Moreover, sudden stops or
retrenchments exert stronger effects in periods of recession (Broner et al., 2013; Davis,
2015)) and these effects have intensified with financial integration (David et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, this positive correlation in the movement of capital inflows and capital
outflows remains a puzzle, making both the determinants and response of capital flows
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to shifting external financial conditions the focus of recent research.
Several theoretical propositions have been made in the literature on the probable
reasons for the puzzle on the co-movement between a sudden stop in capital inflows
and a retrenchment in capital outflows. (Tille and Van Wincoop, 2014) underscore
the importance of heterogeneity among investors and private information in explaining
the co-movement. They consider that investors will have diverse portfolios, encounter
distinct frictions and respond differently to a shock in fundamentals. However, the
correlation between inflows and outflows may be attributable to the different informa-
tion sets available to external and domestic investors. Tille and Van Wincoop (2014)
suggests the pattern of correlation exhibited by capital inflows and outflows may be
due to information asymmetry between external and local investors, a reflection of the
varied information and expectations of both groups. Gourio et al. (2016) argue that
external and local investors are subject to varying degrees of uncertainty arising from
different government policies that may directly or indirectly alter conditions between
external and local investors. These implicit or explicit factors may include, capital
controls, taxes, risk of expropriation and exchange rate risk.
On the other hand, Caballero and Simsek (2018) proposition that the fickleness of
capital inflows may arise from external investors response to adverse conditions in the
host country. When financial distress occurs in a host country, investors will tend to
retreat away from the host country in crisis and lean toward their domestic market.
On the other hand, domestic distress in the source country may result in a reduction in
capital outflows as investors reverse investment abroad. In these conditions, there will
be a correlation in the movement of capital inflows and capital outflows. Caballero and
Simsek (2018) postulate the cause of fickleness or retrenchment inflows as the result
of investors reacting to information asymmetry or Knightian uncertainty, specifically
asymmetry in regulation and poor property rights. Nevertheless, limited evidence exists
on these hypotheses. Chapter 4 of this thesis addresses the question of whether there is
a differential response of investors to external and domestic uncertainty. Specifically, it
addresses the question of how bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j respond
to uncertainty in country i and country j measured by uncertainty regarding different
aspects of the economy.
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides the empir-
ical study on the impact of country-specific financial market development on bilateral
foreign direct investment. Chapter 3 examines the international transmission of mon-
etary policy conducted by central banks in major advanced economies on the cross-
border portfolio allocation of large institutional investors. Finally, chapter 4 analyses
the response of foreign direct investment to the domestic and foreign uncertainty. The
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empirical analysis examines the response of foreign direct investment to different types
of uncertainty. Chapter 5 concludes with the overall findings of the thesis and potential
avenues for further research.
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Chapter 2
Financial Development and
Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
2.1 Introduction
Access to financial resources will shape firm investment decisions. However, disparities
in the accessibility of capital among countries will determine the extent to which the
firm uses internal and external finance to support production and expansion. The
existence of inadequately developed financial institutions or financial constraints can
preclude firms from attaining the external resources necessary for investment. The
growth in financial markets will ease credit constraints and enable firms to undertake
investment ventures in external markets (Di Giovanni, 2005). Firms constrained due to
financial conditions at home will engage in less outward foreign direct investment (FDI)
(Klein et al., 2002). However, the effects of having a well-developed financial sector
for foreign direct investment in the host country is ambiguous. Credit constraints in
the host country could either be beneficial and result in more foreign direct investment
or could be detrimental to Multinational corporations (MNCs) incentives to invest
(Desbordes and Wei, 2017).
A well-developed financial system permits firms access to capital to pursue invest-
ment opportunities. Multinational Corporations engaging in cross border activity incur
significant initial costs which may not be fully covered from internally generated funds
(Bilir et al., 2014). This necessitates the need to access external capital to fund invest-
ment abroad. The extent of financial development at home will have an influence on
the capacity of firms to access capital. Financial constraints arising from weak finan-
cial institutions and disruptions to the supply of capital during a crisis will affect the
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access to credit and ability to invest for these firms. With underdeveloped financial
markets, budding entrepreneurs are inhibited from accessing capital to harness inno-
vations brought by external capital, limiting the potential for expansion into export
markets (Alfaro et al., 2004). An improved financial system results in alleviated credit
restrictions for local firms, promoting greater intermediary production, which could
enhance foreign direct investment inflows from abroad as host country firms provide
inputs (Alfaro et al., 2010).
This chapter addresses the question of how external financing conditions influence
foreign direct investment. It focuses on the dual effects of financial development in both
source and host country and the implications for outward foreign direct investment.
Financial development in the source country will facilitate the capacity of foreign firms
to enter new markets (Di Giovanni, 2005). The financial conditions in the host country
will determine whether foreign investment occurs and in what form the foreign direct
investment will take (Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016). Changes to the availability of capital
due to tightening credit conditions arising from a financial crisis will also have implica-
tions for foreign direct investment. This crisis effect might be beneficial or deleterious
to foreign direct investment. Exogenous shocks to the supply of credit or crises are
anticipated to have a negative impact on outward foreign direct investment as firms
are unable to gain the access to expand abroad.
Following the global financial crisis, the demand for foreign direct investment and
goods produced by foreign subsidiaries were adversely affected by demand shocks in the
form of lower global GDP. Supply side factors related to tighter credit conditions owing
to the global financial crisis also impacted the capacity of firms to finance foreign direct
investment activities abroad (Sauvant et al., 2010). The crisis resulted in two outcomes
related to foreign direct investment, reduced demand and reduced credit (Gil-Pareja
et al., 2013). These outcomes arose through the foreign direct investment extensive
margin, lowering investment abroad or through the intensive margin of foreign direct
investment, lowering the size of investments.
This analysis considers changes to external financing conditions during the global
financial crisis and in countries that experienced systemic banking crisis and the im-
plications for foreign direct investment. However, a closer look at the type of crisis
may be warranted. Foreign direct investment is considered to be more stable com-
pared to other foreign inflows which are prone to reversals from host countries in times
of crisis. During periods of financial distress, host countries may register greater in-
flows. A failure in the domestic financial intermediation process in the host country
presents opportunities for foreign direct investment from foreign firms (Stoddard and
Noy, 2015). The type of crisis will influence the form of foreign direct investment and
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attractiveness of the host country for investment. Horizontal foreign direct investment
aimed at accessing the local market in the host country will likely be adversely affected
where a crisis leads to a contraction in the real economy as it will not be profitable
for the multinational corporations to invest. On the other hand, vertical foreign direct
investment seeking to lower production costs may benefit from wealth effects arising
from currency depreciation (Stoddard and Noy, 2015). This wealth effect may result
in more foreign direct investment as it is cheaper for foreign investors to acquire assets
in the host country following a currency depreciation (Froot and Stein, 1991).
This chapter contributes to the literature focusing on the link between multina-
tional firm activity and external financing conditions. Prior work has explored the
simultaneous influence of source and host country financial conditions on greenfield
Foreign direct investment, expansion and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) foreign di-
rect investment (Desbordes and Wei, 2017), greenfield foreign direct investment and
reinvestments (Gil-Pareja et al., 2013), Mergers and acquisitions foreign direct invest-
ment (Coeurdacier et al., 2009), aggregate foreign direct investment (greenfield and
mergers & acquisitions) (Donaubauer et al., 2016). This chapter uses recent data to
investigate the role of financial development in both source country and host countries
for total outward bilateral foreign direct investment (greenfield and mergers & acqui-
sitions). It further examines the role of changes to credit conditions during crises and
the implications for outward foreign direct investment. Tightened credit conditions
arising from the global financial crisis and country specific conditions in source and
host countries following a systemic banking crisis are considered.
The focus of the analysis is emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) as they
constitute the major recipients of world foreign direct investment. The volume of for-
eign direct investment inflows accounted for 52 % of world foreign direct investment
inflows in 2012 (UNCTAD, 2013), surpassing cross border investment to developed
countries and rose to 54% by 2013 (UNCTAD, 2014). This was against the backdrop
of the global economic turmoil following the global financial crisis, attesting to the
growing importance of these countries as destinations and the confluence of both ex-
ternal and internal factors as drivers of foreign direct investment to these countries.
Although, most foreign direct investment activity emanates from advanced countries
with the highest volume of cross border activity occurring between advanced economies,
cross border activity in emerging and developing countries has been steadily increas-
ing. Firms from emerging market and developing economies have increasingly become
investors pursuing growth opportunities abroad particularly into other developing coun-
tries, elevating the portion of world outward foreign direct investment originating from
emerging market and developing economies. By 2012, the volume of outward invest-
ment arising from developing countries as financiers to other countries represented one
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third of world outflows (UNCTAD, 2013). This subsequently rose to 39 per cent by 2013
a substantial increase from 12 per cent registered in the early 2000s (UNCTAD, 2014).
The research considers both developed and emerging economies as source countries of
outward foreign direct investment.
The analysis estimates the impact of credit constraints on bilateral foreign direct
investment to emerging market and developing economies. To exhibit how the different
financing arrangements, shape the pattern of foreign direct investment to emerging
markets and developing economies, the inclusion of financial deepening characteristics
is applied to both originating and destination countries. The analysis will seek to
explore the degree with which foreign direct investment is driven by credit constraints
in a bilateral country-pair setting incorporating other determinants of foreign direct
investment. It expands this literature on the role of financial development in shaping
the activity of multinational corporations.
This analysis finds that a well-developed financial sector in the source country is
beneficial for outward bilateral foreign direct investment. This chapter also finds that
the tightening of credit conditions in source countries experiencing systemic banking
crisis adversely affected outward bilateral foreign direct investment to emerging market
and developing economies. Constricted external financing conditions for host countries
experiencing systemic banking crisis facilitated greater foreign direct investment.
The main policy implications of the chapter relate to both source and host coun-
tries. Countries seeking to enable the entry and growth of multinational corporations
into foreign markets and those countries seeking to encourage inward foreign direct
investment from multinational corporations should execute policies that will enhance
financial development. Secondly, these countries ought to put in place policies to
sustain access to external financing for firms in periods of severe financial distress.
Furthermore, better developed financial systems are important as they will safeguard
the access to external financing by local firms as domestic borrowing by multinational
firms expands (Desbordes and Wei, 2017). Therefore, having a well-developed financial
system will be advantageous for both domestic and external investors.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides the background
and the distinct ways in which financial development in both source and host countries’
financial development may influence foreign direct investment. Section 2.3 describes
the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4.5 provides the results and section
4.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Financial frictions and foreign direct investment
According to Foley and Manova (2015), capital market considerations were deemed
by prior literature as secondary for the firm decision to undertake foreign direct in-
vestment abroad. The multinational corporation’s foreign direct investment decision
is examined as being a firm-specific strategic decision, made primarily to exploit a
particular advantage. This firm-specific advantage could be in the form of intangible
assets such as patents, brands and intellectual property rather than one dictated by
capital markets or disparities in interest rates across countries. The ownership, location
and internalisation (OLI) paradigm explain multinational corporations’ motivations for
owning assets abroad. Ownership advantages arising from firm-specific valuable assets,
the capacity to locate in multiple locations and the internalisation of operations due
to costs can also explain the role of multinational corporations’ as sources of foreign
inflows as well as owners of assets (Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016).
The literature from corporate finance provides perspectives on the probable chan-
nels through which financial restrictions may affect the global pattern of foreign direct
investment as well as trade. Earlier studies generally assume firms as having unfet-
tered access to funds required to undertake investment ventures (Foley and Manova,
2015). Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2011), suggest that the efficient market hypothesis
and assumptions of complete financial markets and integration of financial markets
led to the subordination of firm financing as a potential determinant of foreign direct
investment compared to other conventional factors considered previously within the
literature. Prior literature has emphasised disparities in firm productivity as a driver
of foreign direct investment. This entailed the least productive firms producing for the
domestic market, the relatively productive exporting and the most productive firms
entering new external markets (Helpman et al., 2004).
Nevertheless, firm financing choices may not be endogenous to foreign direct in-
vestment. Firms may have no need for external capital if there are no new profitable
markets to expand into. Thus, in this case the firms will report less use of external
capital and low foreign direct investment, although not financially restricted and the
firm will not seek access to capital. Alternatively, firms with potential profitable ven-
tures will report less use of external capital if they are credit constrained and have no
means to expand to prospective markets. Thus, the condition of the financial system
will determine the relative ease with which firms can raise capital through the issuance
of debt and equity securities, the extent of protection conferred to creditors and the
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degree of enforcement of contracts (Foley and Manova, 2015). In a country with an
underdeveloped capital market, firms may be restricted in obtaining capital to pursue
investment and expansion. Local financial conditions and the ease of access to credit
could impose a constraint to firms’ expansion activities abroad.
Financial deepening with respect to the size and liquidity of capital markets is essen-
tial in supporting foreign firm investment abroad (Jongwanich et al., 2013). Financial
development allows firms the capacity to obtain external finance to pursue investment
ventures abroad which they would have otherwise forfeited (Di Giovanni, 2005). Since
financial systems across countries are heterogeneous, the level of credit available and
the cost of acquiring external finance by firms is likely to varied. Firms are likely to
obtain finance to undertake viable investments with relative ease in countries with a
better developed financial market (Levine, 2005). The existence of differential access to
capital across countries can also be conditioned by legal traditions which impact credit
markets outcomes (La Porta et al., 1998, 2008). For example, the legal convention in a
country determines the conduct toward protection of property rights (Ferna´ndez and
Tamayo, 2017). Stronger financial institutions which provide for adequate enforcement
of contracts and the protection of creditor rights will result in destination countries
receiving more foreign direct investment or hosting more multinational corporations
unlike those with weaker institutional frameworks for financial contracts (Buch et al.,
2009).
Funding costs and differential access to capital
The underlying financial conditions within which the firm operates will generate varia-
tions in foreign direct investment outcomes. Accordingly, both domestic and multina-
tional firms face significant initial costs when choosing whether to undertake produc-
tion, export or enter foreign markets all of which require financing (Foley and Manova,
2015).
Markusen and Maskus (2002), highlight that the origins of financing for multina-
tional corporations can be seen as separate from the parent firm in the source country.
Owing to their presence in multiple countries, multinational corporations have the ca-
pacity to raise resources from one location and transfer them to another subsidiary
elsewhere through internal capital markets to circumvent local financial restrictions
(Desai et al., 2004). In comparison to domestic firms, multinational corporations have
a distinct advantage for overcoming financial frictions if conditions are constrained in
the location in which they are domiciled. While both multinational corporations and
domestic firms can be perceived to be affected by the conditions in the local financial
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system, the domestic firm is solely restricted to the market within which it operates.
The response of multinational corporations is to use internal capital markets. Despite
multinational corporations attaining capital elsewhere in comparison to domestic firms,
they are still responsive to changes in local financial conditions (Foley and Manova,
2015). This implies that the type of foreign direct investment that multinational corpo-
rations choose to engage in may arise from financial constraints in an underdeveloped
capital market in the host country.
In comparison to affiliates based in locations with well-functioning capital markets,
affiliates in locations with inadequate protection of creditors and weak financial insti-
tutions use less external capital and more internal capital from the parent company.
This is due to the expensive cost of funds from external providers. In the presence
of underdeveloped capital markets, the difference between the cost of external funds
and internal sources is greater (Noe, 2000). Alternatively, the financial advantage of
multinational corporations in terms of foreign direct investment can also be viewed in
the context of exchange rate effects. Wealth effects arising from exchange rate changes
exogenous to firm profits can impact foreign direct investment (Forssbaeck and Oxel-
heim, 2011). Following an exchange rate appreciation, the changes in wealth of foreign
investors supports the purchase of cheaper assets abroad (Froot and Stein, 1991). The
concomitant increase in wealth reduces the cost of capital for the multinational corpo-
ration to pursue investment abroad.
Considering that the amount of internal capital at the disposal of the firm is limited,
this leads to the need to acquire resources externally to fund the fixed costs associ-
ated with production, export or foreign direct investment activities (Bilir et al., 2014).
Therefore, the capacity of firms to cover the fixed costs of undertaking investment
abroad may be affected by credit constraints. Bilir et al. (2014) highlight that financial
institutions can impact the distribution of foreign direct investment across countries
owing to firms’ need to source external financing to meet the fixed costs to production.
How these expenses are met is sensitive to firm-specific financing choices of whether to
use debt or equity and also to the underlying financial conditions.
Information asymmetry and foreign direct investment
The firm choice on the type of foreign direct investment to undertake in a given country
will vary dependent on the extent of financial frictions and the level of development
of financial systems. Accordingly, financial constraints might arise due to agent’s sen-
sitivity to information frictions or costs (Ferna´ndez and Tamayo, 2017). Since, firms
operate in imperfect markets characterised by moral hazard and adverse selection,
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these information frictions may exacerbate financial constraints, leading to costly and
lower volumes of capital being extended (Foley and Manova, 2015). Foreign direct
investment is more sensitive to information asymmetries than other types of capital
inflows (Froot and Stein, 1991). The capacity of the firm to obtain external capital
from investors is influenced by information asymmetry and managerial behaviour, or by
moral hazard considerations as espoused by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Jensen and
Meckling (1976), respectively. These corporate governance characteristics can influ-
ence the foreign direct investment decision and shape the form of ownership structure
multinational corporations take when entering destination countries for foreign direct
investment.
Alternatively, the imperfect integration of capital markets may also be exploited
by multinational corporations behaving as arbitrageurs, as illustrated by Baker et al.
(2009). They advance a cheap financial capital hypothesis in which overvalued firms
in the source country take advantage of less costly funds available to them. In this
scenario, over-valuation by the multinational corporation will arise due to managers
having a firm-specific information advantage over investors. In this case, moral hazard
arises due to the potential misconduct by managers seeking to advance self-interests at
the expense of the investors as owners of external capital.
Baker et al. (2009) further propose a cheap assets hypothesis, where foreign direct
investment arises due to the undervaluation of assets in the host country. Hausmann
and Fernandez-Arias (2000) corroborate this and postulate that, within a poorly devel-
oped financial market, a local firm with limited access to international capital markets
will encounter restrictions in growth due to constraints in obtaining finance. This will
be evident in low firm growth prospects and high discount rates in valuation. Whereas,
a multinational corporation as a potential buyer not impeded by such restrictions will
value the domestic firm with high revenues or lower discount rate. Domestic firms in
the destination country facing capital inadequacies will be compelled to sell to multi-
national corporations with superior access to capital. Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2011)
refers to this as the discount factor financing effect on foreign direct investment which
captures the motive of multinational corporations responding to imperfect capital mar-
kets and the attendant disparities in stock valuation in the presence of information
asymmetry. The pricing differential in valuations generates the possibility of arbitrage
for the foreign firms (Foley and Manova, 2015). In this case, multinational corporations
engage in foreign direct investment based on the dual effect of an arbitrage opportunity
and the weak state of capital markets in host countries (Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016).
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Contract enforcement and foreign direct investment
The type of engagement multinational corporations opt for abroad will entail consid-
erations of a trade-off between ownership and control and financing. The effectiveness
of institutions that uphold the protection of property rights and the enforceability of
contracts will condition the security and operations of the financial sector (Ferna´ndez
and Tamayo, 2017). These institutions may arise from the legal traditions emanating
from the English, French, German and Scandinavian legal systems which influence the
corporate law and finance nexus (La Porta et al., 1998). Institutions conditioning out-
comes in the financial sector assist in lowering the effects of information asymmetry in
a number of ways (Ferna´ndez and Tamayo, 2017). Firstly, they provide buffers against
adverse selection and unequal negotiation abilities between controlling and minority
shareholders rights. Secondly, they provide an autonomous judicial framework which
facilitates the enforcement of contractual obligations.
The role of corporate governance with respect to the enforceability of contracts
can also be taken into consideration in the context of foreign direct investment. This
applies in the case where the foreign direct investment decision arises to exploit a firm-
specific advantage. Foley and Manova (2015) stipulate that, the incentive to undertake
investment in external markets is compelled by the existence of intangible assets with
monetary value for the firm. These firm-specific intangible assets could include patents,
brands or proprietary knowledge and technological advances. These intangible assets
compel multinational corporations to enter markets in which they would have a compar-
ative advantage. Intangible assets in turn influence the type of ownership and control
structure that multinational corporations assume in the destination country. The de-
gree of enforcement of property rights and the prospect of agency problems between
managers and investors will determine whether foreign investment takes the form of
an arm’s length operation (i.e. through third-party sellers or suppliers) or corporate
control and physical establishment in the destination country. Therefore, the form of
ownership and the degree of control multinational corporations exert on their assets
in external markets will depend on the extent of corporate governance and institu-
tional quality prevalent in the host countries they operate in. Consequently, the firm’s
decision to locate abroad is encapsulated by the decision either to control and man-
age its interests directly in the new market, or through the establishment of linkages
such as arm’s length operations. Therefore, intangible assets will influence multina-
tional corporations’ decision on whether to relocate and keep proprietary knowledge
and expertise within the firm or engage with partners in the destination country.
Alternatively, deficient financial markets and the lack of attributes such as sound
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contractual enforcement present in some host countries instigates the choice for foreign
firms to engage in foreign direct investment activity (Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias,
2000). Foreign firms will find it more cost-effective to access external finance at home
and allocate funds to the domestic firm through foreign direct investment to substitute
for the absence of efficient debt markets. They argue that, investors from the source
country will prefer to purchase assets in countries with weaker financial development.
The institutional environment, governing financial contracts and the protection of
creditors varies across countries. Buch et al. (2009), posit a firm can either establish
an affiliate, or alternatively enter and replicate operations to serve a foreign market.
Both decisions entail fixed costs to entry, and they advance a model where insufficient
internal capital will propel the requirement for external funds by the firm. However,
access to external funds(bank credit) is reliant on the firm’s provision of collateral as-
sets to the lender (domestic or foreign bank). In the event of a default, the lender
faces considerable transaction costs to liquidate the assets. Within the Buch et al.
(2009) model, the decision to invest abroad can be impacted by inadequate contract
enforcement and liquidation costs which can be associated with both financial develop-
ment and the existence of source country banks abroad. The source country bank will
undertake better enforcement, monitoring and have reduced information asymmetry
on the parent firm in comparison to the domestic banks in the host country. Because
the source bank mobilises superior quality of information on the foreign affiliate, it
ensures enforceability of repayment of credit or collateral provisions in event of liq-
uidation, thereby reducing the cost of funds, bolstering lending. Host countries with
superior enforcement of contracts and effective liquidation processes will receive more
multinational corporations. On the other hand, destinations with paucity in contract
enforcement are recipients of fewer multinational corporation subsidiaries.
Antras et al. (2009) concur; the choice to engage in either greenfield investments,
mergers and acquisitions or arm’s length transfer of technology, is influenced by the
extent of financial sector development in the host country. Given the existence of the
intangible assets and the need to protect them, multinational corporations may be
wary of managerial misbehaviour in the host country. However, in countries with well-
developed financial institutions the likelihood of managerial misbehaviour or moral
hazard is lower. Lenders will not need for the multinational corporations to possess
an equity stake to ensure monitoring and profit maximisation but rather institutional
quality (financial development) ensures monitoring of managers and protection of cred-
itors (investors). In this case, the multinational corporation may engage in the host
country at arm’s length and not through direct foreign direct investment. Therefore,
a well-developed host financial sector could generate an adverse effect. Multinational
corporations will not be compelled to undertake foreign direct investment as a means
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of corporate control of assets abroad, lowering this form of investment.
Information asymmetry (moral hazard and adverse selection) and institutional en-
vironment influence the location, integration into the local market and corporate gov-
ernance of multinational corporations’ operations (Foley and Manova, 2015). The
theoretical underpinnings in Bilir et al. (2014) posit that, a multinational corpora-
tion based in a country with a better developed financial market may not always have
access to the funds it requires. Financial institutions in the source country may be
unwilling to finance ventures abroad. The potential risk of being unable to fully make
collateral claims abroad will dissuade financiers from supporting multinational corpo-
rations. Bilir et al. (2014), assert that financial development in the destination country
will enable previously constrained domestic firms to enter the market, making it less
competitive for multinational corporations’ operations, in sectors reliant on finance.
This can have an adverse effect of reducing foreign direct investment, as prior con-
strained local firms are accorded greater access to finance owing to improved financial
conditions. Bilir et al. (2014), also show how financial development in the destination
country can alleviate the financial constraints of the multinational corporations. They
conclude that, financial frictions influence not only the decision to undertake foreign di-
rect investment, but also the volume and the type of foreign direct investment whether,
horizontal or vertical.
2.2.2 Direct and indirect effects of financial development on
foreign direct investment
Firms relying on external finance to undertake their operations or invest in new activi-
ties domestically can be anticipated to require external finance to fund growth abroad.
Similarly, firms differ in their financing patterns due to their varied ability to access
external finance from capital markets (Desbordes and Wei, 2017).1 Di Giovanni (2005)
asserts that, a developed financial sector allows firms to embark on ventures they would
have previously foregone. Additionally, mergers and acquisitions permit firms to ex-
pand their activities of outward foreign investment into other countries, which also
intensifies financial integration among countries.
Financial development refers to the mechanisms through which financial interme-
1Other literature has focused on heterogenous firms and the impact of financial frictions on trade
activity. Evidence shows that, in sectors more reliant on finance access to capital enhances export
activity. Manova (2013), derives a conceptual framework highlighting that, the fixed initial costs to
exporting are impacted by financial constraints and the heterogeneity of firms drawing from earlier
work by Melitz (2003). Manova (2013)’s findings reveal that lower developed financial causes reduced
destination markets, diminished export products and results in less total trade.
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diaries and markets lower costs to enable trade, risk diversification and the pooling
of savings. Financial institutions and contracts arise in order to ease the costs of
extending credit such as the gathering of information, enforcement of contracts and
transaction costs. Financial sector development refers to the amelioration of the in-
formation, enforcement and transaction costs the financial sector incurs in the process
of extending credit. In comparison to a firm operating in an underdeveloped financial
system, financial development will ease the credit constraints encountered by the firm
operating in a country with a well-developed financial sector. Therefore, financial de-
velopment can be seen as an indirect measure of the availability and access to credit by
firms. The extent of financial development will influence the volume of credit available
to firms and can impact their ability to engage in cross border activities. The finan-
cial sector is an important element of cross border activity as it supports and enables
the undertakings of multinational firms such as exports (Manova, 2013), mergers and
acquisitions (Di Giovanni, 2005) and direct investment abroad (Liu and Qiu, 2014).
Source country financial development effects
Desbordes and Wei (2017) elucidate the various direct and indirect ways through which
financial development may influence the pattern of foreign direct investment. Focus-
ing on financing effects, they delineate the dual role of financial development in both
originating and destination countries. There are two probable unequivocally beneficial
effects through which source country financial sector development influences foreign
direct investment. Desbordes and Wei (2017) highlight the following potential effects
for source financial development on foreign direct investment:
Positive direct external access to finance effect. Source country firms more
reliant on external finance will have access to funds enabling them to cover the sig-
nificant costs of expanding and investing in profitable opportunities abroad. For this
reason, there will be a direct positive external access to finance effect emanating from
a better developed financial sector in the source country (Desbordes and Wei, 2017).
Positive indirect access to finance effect. Better developed financial sector
may have a positive indirect effect (Desbordes and Wei, 2017). In addition, with greater
access to finance within the home country, the activities of local firms will be enhanced
by contributing to the general expansion and entry of firms particularly in sectors more
reliant on external finance (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This yields greater competition
which is associated with two competing outcomes. The entry of new competitors in
the market could instigate other firms to pursue new markets abroad.
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Negative indirect competition effect. Conversely, there may be a negative
competition effect, where the increased number of firms entering the market results
in the reduction of profits for each firm in the sector. This could curtail the capacity
of firms to invest abroad owing to the indirect negative competition effect (Desbordes
and Wei, 2017).
Host country financial development effects
There is variability in the postulated effects of host country financial development on
foreign direct investment. Capital market conditions in the host country influence
whether foreign investment is undertaken and whether it is financed through foreign
direct investment (Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016). Desbordes and Wei (2017) elucidate
four contrasting effects of host financial development on foreign direct investment as
follows:
Positive direct external access to finance effect. In an adequately devel-
oped financial sector in the host country, a positive access to finance effect will arise
(Desbordes and Wei, 2017). The magnitude of foreign affiliates activities in the host
country will be enhanced if a proportion of the external finance requisite for invest-
ment is sourced within the host country. Domestic financial sector development will
ease financing constraints by availing external finance to both local and foreign in-
vestors alike from the domestic capital market and this will be advantageous for firm
access to resources. Lenders in the source country may be unwilling to finance ven-
tures abroad. The potential risk of being unable to fully make collateral claims abroad
will dissuade financiers from supporting multinational corporations. Bilir et al. (2014),
show that greater host financial development can alleviate the financial constraints
of the multinational corporations’ affiliates. Alfaro and Chauvin (2016) concur and
surmise that, host country conditions attract foreign direct investment because foreign
firms can finance part of their operations locally. Access to the domestic capital market
by multinational corporations will be more advantageous than home country financing
as it permits them to hedge against exchange rate risk of sales or costs associated with
the trading in the host country currency.2
Negative direct disintegration effect. Conversely, better host country financial
development may result in a negative disintegration effect (Desbordes and Wei, 2017).
External investors might have the impetus to substitute foreign financing because the
developed financial system in the host country is able to adequately perform its in-
2Alternatively, the volume of credit available in the domestic economy is enhanced when multina-
tional corporations are present in the domestic market (Harrison et al., 2004).
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termediation functions.3 Accordingly, in the presence of well-developed local financial
sector in the host country, foreign investors will be less compelled to undertake outward
foreign direct investment with resources obtained from the home country financial sec-
tor. Multinational corporations’ substitution of foreign direct investment with local
funds will result in reduced total foreign direct investment inflows brought by multina-
tional corporations to the host country (Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016). This can also be
on account of lenders not requiring multinational corporations to hold equity stakes in
investments in host countries with well-developed financial systems as the potential for
managerial misbehaviour is lower (Antras et al., 2009). In this case, the multinational
corporation may engage in the host country at arm’s length and not through direct
foreign direct investment. Thus, a well-developed host financial sector could generate
an adverse effect. Multinational corporations will not be compelled to undertake for-
eign direct investment as a means of corporate control of assets abroad, lowering this
form of investment.
Negative indirect competition effect. Furthermore, a well-functioning finan-
cial sector in the host country might result in a negative competition effect (Desbordes
and Wei, 2017). The financial sector will implicitly enable local development and aug-
ment market size as existing domestic firms are able to expand due to greater access
to finance. This encourages and facilitates the entry of additional local firms into
the market. As a result, competition intensifies, decreasing the profit for each entity.
This makes the host country a less suitable destination for horizontal foreign direct
investment seeking local share, particularly from previously financially unconstrained
multinational corporations (Bilir et al., 2014). When entry by local firms is limited
owing to lack of access to funds or poor financial institutions, multinational corpora-
tions have a comparative advantage. The prospect of yielding higher returns in sectors
dependent on external finance is greater. In this scenario, the lack of financial devel-
opment in the host country will act as a pull factor for foreign direct investment as
multinational corporations pursue prospectively higher rates of return. This serves as
an incentive to enter the host market particularly in those sectors more dependent on
finance.
Positive indirect agglomeration effect. Finally, with greater access to finance
in the host country, expansion of domestic firm activity in sectors dependent on finance
may promote the amalgamation between local and foreign firms. The expansion output
within an industry tends to create economies of scale, which provide incentives for
firms to agglomerate their operations in a given area. The growth of sectors reliant on
external finance, may be enhanced when there is greater financial development. For
3Nevertheless, excessive borrowing by foreign firms from the domestic capital market can crowd
out local firms and exacerbate credit constraints (Harrison and McMillan, 2003).
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this reason, there may be a positive indirect agglomeration effect on inward foreign
direct investment (Desbordes and Wei, 2017).
This section provides empirical evidence relating financial development to multina-
tional firm activities. It reviews the linkages between firm financing and foreign direct
investment by either directly or indirectly incorporating financial market conditions
and institutions governing the functioning of financial contracts.
2.2.3 Source country financial conditions evidence
Various authors have explored how aspects of home country conditions impact the
decision of firms to establish an affiliate or acquire firm assets abroad. The profit
maximisation motive of the firm will be modified by two aspects, (Frenkel et al., 2004).
These relate to host country characteristics which could potentially affect the return on
foreign investment and the changes in the economic environment in the source country
influencing the viability and intention for firms to expand abroad, exogenous to host
country pull factors. Thus, the profitability of firms as well as the availability of funds
for investments is likely to be influenced by the economic situation prevailing in the
source country, (Frenkel et al., 2004). With results of foreign direct investment from
five major industrial countries to 22 emerging economies, they conclude business cycles
in the source countries have an impact on firm’s inclination to investment. Cross border
activity moves in tandem with swings in the business cycle.
Furthermore, using data on German firms, Buch et al. (2009) analyse the compar-
ative relevance of financial constraints for both parent and affiliate firms. Financial
constraints in the source country, faced by parent firms, adversely impacts the extensive
margin, the firm choice to enter a new market (horizontal foreign direct investment).
Consequently, firms with greater cash flows are more prone to turn into multinational
corporations and establish affiliates abroad. If the financial constraints to attaining
external capital are severe, the magnitude of foreign direct investment at the intensive
margin is lower since expensive fixed costs imply lower internal finance to support pro-
duction. Thus, evidence suggests smaller, less productive firms with a higher share of
fixed assets are unlikely to assume the high initial fixed costs associated with foreign
market entry.
Levy Yeyati et al. (2007) using a gravity model establish firms will usually have
greater profits to engage in investment both at home and abroad, therefore foreign
direct investment outflows would be anticipated to increase during upturns. In recession
periods in the US and European source countries, foreign direct investment flows to
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developing countries were countercyclical, while foreign direct investment from Japan
tended to be procyclical. Furthermore, the comparative rates of return on investment
between foreign and domestic investment is likely to induce substitution effects as
foreign investors choose between domestic and foreign investment. Additionally, the
cost of capital abroad and at home will also matter for the firm investment decision.
Levy Yeyati et al. (2007), surmise a reduction in the real interest rates and output
gap in source countries is likely to be attendant with greater outward foreign direct
investment, especially if the destination country has limited access to capital.
Desbordes and Wei (2017) investigate the impact of financial development on the
volume of greenfield foreign direct investment in sectors more reliant on external fi-
nance. Firms ability to access external finance or financial dependence Rajan and
Zingales (1998) and the ownership of tangible assets suitable to serve as collateral to
support external borrowing, (Kroszner et al., 2007) are used to analyse bilateral foreign
direct investment of manufacturing firms. These factors can restrict the capacity for
firms in sectors more reliant on external finance to initiate investment abroad. Using
distinct firm-level data for 13 manufacturing sectors allows for more granular examina-
tion of foreign direct investment activity compared to aggregate measures such as BOP
data. Desbordes and Wei (2017) exploit both the variation in financial development
across countries and financial vulnerability across sectors for bilateral foreign direct
investment from 83 home countries(both developed and developing) to 125 recipient
countries (both developed and developing) countries. They conclude, in both host and
source countries, the magnitude of bilateral foreign direct investment in financially
dependent sectors is enhanced with more developed financial sectors.
Donaubauer et al. (2016), explore how the development of the financial sector in
both host and source countries has an effect on the level of aggregate outward foreign
direct investment (greenfield and mergers & acquisitions) using a gravity model. Unlike
Desbordes and Wei (2017), who measure financial development by individual measures
of financial development, they capture the effects of financial market development with
a composite index comprised of the four characteristics of financial systems, access,
stability, depth and efficiency (Cihak et al., 2012). Furthermore, they explore the
possible complementarity or substitutability between of financial market development
in the host and source countries. Potential endogeneity is accounted for using financial
development in geographically contiguous countries and the exclusion of host countries
with banking systems consisting of predominantly foreign banks. Using bilateral foreign
direct investment stocks, encompassing the period 2001-2012 from 43 investor countries
to 137 recipient countries, their findings concur with those of Desbordes and Wei (2017).
In both host and source countries, well-developed financial sectors augment bilateral
foreign direct investment. Additionally, local and external financial markets act as
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substitutes, the paucity in the host country financial markets can be swapped with the
access to source country financial market. This is divergent from Desbordes and Wei
(2017) who were unable to find significant substitution effects between source and host
financial development.
Other strands of literature on the implications of financial market conditions have
focused on mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Assessing, financial market conditions in
source countries between 1990-1999, Di Giovanni (2005) finds development of both the
stock market and financial intermediaries in source countries is beneficial for mergers
and acquisitions. Financing through equity markets particularly exerts a larger influ-
ence than credit provided from financial intermediaries. Furthermore, he finds evidence
of distinct effects of financial structures which vary across countries. Stock markets
have significant part in the financing of firms from market-based economies with credit
markets having an important though not significant role in bank-based economies.
Coeurdacier et al. (2009) investigate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between 1985
and 2004 in advanced economies for manufacturing and services sectors with a gravity
model. Divergent from Di Giovanni (2005) they control for sector and individual coun-
try fixed effects. Their results demonstrate, with better developed financial systems,
both source and host countries have greater mergers and acquisitions (M&A) flows in
manufacturing and services sectors. Subsequently controlling for fixed effects, results
in solely source country stock market capitalisation being significant. Furthermore,
changes across time in source country stock market capitalisation are more related to
the return on investment in the destination country.
Dailami et al. (2012) investigate the dynamics of bilateral mergers and acquisitions
originating from firms in emerging market economies (the global south) to both ad-
vanced and emerging host countries. Using 61 emerging countries over the period 1997
to 2010, they find more access to finance through the stock market and the domes-
tic credit market in the source country is linked with more mergers and acquisitions.
The capacity of firms to attain capital through equity markets in source country along
with the presence of a well-developed financial sector in the host country can enhance
mergers and acquisitions. This lessens impediments to financing obstacles with firms
being able to pursue horizontal foreign direct investment and mergers and acquisitions.
Financial development may result in increased foreign direct investment inflows as it
modifies the costs of engaging in investment activities, (Hajilee and Al Nasser, 2015).
22
2.2.4 Host country financial conditions evidence
Host country financial sector development and the implications for foreign direct invest-
ment are particularly important for developing countries seeking to attract more exter-
nal investment. The financial sector, comprised of financial institutions and markets,
engaged in the pooling and distribution of capital, can serve as a medium for trans-
mitting foreign inflows to local economic activities, (Murinde, 2012). Furthermore, the
local financial market assists foreign firms in countering information asymmetries and
facilitates linkages. Foreign investors are able to obtain information on the opportuni-
ties and threats in the local market from domestic financial intermediaries alleviating
the information anomalies existent between local and foreign investors,(Kinda, 2010).
However, the impact of host country financial sector development in determin-
ing the pattern of foreign direct investment across countries is equivocal, Desbordes
and Wei (2014). The literature identifies foreign direct investment occurring due to
multinational corporations’ ownership of intangible assets, the risk of expropriation of
proprietary technology and moral hazard in the destination country. Thus, the de-
gree of investor protection or enforceability of contracts and the extent of financial
development can impact the magnitude of foreign direct investment activities.
Bilir et al. (2014) using U.S data, accentuate the importance of the host country
financial development for multinational corporations’ entry into external markets and
the level of affiliate sales. This is underscored through a competition effect and a
financing effect. They model firms originating from three countries, west and east as
identical economies in which firms encounter no restrictions to attaining external capital
and a south (low wage country) in which firms are financially constrained. Drawing
from Helpman et al. (2004), firms establish a level of productivity once they enter the
market. Relatively productive firms from the East and West produce for the domestic
and export market. While, the most productive firms establish an affiliate in the South
to serve the home market and export to other countries. However, these decisions are
reliant on the financial conditions faced by firms in the three countries. Consequently,
better developed financial systems in the South enables local firms’ entry. This may
be detrimental for multinational corporations’ activities in the host country market as
it enhances competition for foreign firms . This lowers demand for the foreign firm
products and consequently reduces affiliate sales in the host country.
Similarly, Antras et al. (2009)using firm-level data establish paucity in investor pro-
tection and financial frictions in the host countries as limitations to U.S firms’ foreign
activities. Modelling a firm seeking to invest abroad with the assistance of a domestic
entrepreneur in the host country, the firm contends with two choices. The choice of ei-
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ther providing arm’s length transfer of technology or alternatively direct participation
in the host market through affiliate (equity) ownership and financing. Therefore, for-
eign direct investment occurs as an endogenous outcome of financial frictions existent
within the host country. As such to ensure profit maximisation and monitoring of the
venture, lenders demand the multinational corporation’s direct participation. Antras
et al. (2009) find two contrasting effects. Weak financial systems in the host country
lower the magnitude of foreign firm activities; foreign direct investment is characterised
by greater ownership by parent companies, with affiliate firms more reliant on parent
companies for funds. Due to the need for monitoring, foreign firms are more likely
to engage in foreign direct investment than arms-length transactions. Therefore, the
lower financial development in the host country will result in more capital inflows.
Alternatively, in a host country with a well-developed financial sector and adequate
investor protection, foreign direct investment inflows are typified by less ownership by
multinational corporations and more arms-length transfer of technology.
Local institutions relating to poor corporate governance and an inefficient finan-
cial sector can influence the movement of financial flows, (Ju and Wei, 2010). They
hypothesise a model contrasting the movements between financial capital and foreign
direct investment flows given prevailing conditions of the financial system. Countries
with well-developed financial systems, good corporate governance and better financial
intermediaries, are net sources of foreign direct investment on one hand but also draw
more capital inflows from abroad. While in emerging market countries with weak finan-
cial systems and governance, return on investments is lower. Thus, they tend to have
more capital outflows but are net recipients of foreign direct investment due to higher
marginal productivity of capital. Therefore, the effect of financial globalisation on this
set of countries is indistinct. Foreign investors are able to bypass the inadequately
developed financial systems.
Similarly, Hausmann and Fernandez-Arias (2000) suggest, as an alternative for in-
efficient markets, multinational corporations will seek to establish physical presence
abroad especially in locations where the costs of operations and conducting business
are great. Therefore, in host countries with diminutive security of property rights,
deficient capital markets and institutions, external investors will prefer to operate di-
rectly rather than alternate engagement through local intermediaries such as suppliers,
franchises. Therefore, foreign direct investment can serve as a substitute to capital
markets. Investment would bypass the deficient financial markets and occur directly,
undermining the financial intermediation process. They surmise, more investments
take place in destinations with weaker institutional environments since foreign firms
gain access to sounder institutions and capital markets at home.
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The influence of host country financial sector development on the firm’s decision to
enter markets abroad can be viewed through its effects on whether multinational cor-
porations choose exports or foreign direct investment. Evidence by Liu and Qiu (2014)
suggests financial sector development in the destination country encourages the entry
of local firms and generates greater competition for foreign firms, shrinking prospective
export and foreign direct investment returns. Hence, the improved capacity for firms
within the host country to borrow in a well-developed financial sector diminishes both
trade and foreign direct investment inflows. This highlights the significance of the de-
velopment of the domestic financial sector in the destination country for cross border
activities.
2.2.5 Financial crises and foreign direct investment
Other studies have illustrated the outcome of adverse exogenous shocks to financial
conditions in the source and host countries for foreign direct investment activities.
Tighter credit conditions for firms can be manifested in the form of disturbances to the
cost or supply of external capital.
In times of financial distress in the host country, foreign direct investment moti-
vated by arbitrage opportunities will increase. Multinational corporations will tend to
increase investment in distressed countries. These inflows seek to take advantage of
undervalued assets which are available in the recipient country,(Aguiar and Gopinath,
2005; Alfaro and Chauvin, 2016). When asset prices in the destination are low or
the country is in distress there is an increase in mergers and acquisitions activity as
evidenced during the Asian financial crisis.
Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) theorise two probable channels through which a systemic
banking crisis may affect FDI. Firstly, the restricted supply of credit that ensues will
limit foreign direct investment activity. The ability of firms to invest abroad is re-
stricted owing to tighter access to credit and deteriorating balance sheets. This im-
pacts the capacity of companies to finance the fixed initial costs of investing abroad.
Hence, the amount of new investments as well as the operations of existing affiliates
is affected. Secondly, the demand shock arising from a decline in global GDP hin-
dered the firm potential to invest as incomes and foreign direct investment are highly
correlated. Using firm-level data from a sample of 120 home and 161 host countries
between 2003-2010, they find evidence of adverse effects of financial constraints as a
consequence of a systemic banking crisis in the home country. Financial constraints
negatively affect the number of cross border investment projects undertaken by multi-
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national corporations. On the other hand, banking crisis in the host country has no
significant influence on foreign direct investment projects. They provide further evi-
dence using three alternate estimation approaches, the Ordinary least squares (OLS),
Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood method (PPML)and the Heckman two stage es-
timation method. Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) find no evidence of a systemic banking crisis
affecting the aggregate amount of foreign direct investment invested. However, their
findings indicate a reduction in the number of investment projects undertaken by for-
eign firms due to financial constraints. Considering aggregate foreign direct investment
was unaffected, they conclude the decline in total foreign direct investment volumes
evidenced during the global financial crisis might be broadly explained by the decline
in world GDP rather than the financial constraints.
Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) examine macroeconomic developments in G7 source coun-
tries as external determinants for outward bilateral foreign direct investment to devel-
oping countries between 1985 and 2007. They assert a significant share of foreign op-
erations related to foreign direct investment are supported through financing obtained
from international capital markets. Thus, borrowing costs will be responsive to changes
in global interest rates. They find during the period prior to the global financial crisis,
excess global liquidity and lower cost of finance proxied by the real interest rates in
industrialised countries, was associated with greater outward foreign direct investment
to low income countries. Whereas, economic activity proxied by growth of real GDP
and the output cycle in source countries is strongly and significantly linked with more
outward foreign direct investment to low income countries. In addition to these cyclical
factors determining foreign direct investment, they provide evidence of lower outward
foreign direct investment from advanced countries during periods through which they
were experiencing recessions.
Klein et al. (2002) use the natural experiment of financial distress of Japanese banks
in the 1990s to examine outward foreign direct investment to USA. They explore the
role of imperfect capital markets and credit constraints on firms reliant on external
bank finance. They put forward the ‘relative access to credit hypothesis‘ which infers
the capacity of firms to engage in foreign investment abroad is reliant on their access
to external finance. Since many firms in Japan depend on banks for debt finance,
the readiness of banks to offer credit fell following the weakening financial conditions
experienced by local banks. Klein et al. (2002) conclude decline in outward foreign
direct investment from Japan to USA was on account of diminishing financial sector
conditions which resulted in lesser credit provided to firms in Japan by financial in-
termediaries, restraining the capacity of firms to undertake foreign direct investment
abroad. Therefore, the availability of external finance varies with the condition of
the financial sector particularly for firms highly reliant on bank finance for outward
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investment.
Desbordes and Wei (2016) analyse the causal effects of financial constraints on
outward greenfield foreign direct investment during 2003-2010 from 99 source countries
to 135 host countries. They identify the influence of restricted financial conditions
on multinational firms operating in 13 broad manufacturing sectors during the 2008-
2010 global financial crisis using a difference in difference methodology. Considering
most investor countries were from the OECD, facilitates the identification of countries
which experienced banking crisis during 2008-2010 using the crisis database of Laeven
and Valencia (2013). They find evidence the global financial crisis led to an overall
decline in the magnitude of outward greenfield foreign direct investment, in sectors
more dependent on external finance in countries with well-developed financial sectors.
However, this adverse effect was particularly greater in countries which also suffered
from a banking crisis.
Stoddard and Noy (2015) using a sample of emerging market and developing coun-
tries investigate the effects of different types of crises on foreign direct investment
inflows. They find banking, inflation, hyperinflation and external debt crises have a
negative impact on foreign direct investment. They further isolate foreign direct invest-
ment by type and find similar adverse effects of these various crises on greenfield foreign
direct investment, mergers and acquisitions, horizontal foreign direct investment and
vertical foreign direct investment. However, the analysis is unable to find evidence of a
rise in foreign direct investment inflows following crisis episodes given the predictions
of the fire sale foreign direct investment hypothesis of Krugman (2000).
2.3 Empirical methodology
2.3.1 Empirical specification
To ascertain the impact of financial conditions on outward bilateral foreign direct
investment, this chapter examines financial sector development in both the source
and host country. Gravity models are often used to explain flows between countries
and have performed well empirically. Prior studies of equity flows (Portes and Rey,
2005a), foreign direct investment (Loungani et al., 2002), foreign portfolio investment
(Hattari and Rajan, 2011), and international mergers and acquisitions(Di Giovanni,
2005; Coeurdacier et al., 2009; Head and Ries, 2008) have used the gravity model. The
gravity model allows for the assessment of both source and host country determinants
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of foreign direct investment levels. The traditional or intuitive gravity model uses the
concept of Newton’s law of gravitational force. Economic flows will vary proportionally
with the mass of economic activity in the source and host country and inversely with
the distance between the source and host country. Application of this concept yields
the following:
Xij =
MiMj
Dij
(2.1)
The basic gravity model relates economic flows Xij, positively to source Mi and
host Mj countries incomes and inversely to the distance between them Dij. However,
Anderson and Wincoop (2003) highlight the standard gravity equation above has the
imperfection of omitting multilateral resistance factors. Resistance factors include cap-
ital controls, information costs, trade or monetary agreements, languages, differences
in business practices, taxes, bilateral or multilateral agreements. The theoretically con-
sistent gravity model accounts for the elasticity of substitution of traded goods(relative
trade costs between trading partners) and all the bilateral trade costs between home
and recipient countries. These bilateral trade costs will vary for each country-pair and
will be different over time. In equilibrium, bilateral trade depends on the relative prices
of importing and exporting countries which in turn are reliant on other trade barriers
or multilateral resistance of other countries,(Anderson and Wincoop, 2003).
The exclusion of multilateral resistance terms (MRTs) creates a bias which necessi-
tates the introduction of fixed effects to encompasses the various unobservable effects
that might affect the relationship between two countries (country-pairs). Thus, in
order to estimate the theoretically consistent gravity equation, it is suggested to use
source-year and host-year fixed effects consider the country (source and host) charac-
teristics. The existence of multilateral resistance means there is need to account for
heteroscedasticity. Apart from bilateral costs affecting trade between countries, trade
costs of each country with all others also matters. The theoretically consistent gravity
model accounts for these multilateral resistance terms. Following from Anderson and
Wincoop (2003) and Head et al. (2010) the theoretically consistent gravity model can
be specified as follows for the value of Xijt, the foreign direct investment originating
from source country i to host country j in year t :
Xijt = GtMitMjtθijt (2.2)
In equation 2.2, Mit and Mjt denote features of source and host countries in a par-
ticular year t, with Gt representing mutual year-specific dynamics determining foreign
direct investment. Disparities in the intensity of bilateral foreign direct investment
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arise through θijt. Therefore, Mit and Mjt are the monadic effects and θijt is the
dyadic (country-pair) effects. This is comprised of factors affecting costs between bi-
lateral partners (Head et al., 2010). Here, θijt in equation 2.2 includes observed Dijt
and unobserved εijt bilateral determinants respectively as follows:
θijt = λDijt + εijt (2.3)
Following Head et al. (2010), the traditional approach is to take the log of equation
2.2 to obtain a linear combination of factors that affect foreign direct investment be-
tween source country i and recipient country j. Taking the log of the simplistic gravity
equation 2.2 yields:
lnXijt = lnGt + lnMit + lnMjt + lnθijt (2.4)
Firms undertaking foreign direct investment activity encounter hefty upfront expen-
ditures and are usually constrained in their ability of dealing with these costs solely
using internal financing with some sectors being more reliant on external finance than
others,(Desbordes and Wei, 2014). Financial institutions have an effect on the ac-
tivities of foreign firms since they support firms with external finance to back their
fixed costs,(Bilir et al., 2014). This suggests some firms will be reliant on external
finance to participate in foreign investment to either purchase new or existing assets
abroad. Thus, the need to carry out investment surpasses internally generated cash
flows which may arise due to lengthy gestation period, scale of project, short harvest
period or necessity for continuing investment, (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Therefore,
higher investment activities abroad will depend on the firm’s ability to acquire external
finance which is related to the level of financial development. The capacity of these
firms to expand into external markets will rely on financial sector development. Ac-
cess to external finance is influenced by financial sector development and therefore a
well-functioning financial system in the source country will result in greater outward
foreign direct investment. Therefore, the first hypothesis of the analysis is as follows:
Hypothesis One: Source country financial sector conditions influence the deci-
sion of multinational corporations to invest abroad. The impact of more financial
development in source countries is expected to lead to greater outward foreign direct
investment.
By allowing greater financial access for local firms, financial development will stimu-
late diversity in the production of intermediate inputs available in the domestic market,
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(Alfaro et al., 2010). This can stimulate outward foreign direct investment if foreign
firms can rely on these domestic inputs in the host country for production. Conversely,
host country financial sector development, through enabling the growth of domestic
market size will promote market seeking foreign direct investment (Desbordes and
Wei, 2014).
Hypothesis two: Well-developed financial sector in the host country results in
greater inward foreign direct investment from abroad.
However, host country financial sector development is anticipated to generate am-
biguous effects for foreign direct investment, (Desbordes and Wei, 2014). Since financial
constraints in the host country would first affect domestic firms rather than external
firms. A well-developed financial sector in the host country will result in better access
to finance for credit constrained local firms enabling their expansion and entry, shrink-
ing the market size and generating greater competition for multinational corporations
adversely affecting its appeal as a destination for horizontal foreign direct investment,
(Bilir et al., 2014).
The specification of a theoretically consistent gravity model requires the inclusion
of MRTs as well as factors that encourage foreign direct investment. The basic gravity
model consists of outward bilateral cross border investment as a function of the size
of the home and host economies and distance. An augmented gravity model inclu-
sive of other economic and financial variables relating to costs of undertaking foreign
direct investment will be used to test these hypotheses. This will allow isolation of
how financial development determines foreign direct investment independent of con-
ventional gravity variables. The specification used follows Di Giovanni (2005) on the
role of financial deepening in the source country as a driver for mergers and acquisi-
tions and extends the work of Desbordes and Wei (2014). Unlike Donaubauer et al.
(2016), this analysis does not use a composite index for financial development. Rather
it considers financial development in debt and equity markets along with institutional
based measure of financial contracting. It considers the dual effect of financial sector
development in source and host countries as a driver for foreign direct investment and
includes additional determinants for foreign direct investment. The specification is as
follows:
FDIijt = β1lnGDPit + β2lnGDPjt + β3lnDistij + β4lnFDit + β5lnFDjt
+ β6lnTradeijt + β7Xijt + µi + µj + µt + εijt (2.5)
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The equation 2.4 is incorporated in the empirical specification in equation 2.5 by
considering how source and host country factors that affect bilateral investment costs
between country i and country j. The equation is a variant of the gravity equation
and is augmented with financial development and other factors to investigate the two
hypotheses.
In equation 2.5, FDIijt is outward bilateral foreign direct investment value in dollars
flowing from source country i to host country j. Following prior literature (Blonigen
and Piger, 2014; Head and Ries, 2008; Head et al., 2010) controls for source and host
country as well as country-pair variables are included. GDPit and GDPjt are GDP
per capita levels of source country i and host country j in time t. GDP represents
income for source and destination countries, the prospective productivity and purchas-
ing power of consumers. Its effects on foreign direct investment are anticipated to
be ambiguous. Source country GDP is anticipated to have a beneficial effect since
source economies with high incomes have greater ability and tend to participate in
more foreign investment activities. Conversely, lower GDP would signify constricted
domestic markets which would induce firms to expand abroad to new markets,(Hattari
and Rajan, 2009). A smaller home market with constrained prospects for profitability
may propel firms to venture into new markets,(Jongwanich et al., 2013). Therefore,
the magnitude and vicinity of potential markets can be seen as crucial elements in the
choice for source countries to undertake foreign direct investment or trade in individual
host countries.
However, some firms will purchase assets or set up in countries which are not well-
developed to take advantage of factor price differentials such as wages; this could gen-
erate a negative relationship between host country GDP and cross border investment
activity,(Stone and Jeon, 2000). Alternatively a positive outcome would imply large
host countries tend to attract more investment since there are more targets for acquisi-
tion available in the case of mergers and acquisitions (Dailami et al., 2012) or potential
demand from customers, (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). Therefore, with market seeking
foreign direct investment the coefficient of the source GDP would be expected to be
positive. However, when foreign direct investment is vertical, firms expand abroad
with the motivation to reduce cost; it is anticipated for host country GDP to have a
negative effect on foreign direct investment.
Investment Costs: Distij refers to the geographical distance between country i
and country j. It captures the various time invariant bilateral characteristics related
to transaction costs, (Portes and Rey, 2005a). The anticipated sign for this variable
is reliant on the motive of foreign direct investment. Distance may act as a deterrent
for undertaking investment abroad due to the cost of monitoring and operating in an
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external market. The associated transactions costs are likely to be greater the more
distant firm operations are.
However, although distance is often used as a proxy for information and transaction
costs it does not adequately account for these costs,(Aggarwal et al., 2012). This in part
relates to the missing trade problem where trade volumes are lower than anticipated
and the home bias puzzle where the holdings of investors in foreign assets is limited
despite the option for diversification. This implies there are other costs which are
improperly encapsulated by the distance variable. This has resulted in the extension
of the gravity model to include other factors pertaining to investment treaties, property
rights, institutions, political risks,(Aggarwal et al., 2012) .
Differentials in culture between countries related to information costs such as lan-
guage, common colonial ties may generate information asymmetries and other addi-
tional contracting costs which may be anticipated to exacerbate the ease of doing
business,(Di Giovanni, 2005). Hence, cultural distance can yield a negative effect on
foreign direct investment with greater disparity in business practices and operating
environments between country-pairs. Divergent from Donaubauer et al. (2016), who
use country-pair and time effects only, bilateral time invariant variables pertaining to
similarities between country-pairs of common language contiguity and colonial ties are
directly included in 2.5. Hence, the analysis also includes dummy variables equal to
one if country-pairs share; a common language, border or historical colonial ties and
equal to zero otherwise, from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Interna-
tionales (CEPII). Sharing a common border may also inform the existence of vertical or
horizontal foreign direct investment. A positive effect may signify the beneficial effects
of proximity as it lowers the investment costs for re-exporting, while a negative effect
would signify that foreign direct investment is horizontal, (Chenaf-Nicet and Rougier,
2016).
Increasing bilateral distance between two countries will capture explicit trade costs
associated with shipping and transportation as well as implicit transaction costs as-
sociated with the inadequate knowledge or inability to acquire superior quality infor-
mation by the investor about the host country (Loungani et al., 2002; Dailami et al.,
2012). Alternatively, distance can exert a detrimental effect for foreign direct invest-
ment between countries and acts as a barrier for the interface between country-pairs.
Information costs are likely to be greater the further apart countries are. For more
distant countries, cultural difference may be greater making the ease of doing business
more difficult. Concurrently, the closer the source country is to the host country, the
richer the information firms tend to possess regarding the financial, legal and political
environments of their prospective market, making it less costlier to undertake invest
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abroad, (Dailami et al., 2012).
Financial Development: FDit and FDjt are financial development in source
country i and host country j in time t. Domestic credit to the private sector to GDP
captures the total credit provided to the private sector by banks and other financial
institutions. The analysis uses measures of financial depth as deep financial systems
offer firms entry into the capital market to obtain external finance to support business
activities.
Since firms encounter varied restrictions in sourcing financing across countries, fi-
nancial constraints encountered by firms are characterised by focusing on the disparities
in financial institutions across countries. Information asymmetry and moral hazard im-
pact the capacity of managers to source funds externally from investors. Moreover, the
protection of investor rights is different in countries which may generate differential
outcomes for the attainability of capital. Thus, most studies use an ancillary measure
of financial constraints and imperfect capital markets, in particular, the level of finan-
cial development. The rationale is to draw inference on how expanding access to credit
at a country level can enhance foreign direct investment. The financial environment
in which firms operate will affect firm operations on two fronts. The financing options
available (debt or equity) and the relative accessibility to external finance. Most liter-
ature tends to use the indirect measures of financial constraints using outcome-based
measures on debt and equity financing. These account for the amount of credit avail-
able in the economy and the capacity of institutions to aid financial contractibility,
(Foley and Manova, 2015).
Trade: Tradeijt represents the bilateral trade costs between source and host coun-
try. This is obtained from ESCAP-World Bank trade cost database. These include
estimated total international trade costs between each country-pair calculated using bi-
lateral trade and GDP. It is anticipated trade costs will affect foreign direct investment
ambiguously; as no consensus exists on whether trade and foreign direct investment
are complements or substitutes as both offer alternate methods of accessing markets
abroad, (Hattari and Rajan, 2009). Pre-existing trade relations between countries
implies lower transaction costs, which serves to facilitate foreign investment activity,
(Dailami et al., 2012). Markusen and Maskus (2002) highlight the motive to engage in
vertical foreign direct investment is to take advantage of factor price differentials. Verti-
cal foreign direct investment considers production costs vary in countries and therefore
foreign firms will chose to locate according to relative gains of countries in a particular
phase of production. The aim is how best to serve the domestic market at home taking
advantage of lower production costs in host countries. The firm therefore faces the
compromise of benefiting from low cost production against trade costs to export goods
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back to source countries or other third countries. The firm will engage in foreign direct
investment if the cost of producing abroad counters the trade costs entailed to export
the goods. Lower trade costs would encourage vertical foreign direct investment or out-
sourcing/off shoring production abroad to various host countries. Horizontal foreign
direct investment refers to where increasing returns and imperfect competition along
with transport costs lead to foreign firms establishing entities abroad in order to move
closer to clients and obtain local market share, (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). As an
alternative to exporting, entering into foreign markets through the establishment of
subsidiaries will entail trading off closeness to the market with cost of production at
home, (Markusen and Maskus, 2002).
Host Country Conditions: Xijt , consists of other variables which influence for-
eign direct investment. These include several host country county conditions including
corporate tax, infrastructure and institutions.
Corporate Taxes: Corporate tax represents the average corporate tax in the host
country. Corporate tax is a significant factor for foreign direct investment as it unam-
biguously impacts the earnings of foreign firms with investments in the host country
and therefore reducing corporate tax rates is important for foreign direct investment to
emerging market economies (Arbatli, 2011). The levels of corporate taxes can affect the
inducements of firms to invest in host countries. Consequently, countries with lesser
corporate tax would be more appealing for investment from form foreign firms,(Di
Giovanni, 2005). Data are obtained from KPMG corporate tax survey and augmented
with data from Ernst and Young Worldwide Corporate tax guide.
Infrastructure: Infrastructure is comprised of the sum of fixed-line telephone and
mobile subscribers per 1,000 from World Development Indicators (WDI). This is used
to account for the level of infrastructure in the host country. Good infrastructure is
essential in drawing foreign direct investment to countries (Asiedu, 2002; Kinda, 2010).
Institutional quality and political environment in the host country is an important de-
terminant of foreign direct investment. Alfaro et al. (2008) provide evidence against the
Lucas Paradox (Lucas, 1990) and illustrate how capital does not go to poor countries
as anticipated in the neoclassical theory owing to paucity in host county institutions.
Wei (2000) concurs, corruption may act as a deterrent for investment.
Institutions: institutional quality takes the indicator of regulatory quality from
the World Bank Governance Indicators. Institutions potentially promote productiv-
ity expectations and offer good governance structures which offset costs relating to
corruption, insecurity of investor rights, government inefficiencies and would encour-
age more foreign direct investment, (Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al., 2007). The huge upfront
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costs entailed in foreign investment necessitate the need for stability and enforceabil-
ity of contracts. This implies government stability and property rights protection are
essential, (Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013).
In the theoretically consistent gravity model in equation 2.2, θijt are country-pair
(dyad) effects comprised of observed and unobserved influences on foreign direct invest-
ment. In the model, two types of observed influences are controlled for, time invariant
and time variant controls. Time invariant controls encompassing distance between
countries, contiguity, common language and common legal origins (colony). Neverthe-
less, the unobserved factors will culminate in the error term creating a bias. To control
for these unobserved influences, a second estimation is carried out using country-pair
fixed effects. This implies all time invariant variables (cultural, geographical, and his-
torical) will be perfectly collinear and excluded. µi are source countries effects, µj
are host countries fixed effects and µt represent the time fixed effects and finally εijt
is the error term. The host and source country fixed effects in the estimations are
included to eliminate the cross section and time series correlation arising from omit-
ted variable bias,(Aleksynska and Havrylchyk, 2013). Therefore, like similar studies
estimating a gravity model for foreign direct investment, time, source and host fixed
effects have been included to account for the multilateral resistance factors, (Anderson
and Wincoop, 2003). On the other hand, time effects are included to account for rising
foreign direct investment over time owing to the rise in financial integration across
countries,(Coeurdacier et al., 2009).
2.3.2 Outward foreign direct investment and financial crises
This section considers the considers the impact of financial crises on multinational
corporations’ activities. Shocks to the supply of credit are anticipated to have a detri-
mental effect on outward bilateral foreign direct investment. To test this hypothesis,
the estimated model is as follows:
FDIijt = β1lnGDPit+β2lnGDPjt+β3lnDistij+β4lnFDit+β5lnFDjt+β6lnTradeijt+β7Xijt
+ β8GFCt + µi + µj + µt + εijt (2.6)
The global financial crisis, GFCt is encapsulated by a dummy variable and takes
the value of 1 for the period between 2008-2010 and 0 otherwise. The global finan-
cial crisis resulted in many countries experiencing banking crisis, with advanced and
emerging economies suffering greater output loses compared to developing countries,
(Laeven and Valencia, 2013). Laeven and Valencia (2013) assert that these output
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losses were largely instigated by banking crises. This makes banking crises very dis-
ruptive, (Kroszner et al., 2007). The analysis further investigates the credit channel
effect of the global financial crisis by focusing on country specific deterioration in credit
conditions similar to (Desbordes and Wei, 2016). The severity of the global financial
crisis was varied across countries, with some countries subsequently experiencing sys-
temic banking crises. This credit channel effect may have a varied effect on outward
foreign direct investment depending on whether source or host countries experienced
systemic banking crises. To test this hypothesis, countries adversely impacted by sys-
temic banking crises are identified using the systemic crisis database of Laeven and
Valencia (2013). They identify a banking crisis based on two factors. First, when
there are considerable indications of financial distress in the banking system. This
entails bank runs, bank losses or bank liquidations. Second, when policy intervention
operations take place in reaction to considerable losses within the banking system.
Therefore, a country specific dummy variable SY S equal to 1 is created for when the
source country had a systemic crisis and 0 otherwise. A similar variable is created for
the host country.
FDIijt = β1lnGDPit+β2lnGDPjt+β3lnDistij+β4lnFDit+β5lnFDjt+β6lnTradeijt+β7Xijt
+ β8SY Sit + β9SY Sjt + µi + µj + µt + εijt (2.7)
Systemic banking crises are anticipated to adversely impact the level of country incomes
and generate demand shocks or through financial constraints by lowering the amount
of credit available, (Gil-Pareja et al., 2013).
2.3.3 Estimation approach and data
According to Razin and Sadka (2007), the fixed costs associated with foreign direct
investment create two margins, the extensive margin of whether to enter a new market
or alternatively the decision to embark on investment or not; the intensive margin
regarding the magnitude of foreign direct investment or how much to invest. The values
registered as zero in the data set will therefore either represent actual zero entries or
the consequence of activity that falls below a threshold above zero. Similarly, missing
observations within the may correctly or incorrectly represent actual zeros, (Anderson,
2011). This results in many zeros and missing values in the actual observed foreign
direct investment flows between country-pairs. Furthermore, not all country-pairs will
have investment relations. Given n sample countries, there are supposed to be n(n-1)
country-pairs but observed bilateral data is usually lower. Therefore, this makes the
selection of actual country-pairs endogenous, (Razin and Sadka, 2007).
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The choice of the appropriate estimation approach will depend on the presumptive
reason for the zero entries. Anderson (2011) advances the occurrence of zero entries
in the data as zeros representing very minimal flows as a consequence of reporting
practices or zeros representing the selection decision for the firm. Anderson (2011)
highlights that zeros may reflect meaningful selection by multinational corporations.
Since firms incur fixed costs to entering new markets and only the most productive
firms in source country i can manage to cover these fixed costs to entering new markets
abroad in country j. When entry into a host country j is too costly, no firms in source
country i can afford to cover the fixed cost. This generates zeros in the country-pair
data.
Several corrective measures have been proposed to account for the incidence of zero
entries in the dependent variables for bilateral country-pair data. Firstly, truncation,
this entails simply discarding from the sample all country-pair observations with zero
entries. This is valid if zero entries represent random missing data or rounding er-
rors, (Head and Mayer, 2014). On this basis, these entries offer no information and
consequently are not useful. It is valid to eliminate these zeros because they are of no
economic significance relative to the non-zeros, (Anderson, 2011). Estimation of the log
linear specification of the gravity model using OLS may produce inconsistent results.
Given the log of zero is undefined and most of the country-pairs tend to have missing
data, using a log linear specification decreases the sample size by omitting the zeros,
hence generating a selection bias,(Head and Mayer, 2014). The sample estimated is not
randomly selected from the population and will comprise exclusively of country-pairs
with positive foreign direct investment stock entries. Therefore, truncation introduces
bias in the least squares’ estimation approach, (Westerlund and Wilhelmsson, 2011).
Furthermore, Silva and Tenreyro (2006) provide evidence that the estimation of the
gravity model in logs produces inconsistent estimates in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity.
Conversely, if these entries were erroneously registered as zeros, the incidence of
large number of zero observations in the data might yield biased estimation results
(Head et al., 2010). Should these entries denote actual zero foreign direct investment
data or errors arising from rounding due to very limited volumes of foreign direct
investment activity, their omission will result in the exclusion of information which
could generate inconsistent results. For instance, these values might reflect unobserved
costs such as exorbitant transportation costs on account of distance between country-
pairs or related to the country remoteness or limited size of the market (Head and
Mayer, 2014). Similarly, Guo and Pan (2015) highlight the omission of the observations
with zero entries disregards the extensive margin and the impact of fixed costs.
37
Alternatively, the addition of one or a small constant to entries of foreign direct
investment prior to taking the log of FDI to prevent the exclusion of zero observations
has been suggested. However, this method is considered ad hoc and might not be a
true depiction of the actual values and is prone to providing results which are incon-
sistent, (Head and Mayer, 2014). Tobit estimators presume the existence of zeros is
due to measurement error, where investment transactions are not recorded. All foreign
direct investment below a certain level are not recorded because of measurement error.
Although a valid explanation for the incidence of zero observations, it may be seen as
incomplete and biased as it does not preclude the fact some country-pairs do indeed
have no bilateral transactions in a given year, (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). This approach
entails left censoring observations at zero or some minimum positive value, these cen-
sored observations are accounted for as zeros. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) corroborate
the inappropriateness of Log-linear and Tobit models as they produce inconsistent
estimates with the existence of heteroscedasticity.
The Heckman Selection model is often used as a solution to the shortcomings of
OLS and Tobit estimators and as an alternate to dealing with the zeros to facilitate
the inclusion of all country-pair information. It accounts for both measurement error
and initial costs as factors giving rise to zeros recorded for country-pairs. It consid-
ers foreign direct investment as a two-step process, the investment decision (selection
equation) and the magnitude of investment(outcome equation). This considers the
selection decision for foreign direct investment and has been used by Helpman et al.
(2008). The outcome equation describes the relationship between foreign direct invest-
ment and selected determinants. While, the selection equation entails an augmented
model that explores the link between positive foreign direct investment, the prior group
of independent variables and a supplementary variable which serves as an instrument.
To meet the exclusion restriction, the additional variable must be related to the like-
lihood of country-pairs engaging in foreign direct investment but not the volume of
foreign direct investment. The drawback of this methodology is the difficulty in the
choice of appropriate instruments for the selection equation that meets the exclusion
restriction,(Anderson, 2011).
The third alternative is to estimate the model in levels using an alternate estimation
technique. Estimating the gravity model using logs leads to inconsistent estimates.
With a lot of zeros in the data the disturbance term has a substantial mass at very
small values which violates the normality assumption, (Anderson, 2011). The Poisson
pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is the
most appropriate and efficient methodological technique to use. It can be used on the
levels of foreign direct investment and provides estimates for the non-linear gravity
model and prevents the discarding of zero foreign direct investment entries. Modelling
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the disturbance term as generated by the Poisson is considered better and will result
in smaller estimates compared to OLS. This approach considers zero observations in
the dependent variable and is scale invariant. With heteroscedasticity, the PPML
achieves consistent estimates than OLS regardless of the distribution of the data where
estimating a log-linearised model with OLS would discard zeros from the model and
create a sample selection bias; (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006).
Considering not all country-pairs have data reported in a given year. The dataset
used in the analysis is comprised of a significant amount of zero observations. While
both Heckman and Poisson approaches have the preferred properties of retaining zeros
in the dependent variable, through simulations Head and Mayer (2014) show that the
Poisson estimator by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) is the best approach for handling zeros.
Therefore, the analysis uses the Poisson approach to estimate the gravity model follow-
ing Coeurdacier et al. (2009) and Donaubauer et al. (2016) to analyse multinational
investment activities in emerging market and developing economies. This is a more
suitable approach because it is robust to different patterns of heteroscedasticity and
allows for the inclusion of a large number of zeros in the dependent variable. It further
addresses potential measurement errors and firm heterogeneity in selecting to engage
in investment activities abroad.
2.3.4 Data and summary statistics
Bilateral foreign direct investment data
This analysis uses a panel dataset on bilateral outward foreign direct investment(greenfield
and mergers and acquisitions) stocks from 43 source countries (advanced and emerging)
to 116 host countries (emerging and developing). The data cover the period of 2001 to
2012, which also includes the period of the global financial crisis. The data is extracted
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) owing to
the greater coverage of bilateral flows for emerging market countries. Source countries
of outward foreign direct investment include investors from the North(industrialised
and emerging)and the global South (emerging and developing countries). The selec-
tion of countries and the time period are solely based on availability of bilateral foreign
direct investment data sourced from UNCTAD. The bilateral data used reflects both
aggregate greenfield and mergers and acquisitions foreign direct investment contrary
to Desbordes and Wei (2017)who use greenfield and mergers and acquisitions bilateral
foreign direct investment data in the manufacturing sector.
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The panel has an unbalanced structure with a large proportion of the sampled
country-pairs consisting of zero foreign direct investment values. From a total of 17,558
observations, 29% of the foreign direct investment stock observations are zero. This
may imply that not all countries were recipients of investments in some years. Table 2.1
presents the summary statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis.
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Min Max Standard Deviation Observations
FDI 1222.03 0.00 138603.00 5053.28 17558
ln(FDI) 4.93 -0.71 11.84 2.59 12533
ln GDP Source 11.08 3.02 14.30 1.76 20387
ln GDP Host 5.98 -0.88 13.65 3.93 20213
ln Distance 8.55 4.71 9.88 0.82 20111
Common Border 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.23 20111
Common Language 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.35 20111
Colonial Links 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.20 20111
CreditSource 94.84 5.38 212.90 48.81 19667
CreditHost 39.72 0.55 150.21 32.23 19905
ln Trade 5.05 2.42 7.26 0.44 18409
ln Tax -1.33 -2.41 -0.60 0.33 18031
Infrastructure 3.85 -2.00 5.47 1.21 19958
Institutions -0.17 -2.34 1.96 0.73 18662
Credit indxSource 4.63 0.00 6.00 1.38 13512
Credit indxHost 2.81 0.00 6.00 2.47 13183
Legal rightsSource 6.13 2.00 10.00 2.13 13512
Legal rightsHost 5.19 0.00 10.00 2.36 13183
Bond marketSource 42.63 0.00 197.13 39.29 17550
Bond marketHost 17.03 0.00 71.30 18.85 6220
Stock marketSource 71.03 1.16 265.13 46.28 20186
Stock marketHost 47.00 0.01 996.94 58.64 15080
Zero foreign direct investment entries may be on account of errors in rounding
diminutive volumes of foreign direct investment, missing entries erroneously registered
as zeros or the outcome of firm decision not to engage in any outward foreign direct
investment activity. Given the likelihood missing values are either not reported foreign
direct investment (non-zeros) and taking unreported foreign direct investment as zero
might lead to biases, (Head et al., 2010). The analysis therefore handles missing values
as missing. Furthermore, negative bilateral foreign direct investment entries signify
no foreign investments occurred between a given source and host country-pair, ren-
dering it practical to handle negative values as zero. Observations with either zero or
negative bilateral foreign direct investment values are considered as zero. Therefore,
the dependent variable is either zero or positive, with negative observations of foreign
direct investment assigned a value of zero similar to Donaubauer et al. (2016).
The measure of aggregate multinational corporation activity is foreign direct in-
vestment stock rather than foreign direct investment flows. Foreign direct investment
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stock is used as the dependent variable because it represents the total value of assets of
the foreign investor. It is reflective of the assets involved in international production,
(Stephan and Pfaffmann, 2001). Daude and Stein (2007) use stocks to represent the
activity of multinational corporations and advance capital stock as a better measure of
multinational corporation’s investment activity than investment flows. On the other
hand, foreign direct investment flows account for the amount invested in affiliates by
foreign firms, therefore foreign direct investment stock is better suited to accurately
measure the long run effects. Compared to foreign direct investment flows, foreign di-
rect investment stock adequately captures the activities of multinational corporations,
(Wacker, 2016).
Credit constraints play an important role in the type of investments firms can pur-
sue, with some ventures or sectors being more reliant on finance than others. Prior
literature has used the difference in difference approach to identify sectoral level re-
liance on external financing and the heterogeneous development of capital markets
across countries. Manova (2013), uncovers the relationship between trade and finance
and is similarly, adopted in the context of the causal effects of financial development
and foreign direct investment by (Desbordes and Wei, 2017). These studies exploit
sectoral data on external dependence and asset tangibility and variations in country
level financial development. This is an improvement from simply looking at the level
effect of financial development which may be subject to bias, where the influence of
reverse causality could be greater,(Foley and Manova, 2015).
In the empirical analysis credit provided to the private sector by banks and other
financial institutions to GDP is used as a proxy for firm external financing. The analy-
sis will examine the impact of tightening credit conditions following the global financial
crisis and country specific systemic banking crisis similar to Desbordes and Wei (2016).
This will be done by incorporating the credit conditions in both origin and destination
countries similar to Donaubauer et al. (2016) and Desbordes and Wei (2017). However,
the latter uses firm level sector specific greenfield foreign direct investment data over
a shorter period.4 This analysis uses outward aggregate foreign direct investment data
obtained from the UNCTAD database which is publicly available as an alternative.
This is similar data used by Donaubauer et al. (2016) and covers a wider time frame
and includes mergers and acquisitions, and not only initial investments. Donaubauer
et al. (2016) use a parsimonious gravity model estimated with solely country-pair fixed
effects to account for all bilateral time invariant attributes between partner countries.
This analysis uses an augmented gravity model explicitly including time invariant vari-
4Desbordes and Wei (2017) use foreign direct investment data based on firm level greenfield in-
vestment for obtained from the Financial Times Limited Cross Border Investment Monitor database.
Available at: https://www.fdimarkets.com/
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ables along with both vertical and horizontal determinants of foreign direct investment.
Therefore, this analysis takes a country level perspective rather than firm level due to
the nature of the data available.
Financial development
Financial sector development variables are from the World Bank Global Financial
database. The main conventional measures of debt and equity financing of the firm
in the literature are based on financial depth or the extent of financial deepening of
debt and equity markets. Given firms differential access to financing, the analysis uses
the firm fund-raising practices as encapsulated by two types of contracts, debt and
equity financing. The debt market is considered using a proxy for access to loans as
well as corporate bond financing. The availability of equity capital is captured by
measures of the stock market. The depth of debt and equity markets are time varying
and data is collected for a large sample of countries, (Beck et al., 2009; Cihak et al.,
2012). The caveat is they consider both the supply of external and the demand by
firms for external capital, Foley and Manova (2015). The inclusion of both debt and
equity financing contracts permits the consideration of the impact of these alternative
financing arrangements on outward bilateral foreign direct investment. The provision
of credit by banks has often been viewed as vital for channelling resources to borrowers,
nonetheless financial development in equity and debt markets have also become impor-
tant alternative sources of funds particularly for foreign investment such as mergers
and acquisitions, (Jongwanich et al., 2013). Similarly, time invariant measures account
for the institutional aspects governing the effectiveness or enforceability of financial
contracts and may create heterogeneity in the extent of financial development across
countries. These institutional based proxies of financial development will ultimately
affect the relative ease with which firms can obtain external financing. Substitute
measures of external finance include time invariant factors such as accounting stan-
dards, risk of repudiation, creditor rights and risk of expropriation in a given economy,
(Manova, 2013). The analysis uses the strength of legal rights index and credit infor-
mation index as alternate time invariant measures of external finance contracts from
the World Bank Doing Business database.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Effects of financial development on bilateral foreign di-
rect investment
This section presents the estimates of the impact of financial conditions on the volume
of foreign direct investment. Following Gil-Pareja et al. (2013), estimations are carried
out using the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), Poisson Maximum Likeli-
hood country-pair (PPML-CP) panel estimations and OLS. Table 2.2 shows results for
two alternate specifications using the log linearised model estimated by OLS and Pois-
son regressions on the volume of aggregate bilateral foreign direct investment. Columns
(1) and (2) in table 2.2 report the results when the gravity model specifications exclude
all country-pairs with foreign direct investment stock values of zero and treats all zeros
in the data as actual zero entries recorded. The results for the conventional gravity
model determinants, economic size, distance and the time invariant bilateral variables
under the OLS regression are broadly in line with literature and have the expected
signs. However, these estimations suffer from self-selection bias as the log linearised
specification discards observations with zero values in the dependent variable.
Although OLS estimations have limitations, these are presented in table 2.2 in
columns (1) to (2). The OLS estimates serve as a benchmark and are qualitatively
similar with the estimates using the Poisson estimator. This highlights the robustness
of the results to estimation methodology.5
Given the limitations of the prior OLS estimations, the analysis focuses on the
results of the preferred Poisson estimates presented in columns (3) to (6) of table
2.2. The gravity equation performs well explaining around 83% of the variation in
in bilateral investment flows. These specifications presume that zero values in the
foreign direct investment data are random and arise due to high initial fixed costs or
measurement errors. Following, Silva and Tenreyro (2006), the dependent variable is
outward foreign direct investment stock in levels on a bilateral basis instead of logs and
therefore incorporates the zero values in the data. The interpretation of coefficients
in Poisson regression is similar to OLS. Albeit, while the dependent variable in the
Poisson model is expressed in levels, the coefficients of regressors in logarithms can be
interpreted as elasticities while regressors in levels are interpreted as semi-elasticities,
(Shepard, 2012). In columns (3) and (5) of table 2.2, country fixed effects for both
source and host and year fixed effects are included with errors clustered at country-
5The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation will be used for future publication. This is analogous
to a log transformation but preserves the zeros.
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pair level. This is done to remove the bias of misspecification that arises due to the
exclusion of multilateral resistance terms as stipulated by (Anderson and Wincoop,
2003). This is done to remove unobserved heterogeneity that may arise from excluding
variables at the country-pair level that may impact bilateral foreign direct investment.
In columns (4) and (6) country-pair and year fixed effects are included. This excludes
all time invariant bilateral variables.
Focusing on the baseline results in column (3), source country financial development
is significantly positive with a coefficient of 0.29. While host country financial devel-
opment is also significant with a coefficient of 0.19. These estimated coefficients imply
that a 1% increase in the private credit to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.29% and
0.19% increases bilateral foreign direct investment for source countries and host coun-
try respectively. Better financial development in source and host countries is predicted
to result in greater volume of bilateral foreign direct investment stocks. Financial
deepening, an increase in credit to GDP, is associated with an increase in bilateral
foreign direct investment. This suggests financial market development is an impor-
tant driver of foreign direct investment with source country credit market conditions
emerging with a larger impact. Aggregate outward foreign direct investment on a bi-
lateral basis is expected to increase with greater source country financial development,
if multinational corporations are able to access capital in a well-developed financial
system. Inadequately developed financial markets at home may hinder the expansion
of multinational corporations seeking funds to cover the fixed initial costs associated
with foreign direct investment. Alternatively, lower financial development may result
in a greater reliance on internal capital markets by multinational corporations seeking
to support their foreign subsidiaries. Host financial development may also hinder or
promote foreign direct investment between country-pairs.
In column (3), the estimates for market size and distance yield similar results to the
intuitive gravity model with the exception of host country GDP. The size of the source
country market is positive and significant, an increase in home GDP of percent will
increase foreign direct investment by 0.17% percent. A big market within the source
country may signify larger income and greater capacity to undertake investment abroad.
Thus, it is anticipated outward foreign direct investment will respond positively to a
large market size in the source country. Contrary to the predictions for horizontal
foreign direct investment where investment is driven by market seeking motives; the
host county market size effect is not a significant determinant of bilateral foreign direct
investment. This could reflect the smaller market sizes for small countries included in
the sample.
Coefficients for distance suggest it to be a resistance factor to foreign direct invest-
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Table 2.2: Private Credit and Bilateral Foreign Direct Investment
ln(FDI) ln(FDI) FDI FDI FDI FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Source 0.129 0.327** 0.288* 0.335** 0.325** 0.374**
(0.435) (0.019) (0.063) (0.028) (0.043) (0.018)
CreditHost 0.206** 0.310*** 0.194** 0.221*** 0.188** 0.211***
(0.042) (0.000) (0.011) (0.004) (0.014) (0.005)
ln GDP Source 0.100** 0.190*** 0.176*** 0.158*** 0.170*** 0.152***
(0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln GDP Host 0.002 0.028* 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.007
(0.933) (0.070) (0.744) (0.635) (0.764) (0.638)
ln Distance -0.811*** -0.362*** -0.362***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Common Border 0.303 -0.338** -0.337**
(0.152) (0.045) (0.045)
Common Language 0.582*** 0.822*** 0.822***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonial Links 0.666*** 0.245 0.244
(0.001) (0.180) (0.181)
ln Trade -1.761*** -0.451*** -1.544*** -0.400*** -1.542*** -0.393***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln Tax -0.408*** -0.117 -0.723*** -0.458*** -0.712*** -0.440***
(0.005) (0.271) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Infrastructure 0.011 0.073 0.308*** 0.268*** 0.316*** 0.275***
(0.878) (0.217) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutions 0.080 0.043 0.141 0.195 0.129 0.182
(0.636) (0.804) (0.277) (0.137) (0.316) (0.164)
GFC -0.238*** -0.336*** -0.071** -0.083***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.003)
CreditSource × GFC -0.123*** -0.123***
(0.002) (0.001)
CreditHost × GFC 0.028 0.032
(0.313) (0.218)
Constant 14.656*** 2.478** 7.459*** 6.668***
(0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000)
N 9,479 9,479 12,645 12,296 12,645 12,296
R2 0.69 0.39 0.83 0.83
Estimator OLS OLS PPML PPML-CPFE PPML PPML-CPFE
Source FE Yes Yes Yes
Host FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes
Statistical significance denoted at 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Observations clustered within country-pairs
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ment. The proximity between source and host country exerts a negative influence on
outward foreign direct investment as it accounts for information and transaction costs.
The more distant countries are the more costly it is to monitor investments abroad, (Di
Giovanni, 2005). Greater distance will result in a 3.6 % reduction in outward foreign
direct investment.
Focusing on the bilateral time invariant variables, countries sharing a common lan-
guage are likely to have lower transaction costs, such as business search costs and
lower risk perceptions of firms within the host country,(Jongwanich et al., 2013). A
shared common language encourages foreign direct investment between country-pairs
and may reflect its enabling role in easing the cost of doing business. In contrast, shar-
ing a common border is associated with a 28.7% percent decline in outward foreign
direct investment.6 The negative coefficient obtained for contiguity may also suggests
the nature of bilateral foreign direct investment in the sample could be horizontal and
that the gains of lower transportation costs from proximity do not enhance cross bor-
der activity, (Chenaf-Nicet and Rougier, 2016). However, the insignificant coefficient
obtained for host country GDP, the main driver of horizontal foreign direct investment
does not confirm this. This may reflect opposing patterns of horizontal and vertical
foreign direct investment in the countries in the sample. 7 Whereas the impact of
colonial links on the volume of bilateral foreign direct investment is insignificant.
The association of trade costs with foreign direct investment is negative at the 1%
level indicative of a substitutive relationship. Trade costs lower bilateral foreign direct
investment. foreign direct investment can substitute trade when there are impediments
such as transportation costs and trade barriers, (Di Giovanni, 2005). This entails a
comparison between the associated costs of setting up a physical plant with trade costs
which would be incurred if the firm were to export. Given a small potential host
country, the fixed costs to the firm of establishing a physical plant abroad may not
adequately counterbalance the savings on trade costs from not exporting. Conversely,
greater host country market size and lower fixed costs are would be more conducive for
horizontal foreign direct investment. The firm motive is driven by how best to serve
the market abroad (host) through either physical presence or exports. If source firm
seeks to assemble and export its goods from the host country to other countries, then
lesser trade costs would encourage foreign direct investment. This would be conducive
for investment driven by vertical foreign direct investment motives seeking to lower
6Note that coefficients are not solely elasticities. The impact is calculated in the form exp(-0.338)-1
7Following the theoretical knowledge-capital model of Kleinert and Toubal (2010) and additional
determinants of vertical foreign direct investment using the difference in GDP per capita between
source and host countries (skills difference) and the sum of host and source GDP (market size) to proxy
the size of demand from the two countries, Chenaf-Nicet and Rougier (2016) find similar contradictory
effects for types of foreign direct investment
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costs. Alternatively, if the destination offers a sizeable and profitable market for source
country firm products, then it would engage in foreign direct investment and establish
physical presence rather than export in order to circumvent trade costs,(Frenkel et al.,
2004). This would encourage market seeking, horizontal foreign direct investment into
host countries.
Average host country corporate tax has a negative and significant effect on bilat-
eral foreign direct investment. Higher corporate taxes result in 7.23% reduction in
foreign direct investment. Host countries with higher taxes will inhibit foreign invest-
ment as they affect the inducements of companies to undertake economic activities.
Additionally, foreign firms are inclined to enter markets where the tax rates are lower,
(Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Therefore, host countries with lesser taxes will encourage
more inward investment, (Di Giovanni, 2005). The availability of infrastructure in the
host country is positive and statistically significant. Good infrastructure is essential in
drawing foreign direct investment to countries, (Asiedu, 2002; Kinda, 2010). The reg-
ulatory quality in the host country obtains a positive coefficient that is not significant
in the Poisson regressions in column (3).
To account for the effects of the global financial crisis on outward bilateral foreign
direct investment, a dummy variable is introduced . The coefficient is negative and
highly significant. This is in line with the outcomes of prior studies analysing the effects
of the global financial crisis on foreign direct investment, (Desbordes and Wei, 2016).
Outward bilateral foreign direct investment decreased due to the tightening of credit
conditions and economic slowdown during the global financial crisis period, particularly
outward foreign direct investment from developed countries, (Sauvant et al., 2010).
Column (4) uses the Poisson maximum likelihood country-pair fixed effects esti-
mation. This implies that all dyadic time invariant variables are dropped from the
estimation (distance, contiguity, language and colonial links). In terms of the main
variable of interest, the effect of external financing conditions in both source and host
countries is still positive and greater in magnitude than the previous result in column
(3). When controlling for country-pair and time fixed effects, an increase in financial
deepening is associated with a 0.34% and 0.2% increases bilateral foreign direct in-
vestment for source countries and host country respectively. The coefficients for other
determinants maintain the expected signs and are statistically significant. While, bi-
lateral trade costs and host country average corporate tax are deterrents of foreign
direct investment. There are positive and significant effects related to infrastructure
and source country income coefficients.
In column (5) and (6) the dummy variable for credit conditions in the crisis period
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2008-2010 is interacted with source country and host country financial development.
For source countries the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and statistically
significant in both specifications. This implies that the global financial crisis reduces
the effect of source financial development on foreign direct investment by 11.57%, on
average.8 This suggests that during the financial crisis, bilateral foreign direct invest-
ment benefited to a less extent from private credit in the source country. The coefficient
for the host countries reflects the global financial crisis effects on host financial devel-
opment had insignificant effects on foreign direct investment. Therefore, the results in
table 2.2 support the hypotheses of a positive effect on the volume of foreign direct
investment arising from source and host country financial development. The positive
effect of source country financial development is larger than the coefficient on host fi-
nancial development. Overall, the results in table 2.2 substantiate the hypotheses that
both source and host financial development have a positive influence on foreign direct
investment.
2.4.2 Systemic banking crisis effects
Table 2.3 shows the results wen country-specific credit tightening is introduced. Of
the countries included in the sample, 20 source countries and 13 host countries are
identified as having experienced a systemic banking crisis using the database from
Laeven and Valencia (2013). A banking crisis is identified based on two aspects; when
there are considerable indications of financial distress in the banking system and when
policy intervention initiatives occur in reaction to considerable losses within the banking
system. This is done to isolate countries that were greatly affected by the economic
crisis and consequently experienced a banking crisis during the period 2008-2010. The
country-specific systemic banking crisis data are used to examine the credit channel of
the global financial crisis, similar to Desbordes and Wei (2016). The countries included
that were affected by a systemic banking crisis is listed in table 2.8 in the appendix.
Column (1) includes the effects of local credit constraints in source and host coun-
tries, as identified from the systemic banking crisis database. For source countries, the
responsiveness of outward foreign direct investment to a systemic banking crisis in the
home country is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests when source
countries experience a banking crisis, aggregate bilateral foreign direct investment is
reduced by 19.1%.9 This differs from the result obtained by Gil-Pareja et al. (2013)
who examined the effects of systemic banking crises on the margins of foreign direct
investment. Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) find that while a systemic banking crisis in the
8The impact is calculated in the form exp(-0.123)-1
9The impact is calculated in the form exp(-0.212)-1
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source country will lower the number of new investment projects, they are unable to
find similar adverse effects of a systemic banking crisis on aggregate bilateral foreign
direct investment. The result in this analysis is consistent with Desbordes and Wei
(2016) who find negative effects of source country systemic banking crises on greenfield
foreign direct investment or initial investments in the manufacturing sector. On the
other hand, the tightening of local credit conditions in host countries following a sys-
temic banking crisis yields a positive and insignificant effect on bilateral foreign direct
investment. This finding is similar to Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) who find no evidence for
the effects of host country systemic crisis on total bilateral foreign direct investment.
As shown in column 1, private credit is positive for both source and host countries at
1% and 5% respectively. This result is consistent with Donaubauer et al. (2016) who
find a beneficial effect for aggregate bilateral foreign direct investment in both source
and host countries.
Column (2) shows results for the country-pair estimations. This yields a similar
negative and significant effect for source country financial constraints and divergent
results from those obtained in column (1) for the host local country credit constraints.
The effect of host country financial constraints on foreign direct investment is positive
and significant at the 10% level. This suggests when host countries are experienc-
ing a banking crisis, aggregate bilateral foreign direct investment increases by 13.9%
on average. This could reflect the fire sale FDI hypothesis put forward by Krugman
(2000), this notion suggests periods of crises are associated with an influx of inward
foreign direct investment. Aguiar and Gopinath (2005) provide evidence that liquid-
ity constrained firms in countries undergoing crisis tended to draw more mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) foreign direct investment inflows from foreign investors during
the 1997-1998 Asian crisis. Adverse local credit conditions in the host countries were
accompanied by a considerable rise in acquisitions by foreign firms at cheap prices.
Considering that other domestic firms will also be financially constrained, the buyers
of these cheap assets are likely to be foreign. Furthermore, this effect might also re-
flect support for the cheap assets’ hypothesis advanced by Baker et al. (2009), which
considers multinational corporations as arbitrageurs seeking to take advantage of the
differences in valuation in order to take control of cheap assets in host countries. Sim-
ilarly, there may be a wealth effect which may result in more foreign direct investment
inflows as it is cheaper for external investors to purchase assets in the host country
following a currency depreciation. For example, Sauvant et al. (2010) highlight that
not all multinational corporations may have been credit constrained during the crisis;
in particular state-owned enterprises from emerging economies that were engaged in
foreign direct investment. They suggest multinational corporations from economies
with high foreign reserves such as China were in better condition to venture into new
49
markets to take advantage of low asset prices through mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
in crisis-affected host countries.
With a well-developed financial system, firms are likely to benefit from greater ac-
cess to external finance. The financial sector will intermediate and allocate resources
more efficiently compared to an underdeveloped capital market. However, financial dis-
tress arising from a systemic banking crisis will alter the supply of credit and tighten
external credit conditions. This will have implications for the amount of domestic
credit available to firms, which in turn will affect multinational corporations; capacity
to undertake outward foreign direct investment. To test this effect, interaction terms
between the availability of domestic credit and country-specific systemic banking crisis
are presented in column 3. This interaction seeks capture the relationship between
the supply of external capital to firms with local credit constraints following a sys-
temic banking crisis. Results suggest credit constraints at home reduce the effect of
source country financial development on aggregate outward foreign direct investment
by 31.4% on average.10 With the deterioration of source country local credit condi-
tions, multinational corporations will engage in less outward foreign direct investment
due to lower availability of domestic credit. During the financial crisis, the potential of
multinational corporations to finance the fixed costs associated with pursuing foreign
direct investment abroad was restricted due to financial constraints,(Sauvant et al.,
2010). This result may reflect the fact that credit constraints were intensified in source
countries that experienced systemic banking crises. Therefore, a systemic banking cri-
sis mitigates the beneficial effects of source country financial development on outward
foreign direct investment. On the other hand, there is no evidence of non-linearity
between systemic crisis in the host country and domestic financial development. The
interaction of financial constraints in the host countries yields negative and insignifi-
cant effects. In column 4, country-pair fixed effects are controlled for, there is evidence
of non-linearity between systemic crisis and financial crisis for both source and host
countries. Credit constraints in the source country lower the effect of source country
financial development on aggregate outward foreign direct investment by 36.9% on av-
erage. Similarly, the effects of host country credit constraints reduce the effects of host
country financial development on foreign direct investment by 21.0% on average.
High income countries are likely to be exporters of capital, the estimated coefficient
for source country GDP is significant in all specifications. Contrary to the predictions
for market-seeking horizontal foreign direct investment, host country market size is not
significant. This is similar to results in table 2.2. This may imply that for countries
in the sample, foreign direct investment may not by driven by horizontal FDI motives.
The estimated parameters for bilateral trade and host country conditions (tax, infras-
10The impact is calculated in the form exp(-0.377)-1
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Table 2.3: Systemic Banking Crisis
FDI FDI FDI FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CreditSource 0.367** 0.365** 0.485*** 0.518***
(0.021) (0.018) (0.002) (0.000)
CreditHost 0.234*** 0.284*** 0.215*** 0.252***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.010) (0.001)
Syssource -0.212*** -0.232*** 1.653*** 2.041***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Syshost 0.123 0.131* 0.333 0.919**
(0.106) (0.091) (0.475) (0.031)
ln GDP Source 0.117*** 0.096*** 0.110*** 0.088***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002)
ln GDP Host 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.005
(0.910) (0.824) (0.915) (0.747)
ln Distance -0.351*** -0.355***
(0.000) (0.000)
Common Border -0.380** -0.372**
(0.023) (0.026)
Common Language 0.842*** 0.842***
(0.000) (0.000)
Colonial Links 0.226 0.226
(0.204) (0.205)
ln Trade -1.620*** -0.342*** -1.601*** -0.219*
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.083)
ln Tax -0.649*** -0.374*** -0.620*** -0.333**
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.011)
Infrastructure 0.303*** 0.241*** 0.307*** 0.247***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutions 0.163 0.265* 0.117 0.218*
(0.230) (0.053) (0.365) (0.092)
CreditSource × Syssource -0.377*** -0.460***
(0.000) (0.000)
CreditHost × Syshost -0.066 -0.236*
(0.635) (0.069)
N 11,569 11,152 11,569 11,152
R2 0.84 0.84
Estimator PPML PPML-CPFE PPML PPML-CPFE
Source FE Yes Yes
Host FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes
Statistical significance denoted at 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Observations clustered within country-pairs
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tructure and institutions) have the expected signs and remain consistent to changes
in the model specifications. Trade costs and higher taxes will hinder foreign direct
investment while good institutions will encourage foreign direct investment inflows. In
addition, distance and contiguity adversely affect outward foreign direct investment
sharing a common language is beneficial for cross border activity.
2.4.3 Robustness
Alternative measures of financial development and bilateral for-
eign direct investment
Table 2.4 illustrates the effects financial conditions on foreign direct investment using
alternate measures of financing development. Column (1) provides the results from
the baseline Poisson regression from table 2.2 using credit to the private sector. Stock
market capitalisation to GDP, accounts for the size of the stock market. This is the
average value of listed shares to GDP. In column (2), financial development measured
by the equity financing variable has a positive and significant coefficient. This result
is similar to the previous findings for debt financing as measured by private credit
from Table 2.2 presented in column (1). Developed equity markets could boost the
practicality of using this market to fund investment. Alternatively, the greater the rise
in stock prices could signal potential of yielding greater rates of return on investment
and elevate the credence of equity markets as avenues of raising capital resulting in
more foreign direct investment, particularly for mergers and acquisitions (Jongwanich
et al., 2013). Furthermore, an efficient equity market is imperative for foreign direct
investment flows in the form of mergers and acquisitions as these funds provide an
additional connection between local and external investors aside from employment
creation and skills transfer (Alfaro et al., 2004).
In column (3) the sample size is restricted to private bond market capitalisation as
an alternate measure of financial conditions. It is anticipated that firms will have access
to the corporate bond market as alternative debt financing aside from access to bank
loans to support investment. Bond market development is proxied by total volume of
outstanding corporate bonds to GDP. As not all countries in the sample have active
bond markets, the sample size is reduced from 12,645 observations in column (1) to
4,065 observations. The source and host coefficients are significant at 5% and 1% level
respectively. These estimated coefficients imply that a 1% increase in private bond
market capitalisation to GDP ratio is associated with a 0.15% and 0.19% increase in
bilateral foreign direct investment for source countries and host country respectively.
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Additionally, the credit infrastructure in countries is accounted for using two institu-
tional based measures of financial conditions. These time invariant measures account
for the institutional aspects governing the effectiveness or enforceability of financial
contracts. These factors may create heterogeneity in the extent of financial develop-
ment across countries. This will ultimately affect the relative ease with which firms
can obtain external financing. The strength of legal rights index and depth of credit
information index, both obtained from the World Bank Doing Business database are
used in columns (4) and (5). The strength of legal rights index indicates ”the degree
to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders”
and therefore facilitates lending. It ranges from 0 to 10 for worst to best. The depth of
credit information index captures ”the rules and practices affecting the coverage, scope
and accessibility of credit information available through either a public credit registry
or a private credit bureau”. It ranges from 0 to 6. Legal rights index confirms prior
findings of the three outcome-based measures of financial development in column (1) to
(3) of positive and statistically significant effects, although smaller. In column (5) the
credit information index provides contrasting results. The source credit conditions now
have a negative and significant impact on outward bilateral foreign direct investment.
The dummy for the global financial crisis is included in all regressions and pro-
vides varied outcomes. It is found with the expected negative effect and is significantly
different from zero with the exception of the stock market capitalisation measures of fi-
nancial conditions. Other independent variables capturing host country characteristics
and trade costs are similar to the findings for private credit model in table 2.2.
The effect of financial development is likely to be correlated with other factors
which impact bilateral foreign direct investment. This has been countered by consid-
ering and an exogenous change in credit or the profitability of investment. Institutions
influence financial development by altering the intensity of financial market frictions.
Financial frictions exist between borrowers and lenders due to the transaction and in-
formation costs associated with extending credit. These frictions affect the volume of
external capital available or financial constraints encountered by the firm, (Ferna´ndez
and Tamayo, 2017). Drawing from literature in Law and Finance highlights the im-
portance of legal systems for corporate financing outcomes,(La Porta et al., 2008);
financial markets develop much faster in countries with strong legal frameworks con-
ducive for contract enforcement and protection of investors, (Ferna´ndez and Tamayo,
2017). Table 2.5 shows similar effects when country-pair fixed effects are considered.
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Table 2.4: Alternative measures of financial development and bilateral foreign direct
investment
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CreditSource 0.288*
(0.063)
CreditHost 0.194**
(0.011)
Stock marketSource 0.265***
(0.005)
Stock marketHost 0.114*
(0.064)
Bond marketSource 0.150**
(0.014)
Bond marketHost 0.195***
(0.000)
Legal rightsSource 0.078***
(0.006)
Legal rightsHost 0.083***
(0.002)
Credit indexSource -0.123***
(0.000)
Credit indexHost 0.030**
(0.013)
ln GDP Source 0.176*** 0.134*** 0.150*** 0.792*** 0.957***
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln GDP Host 0.005 0.010 0.059** 0.021 0.028
(0.744) (0.567) (0.036) (0.266) (0.139)
ln Distance -0.362*** -0.375*** -0.349*** -0.358*** -0.354***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Common Border -0.338** -0.394** -0.479** -0.327* -0.331*
(0.045) (0.018) (0.015) (0.056) (0.054)
Common Language 0.822*** 0.756*** 0.885*** 0.776*** 0.776***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonial Links 0.245 0.286 0.090 0.279 0.277
(0.180) (0.126) (0.636) (0.136) (0.138)
ln Trade -1.544*** -1.520*** -1.717*** -1.575*** -1.589***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln Tax -0.723*** -0.643*** -1.023*** -0.449** -0.419**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.024)
Infrastructure 0.308*** 0.348*** 0.414*** 0.346*** 0.351***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutions 0.141 0.112 -0.030 0.144 0.143
(0.277) (0.383) (0.860) (0.324) (0.338)
GFC -0.071** 0.486*** -0.299*** -0.198*** -0.193***
(0.027) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 7.459*** 6.914*** 14.513*** 4.172*** 4.764***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.007)
N 12,645 10,810 4,065 9,861 9,861
R2 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.84 0.84
Estimator PPML PPML PPML PPML PPML
Source FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistical significance denoted at 1%(***) , 5% (**) and 10% (*). Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Observations clustered within country-pairs
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Table 2.5: Alternative measures of financial development
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CreditSource 0.335**
(0.028)
CreditHost 0.221***
(0.004)
Stock marketSource 0.205**
(0.032)
Stock marketHost 0.124**
(0.042)
Bond marketSource 0.272***
(0.000)
Bond marketHost 0.270***
(0.000)
Legal rightsSource 0.082***
(0.001)
Legal rightsHost 0.104***
(0.000)
Credit indxSource -0.096***
(0.000)
Credit indxHost 0.033***
(0.004)
ln GDP Source 0.158*** 0.125*** 0.138*** 0.734*** 0.880***
(0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
ln GDP Host 0.008 0.006 0.038 0.018 0.028*
(0.635) (0.721) (0.145) (0.304) (0.087)
ln Trade -0.400*** -0.413*** -0.112 -0.456*** -0.532***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.563) (0.000) (0.000)
ln Tax -0.458*** -0.348** -0.931*** -0.098 -0.071
(0.001) (0.020) (0.000) (0.575) (0.684)
Infrastructure 0.268*** 0.298*** 0.268*** 0.243*** 0.255***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Institutions 0.195 0.168 0.120 0.134 0.122
(0.137) (0.182) (0.421) (0.331) (0.395)
GFC -0.083*** -0.150*** -0.340*** -0.027 -0.024
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.318) (0.358)
N 12,296 10,582 4,022 9,507 9507
Estimator PPML-CPFE PPML-CPFE PPML-CPFE PPML-CPFE PPML-CPFE
Source FE
Host FE
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Statistical significance denoted at 1%(***) ,5% (**) and 10% (*). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Observations clustered within country-pairs
55
Instrumental Variable Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
Financial development may be conditioned by institutions that vary the potency of
financial market frictions. The extent of information and transaction costs lenders and
borrowers encounter in the credit market may manifest through aspects such as the
degree of contract enforcement or protection of property rights. Consequently, varia-
tions in credit market frictions could have an impact on the relative access to external
capital by firms. Therefore, the institutional context may create disparities in the
degree of financial development across countries. To determine causality, prior empiri-
cal analysis has instrumented financial development measured by credit to the private
sector with dummy variables for the legal origins on laws and regulations. Therefore,
the Instrumental Variable Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (IV-PPML) approach
is implemented using legal origin dummy variables as instruments for private credit
(financial development). This is a similar approach to Manova (2013) and Desbordes
and Wei (2014). The instruments used are the dummy variables on if a country’s com-
mercial laws are predicated on British, French, German legal origins. Data on legal
origins for source and host countries is obtained from La Porta et al. (2008).
Table 2.6 reports results from a regression conducted. In column (1) reports the
initial results obtained in the baseline 2.2 while column (2) reports the results from
the instrumental variable estimation. The estimation results are not robust to the
instrumental variables approach conducted. When source and host country private
credit is instrumented with legal origins, the initial result for the effects of financial
development on bilateral foreign direct investment for the host country changes from a
positive to negative significant effect. This may be in line with theoretical expectation,
that the effect of host country financial development on foreign direct investment is
ambiguous and may generate both positive and negative outcomes for foreign direct
investment,(Desbordes and Wei, 2014). Previous studies use legal origins as an instru-
ment for financial development such as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Kroszner et al.
(2007), however its validity has been questioned by Manova (2013). This is confirmed
by the test of over identifying restrictions reported in table 2.6, which rejects the hy-
pothesis of instruments being uncorrelated with the error term. This test result is
similar to Desbordes and Wei (2014) who finding robust results for the causal effects of
source and host financial conditions for foreign direct investment were unable to con-
firm the validity of legal origins as instruments. This analysis finds similar outcomes
from the Hansen test of over identifying restrictions as reported in table 2.6. Therefore,
the results are not robust to legal origins, an instrumental variable for private credit,
widely used in the literature.
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Table 2.6: Instrumental variable regression
(1) (2)
FDI FDI
CreditSource 0.288* 0.518***
(0.063) (0.000)
CreditHost 0.194** -0.694***
(0.011) (0.000)
ln GDP Source 0.176*** 0.487***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln GDP Host 0.005 0.315***
(0.744) (0.000)
ln Distance -0.362*** -0.067*
(0.000) (0.072)
Common Border -0.338** -0.446***
(0.045) (0.000)
Common Language 0.822*** 1.059***
(0.000) (0.000)
Colonial Links 0.245 0.143*
(0.180) (0.088)
ln Trade -1.544*** -1.615***
(0.000) (0.000)
ln Tax -0.723*** 0.074
(0.000) (0.379)
Infrastructure 0.308*** 0.353***
(0.000) (0.000)
Institutions 0.141 0.651***
(0.277) (0.000)
GFC -0.071** 0.053
(0.027) (0.360)
Constant 7.459*** 5.425***
(0.000) (0.000)
N 12645 12645
R2 0.83
Estimator PPML IV-PPML
Source FE Yes Yes
Host FE Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Over identification test: p-value 0.0003
Statistical significance denoted at 1%(***) ,5% (**) and 10% (*). Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Observations clustered within country-pairs
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Effects of financial development on the components of foreign
direct investment
Further empirical analysis is carried out to analyse how financial development affects
the different financial instrument components of foreign direct investment. This is
done by considering the effect of source and host country financial development using
alternative foreign direct investment data collected from the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The data used in this section is comprised of
foreign direct investment from 34 OECD source countries to the same sample of 116
emerging market and developing host economies for the period between 2005 to 2014.
The sample coverage is based on availability of data. Furthermore, the dataset permits
splitting of the sample according to the mode of financing of foreign direct investment.
Therefore, the dependent variable FDI is classified into three different components
namely; equity, debt and reinvested earnings.
Equity capital is usually linked to greenfield as well as brownfield investment (merg-
ers and acquisitions) or broadly new investments associated with foreign direct invest-
ment. For this reason, the equity component of foreign direct investment propels most
of the fluctuations in foreign direct investment flows. However, this equity component
may also consist of extension of capital of financial restructuring by the multinational
corporation. On the other hand, reinvested earnings are the proportion of earnings
that the multinational corporation chooses to reinvest in its subsidiary as opposed
to paying dividends. Therefore, reinvested earnings can be a source of financing for
the subsidiaries abroad. In addition, reinvested earnings are considered more stable
with adjustments to this component of foreign direct investment indicating the vari-
ations in the earnings of the subsidiary and the volume of earnings the multinational
corporation decides to distribute. Therefore, higher reinvested earnings may signify
the recognition of by the multinational corporation of viable investments in the host
country where its subsidiary is based. A larger volume of reinvested earnings in the
subsidiary abroad may be compelled by the incentive to take advantage of profitable
opportunities abroad. Nevertheless, the share of reinvested earnings distributed may
also fluctuate depending on the needs of the multinational corporation given that in
some instances the multinational corporation may need more cash to pay dividends
rather than reinvest its profits in a subsidiary abroad. Finally, intra-company debt
is considered the least stable among the three financial flows. This stems from the
fact that intra-company debt is inclined to be compelled by the short-term financing
requirements within the firm and not broad macroeconomic conditions or investment
opportunities.
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Table 2.7 presents estimations of the effects of financial development on the three
components of foreign direct investment. Private sector credit to GDP for both source
and host country are used as the benchmark measure of financial development because
it is widely used in the literature and available at a higher frequency across countries.
Column (1) in table 2.7 shows the findings for aggregate foreign direct investment
outflows. The coefficients for both source and host country financial development are
not statistically significant. This suggests that cross-border direct investment flows are
largely independent of financial development proxied by private sector credit to GDP.
In column(2), foreign direct investment outflows measured as using the equity compo-
nent is considered. The coefficients for source country financial development is positive
and significant. Higher source country financial development increases the volume of
FDI equity outflow. The coefficient for the host county is positive but not statistically
significant. The estimation results for intra-company debt flows are reported in column
(3). The coefficients for both source and host country financial development are nega-
tive but not statistically significant. In the last column, the analysis considers whether
the results vary when using reinvested earnings. Host country financial development
has a negative and significant effect on reinvested earnings. Negative reinvested earn-
ings may be the due to the negative indirect competition effect. If the financial sector
in the host country is developed it facilitates local firm entry into the domestic mar-
ket. This enhances competition and lowers profits for multinational corporations or
subsidiaries operating in the host country. If the main incentive for the multinational
corporation is to serve the local market, the host country will become a less favourable
destination (Bilir et al., 2014). Therefore, multinational corporations will be less in-
clined to reinvest earnings in affiliates abroad where there are less profitable investment
opportunities due to the competition effects.
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Table 2.7: Financial development effects on the components of foreign direct investment
Total Equity Debt Reinvested earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CreditSource 1.496 4.012*** -0.427 -0.483
(1.184) (1.444) (0.806) (1.195)
CreditHost -0.0223 0.442 -0.671 -0.920**
(0.620) (0.918) (0.750) (0.387)
ln GDP Source 1.038 2.172* 4.574 0.295
(0.858) (1.282) (3.175) (0.765)
ln GDP Host 1.166* 0.385 1.090** 2.578***
(0.671) (0.758) (0.445) (0.524)
ln Distance -0.797*** -1.343*** -0.604* -0.489*
(0.215) (0.340) (0.355) (0.258)
Contiguity -0.100 0.905 -1.338*** -0.208
(0.321) (0.558) (0.479) (0.345)
Common Language 1.326*** 1.867*** 0.690* 1.533***
(0.276) (0.365) (0.360) (0.285)
Colony 0.177 0.167 -0.220 0.0991
(0.278) (0.412) (0.406) (0.394)
Trade -1.149*** 0.416 -1.803*** -2.062***
(0.445) (0.674) (0.552) (0.613)
Tax -0.288 -1.398 2.089** -0.00585
(0.578) (0.998) (0.907) (0.809)
Infrastructure -0.0248 0.413 0.105 -0.618**
(0.319) (0.638) (0.294) (0.268)
Institutions 2.156*** 1.856 2.952*** 1.378***
(0.563) (1.175) (1.133) (0.490)
GFC 0.432 -0.426 -0.530 -1.099**
(0.345) (0.536) (0.898) (0.463)
Constant -48.82 -86.69* -115.5 -52.23*
(30.94) (48.45) (76.57) (27.69)
N 2,342 2,063 1,973 1,673
R2 0.595 0.408 0.515 0.886
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter the role of financial development in both source and host countries
on outward bilateral foreign direct investment was investigated. Using a broad panel
dataset comprised of outward foreign direct investment from 43 high income and emerg-
ing market source countries to 116 emerging market and developing economies for the
period 2001-2012. The analysis is conducted using a gravity model to explain the medi-
ating role of financial development on outward foreign direct investment. Controlling
for standard gravity variables and other determinants of foreign direct investment,
this is done by considering the differential access to finance proxied by the extent of
financial sector development in both originating and destination countries. The find-
ings show that on average, greater financial development in both the source and host
countries will result in more aggregate outward foreign direct investment. Therefore,
the depth of financial markets has a positive impact on bilateral foreign direct invest-
ment. This confirms findings from previous papers that found a positive effect for both
source and host country financial deepening, for greenfield investments, expansion and
mergers and acquisitions foreign direct investment (Desbordes and Wei, 2017) and for
aggregate foreign direct investment (Donaubauer et al., 2016).
The chapter also analyses the impact of financial crises on outward foreign direct
investment. This is done by separately considering the role of the global financial crisis
and country specific systemic banking crises. With respect to the global financial crisis,
the results show on average a negative impact on bilateral foreign direct investment.
Accounting for country specific financial constraints in the form of systemic banking
crises provides varied evidence. Tighter credit conditions in source countries undergo-
ing systemic banking crisis have a negative effect on aggregate outward foreign direct
investment. This indicates firms are financially constrained during a systemic banking
crisis and there is an adverse impact on the availability of capital for investment. This
is divergent from previous findings by Gil-Pareja et al. (2013) on the effects of source
country systemic crisis on the outcome for aggregate bilateral foreign direct invest-
ment. This consistent with the fact that firm access to finance tends to be restricted
when credit conditions deteriorate owing to banks experiencing financial distress. In
contrast, financial distress in the host country following a systemic banking crisis was
found to enhance bilateral foreign direct investment.
The main policy implications of the chapter relate to both source and host countries.
Countries seeking to enable the entry and growth of multinational corporations into for-
eign markets and those countries seeking to encourage inward foreign direct investment
from multinational corporations should execute policies that will enhance financial de-
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velopment. Secondly, these countries ought to put in place policies to sustain access to
external financing for firms in periods of severe financial distress. Furthermore, better
developed financial systems are important as gesthey will safeguard the access to ex-
ternal financing by local firms as domestic borrowing by multinational firms expands
Desbordes and Wei (2017). This is essential in preventing a negative crowding out ef-
fect of domestic firms from the host country credit market owing to enhanced domestic
borrowing by foreign firms found in Harrison and McMillan (2003). Furthermore, the
composition of the banking sector between domestic and foreign banks will generate
disparities in the way they provide credit to firms. To limit this potential crowding out
by foreign firms in the domestic credit market, a specific enhancement that would be
useful in host countries could be for policymakers to provide avenues for local firms to
access credit from local banks rather than foreign banks which tend to lend more to
larger firms owing to the ease of obtaining information and monitoring. In this way the
entrance of foreign firms in the host country credit market will not disadvantage do-
mestic firms. Therefore, this chapter has shown that having a well-developed financial
system will be advantageous for both domestic and external investors.
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2.A Appendix
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Table 2.8: Systemic banking crises
Source Countries
Argentina France Italy Portugal Switzerland
Austria Germany Japan Russian Federation Turkey
Belgium Greece Kazakhstan Spain United Kingdom
Denmark Hungary Netherlands Sweden United States
Host Countries
Argentina Kazakhstan Philippines Uruguay
Dominican Republic Mongolia Russian Federation
Ecuador Nigeria Turkey
Indonesia Nicaragua Ukraine
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2013)
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Chapter 3
Unconventional Monetary Policy
and Portfolio Allocation
3.1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, central banks in major advanced economies lowered
short-term policy interest rates. Developed economies central banks lowered policy in-
terest rates to the effective lower bound (ELB). These central banks in key economies
alternated to implementing unconventional monetary policies in efforts to safeguard
the financial system, revive aggregate demand and bolster their domestic economies
from the aftermath of the global financial crisis. However, owing to increased integra-
tion between economies through real and financial channels, unconventional monetary
policies adopted by systemic countries generated unintended consequences for other
economies. These spillover effects were transmitted through trade linkages and finan-
cial markets as these key economies constitute the largest trade partners as well as the
major sources of international finance for the rest of the world. The spillovers from the
international transmission of unconventional monetary policies conducted by central
bank in advanced economies have been large for emerging and developing countries
(Ahmed, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2016; Neely, 2015).
This chapter address the question of the international transmission of monetary
policy through the cross-border portfolio allocation of global institutional investors.
This is relevant considering the extensive use of unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures by major systemic economies, the U.S., the U.K., Japan and the Euro area, in the
wake of the 2008 global financial crisis. Furthermore, this is particularly relevant for
policy makers in emerging markets and developing economies as these economies were
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subject to surges in capital inflows, rising equity prices, falling sovereign bond yields,
real currency appreciations and enhanced corporate debt issuance by the non-financial
sector due to the accommodative monetary policies executed subsequent to the global
financial crisis (Fratzscher et al., 2016; Lo Duca et al., 2016; MacDonald, 2017). Com-
parably, the anticipation of the normalisation or reversal of expansionary monetary
policy by the U.S. was associated with the depreciation of nominal currencies and re-
ductions in stock market prices in emerging markets (Eichengreen and Gupta, 2015).
In this chapter, the spillover effects of unconventional monetary policy by advanced
economies central banks is assessed in terms of the cross-border portfolio allocation
behaviour of institutional investors.
The extant empirical literature tackling the question of spillovers generated by mon-
etary policy stimulus of major advanced economies has been analysed using two princi-
pal approaches, the direct and indirect approach. First, through the indirect approach,
identification of monetary policy spillover effects entails analysis of the response of in-
terest rates and asset prices in foreign countries to the unconventional monetary policy
of advanced economies (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-jorgensen, 2011). Although, the
cross-border transmission of monetary policy can be conjectured as occurring through
the movement of capital flows across countries, the indirect approach infers the im-
pact of monetary policy spillovers indirectly from the response of financial asset prices
abroad such as stock prices and bond yields. Within the indirect approach, evidence of
cross-border spillovers effects from monetary policy conducted by major economies to
emerging market and developing economies have been found primarily through event
studies(Fratzscher et al., 2016; Neely, 2015; Bowman et al., 2015). Nevertheless, lit-
tle consensus exists on the magnitude and the path of cross-border transmission of
monetary policy (MacDonald, 2017).
Second, an alternate strand of empirical literature on monetary policy transmission
spillovers has focused on the direct approach. Within the direct approach, the quantity
effects instead of the asset price effects of monetary policy transmission are identified.
The direct approach entails determining transmission through portfolio allocation de-
cisions or portfolio rebalancing actions of financial intermediaries across different asset
classes in response to unconventional monetary policy. Initial evidence of the direct
approach uses the financial flows of the major sectors of the economy as classified in
the national accounts. This entails the classification of different investor groups based
on the sectors of the national accounts within the source country conducting the un-
conventional monetary policy. Existing empirical literature on the direct approach
supports the notion of investors reallocating portfolio investments in response to un-
conventional monetary policy. Investors that sold or had their assets purchased by the
central bank tend to rebalance into riskier assets (Carpenter et al., 2015). Investors
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portfolio allocation decisions across different asset classes in response to unconventional
monetary policy has been illustrated within the direct approach literature using flow
of funds data for Japan and the U.S. Evidence from the flow of funds data suggests
that investors from whom the central bank purchased assets as part of large-scale asset
purchase programs rebalanced their portfolio towards riskier assets in Japan (Saito and
Hogen, 2014) and the U.S (Carpenter et al., 2015).
Third, an emerging strand of empirical literature using the direct approach, investi-
gates unconventional monetary policy transmission using more granular institutional-
level data. Augmenting initial evidence from broad sectoral-level flow of funds national
accounts data, recent evidence explores monetary policy transmission using micro-level
data on institutional investor firms. Joyce et al. (2017) assess the investment behaviour
of both aggregate sectors and major individual institutional investors domiciled in the
U.K. in response to asset purchases by the Bank of England (BOE). They analyse asset
allocations of sectors from the national accounts and individual insurance companies
and pension funds asset allocations in the U.K. Joyce et al. (2017) find that non-bank
financial intermediaries domiciled in the U.K. altered their asset allocation from gov-
ernment bonds towards more risky corporate bonds, in response to unconventional
monetary policy conducted by the Bank of England (BOE).
Similarly, Buch et al. (2018) provide a meta-analysis assessing the international
transmission of monetary policies from four major economies’ (the U.S., U.K., Japan
and the Euro area) to private sector lending by banks in 17 countries. Buch et al. (2018)
find evidence which suggests that cross-border spillovers from the major advanced
economies occurred and bank-specific characteristics are relevant in the spillovers of
monetary policy to bank credit to the private sector. Finally, Cenedese and Elard
(2018) use capital flows intermediated by mutual funds to directly analyse the ge-
ographical asset allocation of mutual fund managers in response to unconventional
monetary policy by the four major economies. They find evidence that unconventional
monetary policies in the major economies triggered asset managers to rebalance asset
allocations away from the home country implementing monetary policy to other ad-
vanced economies as a substitute asset class. However, Cenedese and Elard (2018) find
no evidence of rebalancing towards riskier assets in emerging markets and developing
economies in response to monetary policy stimulus from advanced economies. This
negates the proposition of an increase in search for yield behaviour by international
investors in response to the low interest rate environment in advanced economies and
subsequent surge in capital inflows experienced by emerging markets and developing
economies in the post-crisis period.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature investigating the inter-
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national transmission of monetary policies using the direct approach.
First, the empirical analysis in this chapter uses micro-level data on the portfolio
composition of individual institutional investor firms. Using this granular data, the
cross-border portfolio allocation of institutional investors in response to the monetary
policies conducted by four key central banks is explored.
Second, this chapter focuses on the investment allocation behaviour of individual
institutional investors. This is divergent from literature using data on mutual fund
managers, (Cenedese and Elard, 2018) or the underlying client investors of mutual
funds (Fratzscher et al., 2016). The portfolio allocations of 94 individual institutional
investors firms domiciled in 13 countries are analysed over the period 1999Q4-2016Q4.
Using this institution-level data, the transmission of monetary policy as a consequence
of the portfolio rebalancing of investment allocations by non-bank financial interme-
diaries is examined. Fratzscher et al. (2016) examine capital flows intermediated by
mutual funds. Their data captures the allocation behaviour of both the fund managers
and the underlying investors. This implies that inferences drawn from these capital
flows may be confounded by the changes in wealth of the underlying individual in-
vestors rather than just portfolio rebalancing by the fund managers. On the other
hand, Cenedese and Elard (2018) use the same database but avoid this problem by in-
vestigating the geographical allocation of fund managers and not the underlying clients.
Nevertheless, the firm-level data used in this chapter allows for the investigation of the
direct portfolio allocation choices of the individual institutional investor firms rather
than underlying investors investments in mutual funds such as country mutual fund
flows data used in previous studies.
Third, this chapter examines the quantity effects rather than the asset price effects
of international monetary policy transmission. This is distinct from prior studies using
the response or changes in financial market asset prices within the indirect approach
literature to identify international transmission of unconventional monetary policies.
These studies infer the spillover effects indirectly through the sensitivity of bond yields,
exchange rates and stock prices following unconventional monetary policy actions by
the major economies(Rogers et al., 2016; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-jorgensen, 2011;
Gagnon et al., 2011; D’Amico and King, 2013) .
Fourth, this chapter analyses the international transmission effects of unconven-
tional monetary policy originating from four systemic countries using different proxies
of the monetary policy stance. This allows the assessment of whether the choice of
proxy used to account for the monetary policy stance when policy rates are at the
effective lower bound (ELB) is consequential in determining the cross-border transmis-
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sion of monetary policy. While the analysis of monetary policy transmission effects
originating from different major central banks is similar to the prior work of Buch
et al. (2018) on bank lending and Cenedese and Elard (2018) on mutual funds’ asset
allocation, this chapter is distinct. Specifically, this chapter focuses on a different type
of financial intermediary. It examines the international transmission of monetary pol-
icy originating from major central banks in four advanced economies on institutional
investors’ cross-border portfolio allocation.
Therefore, this chapter examines the spillovers from monetary policies of central
banks in four major systemic economies in relation to portfolio allocation of insti-
tutional investors. Previous work investigating the link between portfolio allocation
and monetary policy concentrates on individual central banks in advanced economies
and the response of agents following the implementation of unconventional monetary
policies. Prior work provides evidence on portfolio balance (reallocation) effects from
Bank of Japan asset purchases (Saito and Hogen, 2014), European Central Bank as-
set purchases(Koijen et al., 2016), Federal Reserve Bank large-scale asset purchases
(Carpenter et al., 2015) and Bank of England asset purchases (Joyce et al., 2017).
Only Cenedese and Elard (2018) analyse the international transmission effects of mon-
etary policy by four systemic advanced economies central banks and the implications
for portfolio rebalancing by mutual funds. Buch et al. (2018) also examine the cross-
border transmission of monetary policy from the U.S., the U.K., Japan and the Euro
area. However, they focus on the degree with which the transmission of the monetary
policies in these major economies spillover and impact bank lending to the private
sector.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the background and relevant
literature of monetary policy from advanced economies and the theoretical transmission
channels. Section 3.3 discusses the prior evidence in the empirical literature. Section,
4.3 describes the data. Section 4.2.5 describes the empirical framework, specification
and methodology. Section 4.5 presents the results from the institutional investors and
interprets the key findings. Section 4.6 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Monetary policy implementation can be distinguished on two principal analytical ap-
proaches (Borio and Zabai, 2016). The first approach can be classified as interest rate
policies. This is comprised of the central bank tools that signal the monetary policy
stance to the private sector. The second approach can be classified as balance sheet
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policies. This also involves market operations that alter the amount of bank reserves
in the financial system.
3.2.1 Interest rate policies
An interest rate policy, which entails the central bank determining the short-term
interest rate and providing information as guidance for expectations on future short-
term interest rates. In this approach, the policy rate set by the central bank is the
primary communication tool and gives the monetary policy stance. However, the level
of the policy rate does not restrict the monetary policy stimulus. This implies that
for a given short rate, there will be different yields and asset prices corresponding to
changing financial conditions.
Short-term policy rate
The central bank sets the short-term nominal interest rate. In the post-crisis era, the
limitations of cutting the short-term rate became apparent as interest rates reached
the effective zero-lower bound. The alternative was alternate to other non-conventional
policy tools. Only Japan and ECB have lowered interest to below zero or adopted the
negative interest rates in the post-crisis period(Borio and Zabai, 2016).
Forward Guidance
The central bank also provides communication regarding the future path of policy.
The objective is to guide private sector expectations on the future short-term interest
rate. This involves providing information on the state of the economy and central
bank actions. However, in the zero-lower bound era, communication from the central
bank has served as tool to signal commitment to the unconventional monetary policy.
Considering, interest rates were at the effective lower bound, the tools at the disposal
of the central bank in the post-crisis era were limited to either swaying expectations
through forward guidance or balance sheet policies-asset purchases-in particular.
The contents of forward guidance provided by the central bank may be calendar-
based or state contingent. The former relates to communication from the central bank
referring to a particular period. Whereas, the latter refers to communication from
the central bank containing references to the state of the economy. Furthermore, this
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guidance may also consist of specific quantitative or numerical content and less explicit
or qualitative information.
A hypothesised view is that, there should be credibility and pre-commitment by
the central bank for forward guidance to work. The central bank commits to a policy
and executes it. In reality, the central bank does not deem announcements as a prior
commitment. However, divergence from these announcements has cost to reputation.
Rather they are viewed as a way to explicate targets or emphasise persistence to meet
policy goals.
Evidence demonstrates that forward guidance is an effective tool for impacting bond
yields. However, there are differentiated effects from the four major central banks. This
is due to two things. Incomplete comprehension of the information provided by the
central bank. Owing to complexity or ambiguous statements from the central bank
or due to statements made based on the state of the economy which may not be
clearly explicated. This may dampen the effects of forward guidance. Furthermore,
the extent to which the guidance is accepted and incorporated by the private sector
may also affect the efficacy of forward guidance a monetary policy tool. The central
bank cannot promise uniformity in the subsequent policy commitments for long-term
horizons, i.e. after one or two years. Furthermore, the private sector may have a
different perspective on the state of the economy.
3.2.2 Balance Sheet Policies
The second classification of monetary policy tools is the balance sheet policies. These
policies are distinct from the interest rate policies and are a more direct way for the
central bank to affect the market conditions. This entails the central bank altering the
magnitude, structure and riskiness of its balance sheet. The aim is to affect segments of
the financial market beyond the market for bank reserves, particularly where the central
bank has less direct control. Balance sheet policies takes several forms of monetary
operations.
The four major central banks had key differences in the targeted assets used to
support the balance sheet expansion policies. The distinction of these balance sheet
expansion can be delineated between liquidity operations and monetary policy inter-
ventions. The former operations reflected the conventional lender of last resort function
of the central bank and aimed at easing liquidity conditions for the banking system.
The objective is to ensure that the banking sector was liquid and able to function. The
latter consist of central bank interventions aimed at assets held by the private sector
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with specific characteristics. The heterogeneity in the implementation of balance sheet
policies broadly varied between repurchase agreements(repos) or outright purchases,
the purchase of public sector or private sector assets and the purchase of long-term
maturity or short-term maturity assets Haldane et al. (2016). Therefore, the market
intervention arm of balance sheet expansions can be distinguished on the basis of the
extent to which they alter the composition of private sector balance sheets, the type
of asset and segment of the financial market the central bank operations are targeting.
Comparatively, the balance sheet policies implemented by the major central banks
can also be typified by the structure of the financial system in the country implement-
ing the unconventional monetary policies. For example, the Federal Reserve in the
U.S. focused on affecting the non-bank sector owing to the market-based structure of
its financial system. In contrast, the ECB targeted the banking sector owing to the
financial system being more bank-based.
Quasi-debt management policy
Public sector asset purchases
This encompasses the use central bank balance sheet expansion policy as a monetary
policy tool. The central bank conducts large-scale asset purchases of government secu-
rities with the objective of impacting the yield curve of government debt assets. This
in turn alters interest rates and assets prices in the economy. These are policies aimed
at affecting the market for government debt assets. The central bank aims to affect the
term (maturity) and liquidity premia of the government debt asset and in turn affect
asset prices and interest rates. The central bank targets this segment of the financial
market and affects the volume or amount of government(public)sector assets in the
possession of the private sector. These claims on the public sector consist of assets
of different maturities and risk profiles and bank reserves at the central bank held by
different segments of the private sector. The initial use of quantitative easing policies
was implemented by the Bank of Japan. Following consecutive reductions, the actual
short-term policy rate approached the lower bound for nominal interest rates in 1999.
The Bank of Japan, consequently, began expanding its balance sheet in 2001, providing
liquidity to the financial system by purchasing Japanese government bonds through the
creation of bank reserves, (Haldane et al., 2016). These balance sheet expansion mea-
sures were further implemented by the Federal Reserve Bank and the Bank of England
in 2008 and 2009 respectively. Whereas, the European Central Bank commenced with
its asset purchase program in 2015. Expansionary balance sheet policies supplement
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the traditional role of the short-term policy rate when it is at the lower bound. Im-
plementation entails the outright purchases of government debt securities supported
by central bank reserves. The historical use of the central bank expansionary policies
has been linked to the financing of wars and other government activities as well as the
attenuation of financial crises such as the bail-out of banking systems rather than a
policy tool (Haldane et al., 2016). However, following the global financial crisis, central
bank interventions in the four major economies have predominantly used the balance
sheet as a tool to attain monetary objectives aimed at bolstering economic activity.
Credit Policy
Liquidity provision and private sector asset purchases
This involves expansionary balance sheet operations by the central bank aimed at
particular segments in the market for private sector assets. Through direct market
intervention, the goal for this form of monetary operations is to adjust credit condi-
tions for the private sector. The central bank exposure to the private sector is adjusted
by changing the asset composition of private sector balance sheets. This is done by
central bank lending or provision of liquidity or credit to specific markets. When finan-
cial conditions were significantly constrained at the beginning of the global financial
crisis, repurchase agreement operations were more predominantly used by the Federal
Reserve, Bank of England and European Central Bank. This was to ensure the con-
tinual transmission of monetary policy, specifically the liquidity and smooth operation
of the banking sector. In addition to the purchase of the low risk long-term public-
sector assets which alters the duration risk in the private sector, central bank balance
sheet expansions have also involved the purchase of private sector assets. The aim of
this credit easing policy is to lower credit risk in the private sector through central
bank purchases of risky assets. For instance, the Bank of Japan monetary easing pol-
icy broadened the array of assets targeted for purchase beyond government bonds to
include purchases of corporate bonds, commercial paper, equities, and asset backed
securities, Haldane et al. (2016). The Federal Reserve Bank policy also included the
purchase of mortgage backed securities and federal agency debt. Similarly, the Bank
of England asset purchases was also extended to include corporate bonds. The ECB
also further extended the range of assets to include corporate bonds and asset backed
securities.
73
Forward Guidance
Balance sheet expansion
However, adjustments in the composition of the private sector balance sheets in re-
sponse to monetary policy stimulus may not be adequate to fully drive the response
of prices and financial conditions to changes in the monetary policy stance. An addi-
tional dimension of central bank policy tools in the implementation of monetary policy
has been communication. Central bank communication conveying information on its
intentions and conduct of monetary operations are also important. Communication
from the central bank providing information on the evolution of the balance sheet is
also important for the private sector. The forward guidance on balance sheet policy
operates primarily through the signalling channel of monetary policy.
The balance sheet policy of foreign exchange market intervention involves the pur-
chase and sell of foreign currency to affect the level of the exchange rate independent
of the policy rate. Through central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market,
the degree with which the private sector is exposed to foreign currencies is controlled
for a given policy rate, thus the level and volatility of the exchange rate is managed.
This action has been undertaken by central banks in emerging economies in efforts to
stem off the unintended effects of unconventional monetary policies implemented by
the major central banks.
3.2.3 Monetary policy transmission mechanism channels
There are various transmission channels through which monetary policy generates ef-
fects. The bond yield which is comprised of the anticipated average short-term interest
rates and the term premium will be directly impacted by central bank monetary pol-
icy. The different channels of monetary transmission relate to how central bank policy
affects the two components of the bond yield. The channels through which investors
respond to adjustments in the monetary policy stance represent frictions or constraints
that investors face when undertaking investments. Each channel is driven by different
information and market frictions.
74
Signalling Channel
This channel refers to monetary policy actions influencing the first component of the
yield, the expected average short-term interest rate. This component reflects market
expectations of the average short-term interest rate. The signalling channel operates
through lowering the expected short-term rate. Through its effect on the first compo-
nent of the bond yield, adjustments in the monetary policy stance to lower short-rates
influences bond yields to decline. This channel operates through market expectations
of the private sector formed from policy actions and communication conveyed by the
central bank. Similarly, the execution of balance sheet policy in the form of asset pur-
chases of long-term bonds can serve as indication of commitment by the central bank.
This can act as a signal from the central bank to maintain low short-term policy rates.
The signalling channel will likely have an impact on passive reallocation of assets due
to changes in prices, (Cenedese and Elard, 2018).
Portfolio Balance Channel
The portfolio balance channel links the effects monetary policy to the second compo-
nent of the bond yield, the term premium. The term premium represents compensation
to investors for the risk arising from changes in the interest rate. Furthermore, the
term premium may be indicative of the presence of fragmented asset markets. This
segmented asset market is reflective of distinctive asset characteristics related to ma-
turity, risk and other factors that investors will consider depending on their underlying
objectives for undertaking the investment, (Cenedese and Elard, 2018).
Considering that investors have different preferences for assets depending on their
objectives, changes in the availability of certain assets may induce adjustments in
their investment allocation behaviour. For example, in the period following the global
financial crisis, the four advanced economies engaged in large-scale asset purchases.
As part of the unconventional monetary policies, this entailed the purchases of long-
term securities and in the case of some central banks other assets classes including
corporate bonds and equities. These targeted asset purchases by the central banks in
turn affected the stock of assets available in the market, the price and return on the
asset.
Correspondingly, in response to the targeted central bank purchases, investors alter
their portfolios and search of alternate assets as substitutes investments. This search for
alternate assets to the ones purchased by the central bank will include assets in either
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the domestic market or in foreign markets. These domestic or foreign assets substitute
the assets bought by the central bank as part of the asset purchase program.
The balance sheet policy of asset purchases by the central bank asset purchases
will change the availability of long-term bonds and the total maturity risk. As the
central bank purchases the targeted assets (long-term government bonds), the return
or yield on the assets purchased falls. This induces investors to sell their holdings of the
long-term bonds to the central bank. The term premium on the long-term government
bond yield reduces following central bank purchases. These asset purchases also alter
the interest rate premium on other bonds although not directly purchased by the
central bank. This implies that purchases by the central bank may induce lower term
premium of interest rates of other securities within the same asset class. For example,
the purchase of long-term bonds by the central bank may induce a reduction in interest
rates for other fixed income securities. This is because the balance sheet policy of asset
purchases lowers the supply of long-term bonds available to the private sector and the
term premium. This in turn alters the total amount of maturity risk associated with
the long-term fixed income assets available to the private sector.
Furthermore, central bank asset purchases push out investors from the bond market,
it is anticipated that this will generate spillover effects on the price of various other
asset classes. The portfolio rebalancing by investors affected by the central bank asset
purchases will have supplementary price effects on a broader range of assets and not
exclusively on the asset class (long-term government bond) targeted by the central
bank purchases,(Cenedese and Elard, 2018).
There are several factors that account for the portfolio balance effect of balance
sheet policies (asset purchases) in reducing the long-term yield and generating a tem-
poral rebalancing toward riskier emerging market and developing economies assets.
These factors include, the yield curve (the difference between long-term interest rate
and the short-term interest rate), the risk premium, gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, inflation, expectations of the future short-term rate, exchange rates, external
fundamentals (current account). These factors support the notion that the rebalancing
toward riskier emerging market and developing economies assets has been on account
of a fundamentals-based approach. This implies that factors related to risk perceptions
(sovereign credit ratings of host countries), external (current account) may account for
the portfolio balance effect.
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Risk-Taking Channel
The risk preferences and risk tolerance of the private sector are also impacted by the
central bank balance sheet operations. Balance sheet expansion, the associated easing
in credit conditions and the simultaneous withdrawal of risky assets from the portfolios
of the private sector may induce changes in investment behaviour. This alters the risk
structure of the private sector assets. The balance sheet expansion may lower risk
perceptions and prompt greater risk-taking by the private sector. This is because
central bank purchases are likely to be viewed by the private sector as a commitment
to keep interest rates low.
The risk-taking channel effect may be further exacerbated by the search-for-yield
behaviour of investors which is linked to benchmark long-term assets having low yields.
This may push the private sector investors to search for similar long-term duration
assets with high yields albeit riskier than the benchmark assets. This implies that the
private sector in search of high yields will seek to rebalance their portfolios with longer
maturity or assets with higher risk.
Therefore, the efficacy of monetary policy transmission channels is reliant on mar-
ket distortions or frictions within the operations of financial markets. The presence of
these market distortions or frictions enables monetary policy to have larger effects on
financial market asset prices. The absence of these distortions would lower the degree
of sensitivity of asset prices to the monetary policy stimulus. These imperfections in
the operation of the financial market are broadly classified as information frictions and
market frictions, (Haldane et al., 2016). These two frictions form the basis of the ana-
lytical distinctions between the various transmission channels of monetary policy. The
channels of transmission for central bank expansionary balance sheet policies remain
debated. There are various factors underlying the operation of these channels. Fur-
thermore, there are distinct policies that were used in the pre-crisis era and post-crisis
periods.
3.3 Empirical evidence on monetary policy and as-
set allocation
The initial conduit for the transmission of unconventional monetary policy to the econ-
omy occurs through the impact of the balance sheet expansion on asset prices, (Hal-
dane et al., 2016). The impact of monetary easing policies of large systemic advanced
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economies, (U.S., U.K., Japan and the EU) on various assets and financial flows have
been quantified by several studies. These systemic economies have great financial and
trade linkages with the rest of the world. The principal effects from these monetary
easing policies have been currency appreciation and capital inflows. The international
transmission of advanced economies monetary easing impinge generates challenges to
macroeconomic management and raise asset prices. The spillovers arising from avail-
ability of greater liquidity at a lower cost has resulted in a build-up in foreign currency
exposure by emerging markets and developing economies. This build-up in foreign cur-
rency exposure, threatens the solvency of domestic balance sheets. Furthermore, the
availability of funds at a lower cost, promotes credit growth and asset price increases.
Therefore, the literature identifies the cyclical and structural determinants that have
resulted in emerging and developing countries receiving the effects generated from the
international transmission of monetary policies. The literature quantifies balance sheet
expansions or quantitative easing and its effects on asset prices and interest rates( gov-
ernment bond yields, equities and exchange rates ), the size of capital flows, and the
financial institutions involved in intermediating global financial flows. Several conclu-
sions can be drawn regarding the effects of quantitative easing according to Haldane
et al. (2016). Quantitative easing had material impact on financial markets or asset
prices both local and external as evidenced from event studies. They are state depen-
dency effects and quantitative easing may vary over time depending on the state of
the economy and the financial system. Furthermore, quantitative easing has strong
spillover effects to other countries, especially through financial market channels. Fi-
nally, quantitative easing had distributional consequences for households and financial
intermediary’s asset holdings and portfolio allocation choices. Fratzscher et al. (2016)
find evidence of portfolio rebalancing and that actual asset purchases by the Federal
Reserve Bank had a bigger impact in comparison to policy announcements. In general,
the impact of quantitative easing has been to lower the yields on long-term govern-
ments bonds,(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-jorgensen, 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011; Neely,
2015). They find evidence of the flattening of the yield curve following central bank
balance sheet expansion.
The use of asset purchases as an alternative monetary policy tool to the conven-
tional interest rate has broadly investigated by analysing the effects of purchases on
interest rates and asset prices. The effect of central bank purchases in lowering the
long-term yields and generating a temporal rebalancing toward riskier assets, through
evidence of this channels has been found by examining indirectly the effects of central
bank asset purchases on asset prices and less evidence is available on the direct effects
of balance sheet policies on the investment patters on financial intermediaries. This
type of investors would be more sophisticated and likely to engage in arbitrage across
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markets (Carpenter et al., 2015). Hence, we would expect a movement into different
asset classes if the portfolio balance channel is in effect. These investors would be
more dynamic and responsive to shocks faster than other sectors. Therefore, we would
expect that purchases by the central bank would affect the holdings of securities by
these investors.
At a more granular level, an institutional investor firm will face an optimization
problem for a given amount of money to maximise utility subject to a budget constraint
along with other institutional specific factors such as the liabilities. The institutional
investors will also have to consider the risk preferences of various groups. Furthermore,
regulatory requirements may also impose additional constraints to the institutional
investor’s asset allocation decision. Therefore, while the institutional investor may
follow a strategic asset allocation approach considering the firm specific requirement,
the investor may also engage in tactical asset allocation to exploit temporal changes in
market conditions, (Joyce et al., 2017).
The underlying mechanism for the operation of the balance sheet policies is the
changes in actual portfolio holdings made by financial institutions in response to the
market intervention by the central bank through asset purchases rather than based
on changes in asset prices. The empirical evidence on portfolio rebalancing has been
primarily concerned with answering two questions from the perspective of the central
bank. Firstly, which entities reduce government holdings when the central bank pur-
chases long-term securities. Secondly, in which asset classes do these sectors increase
investment or asset holdings. To assesses which firms, reduce the holdings of long-term
government assets (bonds), there is need to assess the net change in government hold-
ings for a given investor on the amount of asset (bond) purchases by the central bank.
These two questions have been addressed at the macro-level using data at the sector
level from the balance of payments of the country conducting unconventional monetary
policy. These aggregate data from the flow of funds accounts allow the observation of
shifts of asset holdings by various sectors of the economy for different asset classes.
This is done in Carpenter et al. (2015) and Saito and Hogen (2014) using compre-
hensive sector-asset allocations to broad asset categories within the U.S. and Japan
respectively. These aggregate level studies are based on national accounts data on
the flow of funds by sector. These studies report evidence of adjustments in holdings
towards riskier assets following quantitative easing policies in Japan and the U.S.
The portfolio balance transmission channel of unconventional monetary policy has
been assessed by analysing the response of investors in different asset markets with
Carpenter et al. (2015) lending support to the preferred habitat hypothesis. With
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low frequency financial accounts data on quarterly holdings of various assets classes
by eight different investor sectors (households, broker-dealers, insurance companies,
pension funds, investment companies), they explore which investors sell assets to the
Federal Reserve Bank during the four different phases of quantitative easing and how
the composition of these private investors’ portfolios changes with the asset purchases.
They find evidence of market segmentation in line with the preferred habitat theory
and portfolio rebalancing in the transmission of unconventional monetary policy within
asset markets. They conclude that households, broker-dealers and insurance companies
were the major sellers of assets to the Federal Reserve Bank during the large-scale
asset purchases. Furthermore, large-scale asset purchases by the Federal Reserve Bank
are associated with rebalancing of portfolios by private investors towards other assets
classes such as corporate bonds, commercial paper, municipal debt and loans.
Saito and Hogen (2014), undertake a similar approach to assess the portfolio bal-
ance channel from the Bank of Japan bond purchases following the Qualitative and
Quantitative Easing (QQE). With bank loans and the net acquisition of financial as-
sets by each sector within Japan, Saito and Hogen (2014) explore which firms lowered
their holdings of government bonds with the onset of the QQE program. Evidence
from the broad sectors in the flow-of-funds data showed that local Japanese banks
and non-residents sold assets to the Bank of Japan or reduced government bond hold-
ings during QQE. Additionally, these two sectors further increased investment in other
assets including, corporate bonds, equities and mutual funds. In contrast, insurance
companies, pension funds did not lower their holdings of government bonds when the
Bank of Japan conducted purchases of long-term Government bonds under the QQE.
Arguably this is due to their liability structure being more long-term in nature and they
would be less responsive or induced to lower their investment in long-term government
bonds due to the need to match their long-term liabilities with long-term assets. This
analysis is carried out using investment flows and bank lending data from the Flow of
Funds Accounts statistics of Japan. These effects vary depending on whether the Bank
of Japan purchased short-term or long-term bonds.
Divergent from the prior studies using the national accounts data on the flow-of-
funds by sectors from the financial account, Joyce et al. (2017) and Bua and Dunne
(2017) analyse the rebalancing effects of quantitative easing using micro-level data
based on the actual portfolio allocations. With data on the net acquisition of bonds
instead of asset stocks for each sector, Joyce et al. (2017) find evidence of a rebalancing
effect arising from asset purchases by the Bank of England at the aggregate sector level
similar to Carpenter et al. (2015) and Saito and Hogen (2014). Institutional investors
were the major sellers of Government bonds and rebalanced their portfolios towards
corporate bonds. Net purchases by the Bank of England or quantitative easing lowered
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the net investment flows or net acquisition of government bonds by investors in five
distinct sectors. They further supplement this sectoral-level evidence with micro-level
data from the portfolio allocations of two sectors; pension funds and life insurance
companies in the U.K. For life insurance companies, the impact of quantitative easing
was negative on the allocation to index bonds and equities and positive on the alloca-
tion towards corporate bonds. This indicates the rebalancing of allocations by these
firms from government bonds to corporate bonds. In contrast to insurance companies,
pension funds increased the allocation toward both index-linked bonds and corporate
bonds, as the Bank of England purchased bonds and lowered their allocation to nominal
government bonds.
An alternative empirical analysis using micro-level data is undertaken by Bua and
Dunne (2017) to assess how the ECB’s asset purchases affected the portfolio com-
position of the investment fund sector domiciled solely in Ireland. They use both
the positions and transaction-level data on net purchases of assets by one group of
investors, investment funds, to assess the effects of Euro system’s Asset Purchase Pro-
gram (EAPP). The transaction-level data provides a more detailed analysis and is
distinct from the approach of Joyce et al. (2017), which depends on the net acquisi-
tion of assets by pension funds and insurance companies to assess evidence of portfolio
rebalancing. Bua and Dunne (2017) argue that consideration of the net purchases of in-
vestor firms allows identification of active rebalancing behaviour, which will be distinct
from a passive portfolio rebalancing outcome that occurs simply from changes in value
of holdings. Therefore, the analysis in Joyce et al. (2017) may merely be capturing a
valuation effect rather than an actual change in the composition of the firm’s portfolio.
Granular information on the strategies of each investment fund in their sample further
permits identification of funds that adjust their portfolios following the EAPP. They
find evidence of rebalancing towards securities from outside the EU area.
Koijen et al. (2016) also analyse the impact of the ECB’s asset purchases on banks,
insurance companies, pension funds, and mutual funds. Portfolio holdings of govern-
ment bonds, corporate bonds, equities and asset backed securities are used. They find
ECB purchases result in the foreign sector selling more government securities compared
to banks, mutual funds and insurance companies.
Evidence of cross-border investment allocations or asset positions in different cate-
gories at more granular levels remains limited. Related literature utilises the bilateral
allocation of assets based on aggregate data compile in the IMF Coordinated Portfo-
lio Investment Survey(CPIS). Portes and Rey (2005b) study portfolio allocation across
countries in a gravity-model framework using the CIPS data. Similarly, a gravity model
framework is applied to euro area security-level data on holdings by, Boermans and
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Vermeulen (2016) to examine cross-border portfolio allocation. Literature accounting
for the effects of monetary policy on the actual asset allocation or portfolio composition
at the micro-level is limited. Other prior work incorporating the role of quantitative
easing (QE)/large-scale asset purchases (large-scale asset purchases) and using disag-
gregated data on the holdings of institutional investors has been based on pension and
insurance companies in the U.K.in response to BOE quantitative easing, Joyce et al.
(2017) and investment funds in Ireland, Bua and Dunne (2017).
The unconventional monetary policy effects can be identified based on the impact on
the private sector balance sheets and the segment of the market the central bank aims to
affect as highlighted by Borio and Disyatat (2010). The adjustments in the composition
of balance sheets of the private sector are an important conduit for the transmission
of unconventional monetary policy. These balance sheet policies are further separated
from the level of the interest rate. This decoupling also ensures that any changes in
the levels of interest rates such as a policy shift toward higher interest rates can be
implemented independent of the balance sheet policies. Therefore, the magnitude and
composition of the central bank balance sheet can be altered independent from the
policy rate target. The implications of this decoupling principle are that the changes
in the balance sheet policy toward contraction of the central bank balance sheet is not
prerequisite for increasing interest rates (Borio and Disyatat, 2010).
Other studies focus on the transmission of external monetary policies through finan-
cial institutions (banks and non-banks), inward and outward monetary policy trans-
mission. Where inward transmission is primarily referring to the boost in domestic
lending by banks as a result of external monetary policies. Baskaya et al. (2017).
Furthermore, frictions that the institutions face related to the liquidity and capital
position are important in the transmission of monetary policy.
3.4 Data and descriptive statistics
This section provides details on the institutional investor firm-level outcome variable,
the different monetary policy stance proxies and control variables used in the study.
Institutional investor data
Data on 94 institutional investors are collected and compiled from Bloomberg. The
micro-level dataset consists of asset holdings of the largest individual private insti-
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Figure 3.1: Asset classes
tutional investors recorded in millions of U.S. dollars. This covers individual asset
positions of the largest asset managers as measured by the industry’s global assets
under management (AUM). The choice for inclusion of investor firms in the sample is
based on the top asset management by global assets. The firms included in the sample
hold over 80% of global assets under management and represent the largest firms in the
industry according to total assets under management as compiled by Investment Pen-
sions Europe (IPE). IPE collects data on the leading 400 asset managers both globally
and in the European market since 2002.
The sample covers institutional investor holdings of different assets compiled on
a quarterly frequency. For each firm and quarter, the dataset contains the nominal
investment in different asset classes denominated in U.S. dollars. This low frequency
firm-level data allows observation of the end-quarter stock positions of different asset
classes for each firm. Figure 3.1 plots the portfolio composition or various asset classes
held by the firms included in the sample.
The dataset covers salient attributes the composition of each firm’s portfolio that
include the firm domicile, the asset class(e.g. bonds or equity), the destination country
of each asset and main currency denomination of each asset. For the empirical estima-
tion, only two asset classes (bonds and equity) are used to refer to these dimensions of
disaggregation of assets within each firm portfolio. The length of panel sample period
is 1999Q4 to 2016Q4, a total of 69 quarters. This covers the periods of both conven-
tional and unconventional monetary policy implementation by the four major central
banks.
In Figure 3.2, the average end of quarter portfolio allocations by asset type in the
sample is plotted. The 94 institutional investor firms in the sample are domiciled in 13
countries. The data also provides information on the destination country of the various
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Figure 3.2: Average portfolio composition across asset classes
Figure 3.3: Portfolio investments by region and firm domicile
assets the institutional investors have allocations.
In figure 3.3 the summary on the institutional investor asset allocation for the
sample period 1999-2016 are presented. Figure 3.3 shows the different destination
regions for bond and equity investment by the institutional investors. The destination
region for portfolio allocation to bonds is mainly in Europe, North America and Asia.
While for equity, the main destinations are in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The
major portfolio allocation is from institutional investors in the US and UK in both
asset classes.
Figure 3.4 plots the bond and equity allocations across different destinations grouped
into major country groups: Emerging Markets(EM),the four major advanced economies
(U.S.,U.K., E.U. and Japan), other advanced economies (OAE) such as Denmark, Swe-
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Figure 3.4: Asset Allocations by destination and currency
den. The share of the portfolio allocation is largest in emerging markets, the U.S and
E.U. for both bonds and equities. In particular for equity, the largest allocations by
the institutional investors in the sample are in emerging markets, the EU and other
advanced economies. The second panel in Figure 3.4 shows that portfolio weights or
allocations in both bonds and equities by the sampled institutional investors are heav-
ily concentrated in assets denominated in the US dollar. Allocation by the currency
denomination are to a lesser extent in assets denominated in the Euro, emerging mar-
ket currencies (EMC) and other advanced economies currencies (AEC). The list of
countries for firm domiciles and destination countries used in the sample are presented
in the appendix in table 3.40.
Data cleaning of sample
To keep the data tractable, the chapter focus on the largest asset managers as measured
by global assets under management for which consistent data was readily available. Al-
though the sample covers only 94 institutional investor firms, the granular nature of
the data allows for a deeper analysis. Before the empirical analysis the data is cleaned
to obtain the final detailed dataset on the international asset allocations(portfolio hold-
ings) of the institutional investors. Several steps were applied to the raw data. These
include the exclusion of all other asset categories and retention of bond and equity
investment holdings. Winsorisation of portfolio holdings at the 5% and 95% levels,
to limit the influence of outliers. Finally, the exclusion of firms reporting portfolio
holdings for less than 8 consecutive quarters.
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Limitations of sample data
A notable limitation of the data is that it does not include balance sheet or firm-level
characteristics such as firm size, assets-to-liabilities ratio or similar firm-specific char-
acteristics. The inclusion of these factors would more closely account for the frictions
which these financial intermediaries encounter. This lack of information on investors
constraints or balance sheet conditions at the individual firm level is a constraint. The
magnitude and composition of the balance sheet may be important to identify infor-
mation regarding the firm leverage (or liquidity constraints) or strength of the balance
sheet. The liability structure of institutional investors differentiates them from other
types of investors. The need to fulfil their mandates and attain high returns will
influence their portfolio allocation.
Accordingly, the risk-taking appetite of investors can also be viewed as being reliant
on both the prevailing macroeconomic environment and the balance sheet conditions
of investors. On that account, the increase in the demand for assets by institutional
investors from advanced economies can be viewed as underlying the surge in capital
flows from advanced economies to emerging markets. Evidence has been found that
the surge in demand for emerging market assets is a consequence of the combination
of a low interest rate environment, low asset returns and weak investor balance sheets
which prompts search for yield behaviour by insurance companies and pension fund
firms,(Bonizzi, 2017). In this context, weaker balance sheets refer to investors having
greater liabilities than assets (low funding levels) and increasing portfolio allocation to
higher return assets in emerging markets for the purpose of meeting long-term obliga-
tions. Therefore, the balance sheet condition of the investor is relevant in ascertaining
the hypothesis of portfolio allocations or movements of capital flows prompted by the
risk-taking or the search for yield behaviour of investors. The capacity to undertake
cross-border holdings will be reliant on the funding level(wealth) or funding costs for
each individual firm.
However, the dataset obtained from Bloomberg albeit narrower provides a greater
degree of granularity than prior studies by using disaggregated institutional investor
data. The data used in this analysis consists of institutional investors asset holdings
and is compiled from Bloomberg. Each institutional investor’s portfolio asset holdings
are collected across time. The micro-level dataset consists of asset holdings of the
largest individual private institutional investors recorded in U.S. dollars. This covers
individual asset positions of the largest asset managers as measured by the industry’s
global assets under management (AUM). The choice for inclusion of investor firms in
the sample is based on the top asset management by global assets. The firms included
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in the sample hold over 80% of global assets under management and represent the
largest firms in the industry according to total assets under management as compiled
by Investment Pensions Europe (IPE). IPE collects data on the leading 400 asset
managers both globally and in the European market since 2002.
The sample covers institutional investor holdings of different assets compiled on
a quarterly frequency. For each firm and quarter, the dataset contains the nominal
investment in different asset classes denominated in U.S. dollars. This low frequency
firm-level data allows observation of the end-quarter stock positions of different asset
classes for each firm. The dataset covers salient attributes the composition of each
firm’s portfolio that include the firm domicile, the asset class(e.g. bonds or equity),
the destination country each asset and main currency denomination of each asset. For
the empirical estimation, only two asset classes (bonds and equity) are used to refer
to these dimensions of disaggregation of assets within each firm portfolio. The sample
period is 1999Q4 to 2016Q4, a total of 69 quarters. This covers the periods of both
conventional and unconventional monetary policy implementation by the four major
central banks.
Other data sources and limitations
The investigation into both the quantity and price rebalancing effects of monetary
policy have been analysed using several sources of data with varying frequencies. One
strand of the literature uses low frequency quarterly data on both gross and net capital
inflows from the balance of payments data of the international monetary fund (IMF),
(Ahmed, 2013; Lim and Mohapatra, 2016).
Another source of data for capital flows, specifically portfolio investment, is the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) of the IMF. The CPIS data is broadly
available on annual basis and bi-annual only for the latest years. However, this dataset
is not especially suitable for the analysis of the transmission of non-standard monetary
policy actions considering that these policies were implemented on a more frequent
basis, (MacDonald, 2017).
Alternately, evidence on the international spillover effects of monetary policies has
been analysed using mutual fund data sourced from the Emerging Portfolio Fund Re-
search(EPFR) Global database. EPFR is a commercial database which consists of
higher frequency data available on a daily, weekly and monthly basis. it consists of
fund flows and country allocations to various countries. With EPFR micro-level data,
a deeper, albeit narrower analysis can be achieved using high frequency fund-flow data
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on bond and equity mutual funds. Studies using high frequency data from the EPFR
database have been carried out to examine international asset allocation, (Bonizzi,
2017), the effects of quantitative easing policies on asset flows (Fratzscher et al., 2016)
and the cross-border transmission of shocks (Raddatz and Schmukler, 2012).
However, the EPFR database does not proxy a completely representative sample.
The EPFR database constitutes only between 5% to 20% of the market capitalisa-
tion of equity and bond funds in the countries covered. Furthermore, the EPFR
database only follows investment by retail and institutional investors in excess of
$100,000 (Fratzscher, 2012; MacDonald, 2017). Consequently, the EPFR database
has an under-representation of individual institutional investors and portray any in-
vestment by non-institutional investors, (MacDonald, 2017).
Divergent from the Balance of Payments Statistics, EPFR data captures inflows and
outflows from mutual funds and exchange traded funds(ETF) and for this reason flows
are not always between residents and non-residents of a given country. Additionally,
the EPFR data only capture financial flows channelled through funds and do not
represent total allocation, (Bonizzi, 2017). When the funding levels or solvency of the
balance sheet deteriorates, the search for yield by firms with long-term liabilities such
as insurance companies and pension funds will likely be more intense in a low interest
rate environment. This implies that other factors such as lower levels of funding or
deteriorating solvency will induce firms to reallocate to higher yielding emerging market
assets, Bonizzi (2017). Additionally, another limitation is that these asset managers
will have multiple funds to serve different investment objectives. These operations at
fund level may not be adequately assessed using the overall firm-level data.
Monetary policy stance measures
The analysis uses various measures of the monetary policy stance to consider the
changes in monetary policy tools used by the central banks in the post-crisis period.
The choice of a suitable monetary policy instrument in the post-crisis zero-lower bound
period is debatable. Prior to the zero-lower bound period, the short-term policy rate
serves as a measure of conventional monetary policy. The actual short-term policy rate
in the four major economies is depicted in figure 3.5. Short-term policy rates in ad-
vanced economies remained low after the global financial crisis as central banks eased
monetary conditions. This low interest rate environment introduces the challenge of
identifying the most appropriate measure of the monetary policy stance encompassing
the two periods. The spillover effects of monetary policy may be distinct in periods
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Figure 3.5: Policy rates
prior to the crisis, when the conventional monetary policy framework was in operation
compared to the post-crisis period of unconventional monetary policy implementation.
This is considering that when the short-term interest rates are at the zero-lower bound
the usefulness of the short-term interest rates in transmitting meaningful information
is limited.
Notwithstanding the above, the literature has provided alternative measures of the
monetary policy stance that may account for the post-crisis zero-lower bound period in
lieu of the actual short-term policy rate. Accordingly, various measures of the monetary
policy stance in the major source economies are used to address the potential differential
effects in the two policy frameworks. This is because monetary policy instruments in
the unconventional period encompassed varied tools such monetary operations and
forward guidance or central bank communication.
Monetary policy operations or large-scale asset purchases
This variable captures monetary policy operations in the form of central bank balance
sheet policies. Asset purchase by the central bank are included to proxy the monetary
operations and accounts for the extent of quantitative easing for each central bank.
The large-scale asset purchases include Federal Reserve Bank purchases of long-term
treasury assets, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and federal agency debt (FAD)
securities. Secondly, the Bank of England asset purchases as part of the Asset Purchase
Facility (APF). Thirdly, the Bank of Japan buying of private-sector assets, government
bill and bonds under its Asset Purchase Program (APP). Finally, the European Central
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Figure 3.6: Central Bank Assets
Bank purchases for the Euro area in the securities markets programme (SMP), main
refinancing operations(MROs) and long-term refinancing operations(LTROs).
The large-scale asset purchases variable or monetary operations variable is measured
in the baseline model as the change in the size of the central bank balance sheet. This is
constructed as the change in central bank assets in percent of the nominal GDP of the
respective country in which the central bank is domiciled. This is used to capture the
magnitude of actual asset purchases or monetary operations comparative to the size of
the economy. This proxy also accounts for the magnitude of the supply of liquidity by
the monetary authorities (Buch et al., 2018). This is computed as the first difference of
each central bank’s assets relative to GDP. For example, for Japan, the first difference
of the Bank of Japan holdings of assets divided by the nominal GDP of Japan. This
change in assets by nominal GDP is constructed for all the major central banks. Figure
3.6 illustrates the expansion of the central bank balance sheets in by the four major
economies across time.
Shadow policy rate
Considering the short-term interest rates have been effectively zero in the four advanced
economies over the period following the global financial crisis, it is not informative to
proxy the changes in the monetary policy stance using the actual short-term interest
rate. Once the path of the short-term policy hits its floor at the zero-lower bound,
substitute measures of the monetary policy stance have been proposed in the literature.
90
Figure 3.7: Shadow policy rates
When nominal interest rates within the term structure reach the zero-lower bound,
monetary policy can be proxied using a shadow policy rate. The shadow rate is derived
from estimations of the term structure of interest rates. The shadow rate permits the
estimation of the monetary policy stance and is beneficial because it encompasses
periods of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy, (Buch et al., 2018).
Consequently, the shadow rate accounts for elements of unconventional monetary policy
actions and converting this into equivalent nominal interest rates when short-term rates
hit floor at the zero-lower bound,(Buch et al., 2018). Therefore, the shadow interest
rates account for determinants linked to both overall liquidity conditions and the effects
of quantitative easing operations by the central bank on the long-term yield curve.
The analysis uses a shadow rate as a measure of the monetary policy stance similar
to Buch et al. (2018) who explore the international transmission of monetary policy to
bank credit to the private sector. Various estimates of shadow interest rates to account
for unconventional monetary policies have been designed in the literature by Krippner
(2016) and Wu and Xia (2016). The shadow rate chosen to be used in the analysis
is from Krippner (2016) due to availability, data from the Wu and Xia (2016) series
does not include estimates for Japan. The shadow rates from the Krippner (2016)
database is comprised of shadow rates for all four major economies, the United States,
the United Kingdom, Japan and the Euro area. 1 The shadow interest rate is able
1Data available from: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research-and-publications/research-
programme/additional-research/measures-of-the-stance-of-united-states-monetary-
policy/comparison-of-international-monetary-policy-measures
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to capture the effects of quantitative easing into equivalent nominal interest rates as
depicted in Figure 3.7.
Monetary policy announcement surprises or monetary policy shocks
As conventional reduction of the short-term policy rate is limited by the effective zero-
lower bound, central banks in advanced economies have engaged in the use additional
non-standard measures apart from large-scale asset purchases to steer monetary policy.
These measures are based on central bank communication or forward rate guidance.
Forward rate guidance entails the use of central bank communication as a monetary
policy tool to inform the private sector on the future path of monetary policy as well
as the economic outlook. The role of the information conveyed by the central bank
and the response of the private sector has been found to be important in quantifying
the response of asset prices and volumes of capital flows to monetary policy. Commu-
nication channels used in forward guidance include monetary policy statements, press
conferences and releases of minutes to policy meetings. The objective of forward guid-
ance is to use these channels to convey private central bank information which is not
in the information set of the public.
However, effectively conveying policy information may be problematic and require
frequent and multiple information releases from the central bank to inform and update
the private sector. Furthermore, the information content of a central bank announce-
ment may be confounded by other information. Specifically, the information content or
composition central bank announcements may comprise of two forms of information.
First, monetary announcements relaying information about the future path of mone-
tary policy or actual monetary policy decisions. Second, central bank announcements
may alternatively convey non-monetary information pertaining to the macroeconomic
outlook and economic growth as well as risk and uncertainty. Therefore, considering
the emergence of central bank communication as a monetary policy tool, alternative
measures to capture the monetary policy stance have been proposed in the literature
to enable the analysis of the international transmission of unconventional monetary
policy.
An alternate measure for the monetary policy stance during both periods of con-
ventional and unconventional monetary policy is the instantaneous effect of monetary
policy news derived from central bank announcements. This approach builds on liter-
ature on the identification of monetary policy surprises in the periods of conventional
monetary policy proposed by Kuttner (2001). The premise of this technique of identi-
fication is that if markets are efficient, future prices are representative of policy rates
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in the future. Therefore, the shifts in the future prices on account of a central bank
policy announcement suggests that markets were surprised (Haitsma et al., 2016). Ac-
cordingly, a monetary policy surprise in the conventional policy framework can be
determined as the disparity between the future rate prior to a central bank policy an-
nouncement and the policy rate announced by the central bank. However, with the
short rate hitting its floor at the zero-lower bound and unconventional monetary policy
being implemented, ascertaining the monetary policy stance and policy expectations is
not so direct (Rogers et al., 2014). They contend that the event study framework used
previously to ascertain the monetary policy surprise in the conventional framework
collapses.
Therefore, the proxy used in this analysis is from Rogers et al. (2014). This mon-
etary surprise proxy consists of the high-frequency response of the term structure of
interest rates following monetary policy announcements by the central bank. These
monetary policy announcements consist of communication from the central bank re-
garding the unconventional monetary policy strategies. The information covered in
deriving this measure includes the monetary policy statements after meetings, pol-
icy speeches and other relevant events. It is proxied by the intra-day change in the
benchmark government bond yield within a specified time window and accounts for the
financial market effects of central bank policy announcements. It is available for all the
four major economies. For example for the U.S., it is constructed as the first principal
component of the change in future yields for the 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year
Treasury futures assets, within a limited 30 minute window of the respective central
bank policy announcement. For the UK, this is captured by the long gilt futures yield
and for Japan it is measured as the change in the 10-year Japanese Government Bond
(JGB) futures yields. Finally, for the European central bank (ECB) monetary policy
surprises this is measured as the spread between Italian 10-year government bonds and
German 10-year government bonds (Rogers et al., 2014).
The response of asset prices and volumes of cross-border financial flows to com-
munication conveyed through central bank policy announcements underscores the im-
portance of the signalling channel of monetary policy narrative. Considering this
communication or information effect of monetary policy necessitates the classification
of important central bank events or announcements. Subsequently, these events or an-
nouncement dates are mapped with the simultaneous high-frequency changes in bench-
mark government bond yields to identify a monetary shock effect. Further evidence
suggests that the intensity of this monetary shock derived from announcements will
vary depending on the composition of the information released by the central bank.
The significance of these announcements is due to the fact that the private sector
decisions are influenced by it.
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Figure 3.8: US monetary policy shock
Figure 3.9: Japan monetary policy shock
Figure 3.10: U.K. monetary policy shock
Figure 3.11: EU monetary policy shock
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Therefore, the policy surprise measure considers changes in both the short-term in-
terest rate and long-term interest rates. The underlying assumption in the construction
of these announcement or surprise series is that the changes in the government bond
yields within a defined 30-minute window occur solely because of the unexpected shift
in the monetary policy stance. The conjecture presumes that no additional relevant
economic news that would considerably alter bond yields was publicised within the
defined short window on the key dates of the monetary policy announcements (Rogers
et al., 2014). However, one caveat is that communication from the central bank on
policy stance announcements may also be obscured by information on the monetary
authority’s expectations of both the present state and future path of the economy.
The monetary policy shock data considering the changes in the entire term structure
of interest rates are available for the Federal Reserve Bank, the Bank of England, the
Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank and taken from Rogers et al. (2014).
The monetary surprise measures depicted in figure 3.8 and figure 3.9 account for
changes in the long-term government bond yields in the U.S. and Japan respectively.
Monetary surprises for the U.K. (figure 3.10) and the EU (figure 3.11) are also available,
albeit as a shorter series covering the period after the global financial crisis. Figures
3.8-3.11 plot the time series of the four monetary policy surprises considered in this
chapter to examine the effects of monetary policy by the Federal Reserve, Bank of En-
galnd, European Central Bank and Bank of Japan on allocation to bonds and equities.
These measures are used to consider how portfolio allocations of institutional investors
respond to monetary policy surprises from four major economies’ central banks and
are obtained from Rogers et al. (2014). They will be used to assess how the signalling
channel of monetary policy impact asset allocations of institutional investors.
3.5 Empirical Framework
3.5.1 Empirical specification
In this section, the approach used to assess the impact of unconventional monetary
policy on the portfolio allocation of institutional investors is presented.
The empirical specification used to examine the relationship between monetary
policy and portfolio allocation is detailed below and builds from the methodological
approach of Cenedese and Elard (2018) and Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) with some
adjustments due to constraints in the nature of the data being used. The effects
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of central bank large-scale asset purchases and monetary policy surprises on the log
weight (share) of the country or region in the portfolio of a firm in each quarter will be
estimated. The initial benchmark specification estimates the effect of monetary policy
on the log weight of a country or region Yit in the portfolio of institutional investor
firm i in quarter t as follows:
Yit = α + βMt + λXt + εit (3.1)
Equation 3.1 will be estimated separately for each country. The variable Yit is
the log of portfolio weight of firm i in quarter t. Yit represents allocations to either
a country or group of countries which include the United States (U.S.), the United
Kingdom (U.K.), the European Union (E.U.), Japan, other advanced economies (OAE)
and emerging market and developing economies (EM). The specification is estimated
with the portfolio weight in log levels.
The variable Mt measures the impact of unconventional monetary policy . This cap-
tures the monetary policy stance for the different major advanced economies. Several
are measures used to account for monetary policy. First, large-scale asset purchases
measured by the size of the central bank balance sheet (total assets) obtained from
the four central banks and scaled by GDP in the respective economy where the central
bank is domiciled. Second, the monetary policy surprise measured as the change in the
intra-day benchmark government bond yields in each of the four economies. This series
is obtained from Rogers et al. (2014). Third, a shadow short-term policy rate to ac-
count for monetary policy in the zero-lower bound period derived from term structure
models and obtained from Krippner (2016).
The set of explanatory variables in Xt comprise of the following elements. First, the
returns of equities represented by the Morgan Stanley Capital international (MSCI)
total return index for equities. This is described as MSCIEM for emerging markets
and MSCIWD for advanced economies. Second, the CBOEV IX volatility index which
measures the implied volatility of the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index, this
is to account for the impact of risk appetite. Third, the returns of bonds represented
by the JP Morgan EMBI which tracks the hard currency bonds in emerging markets.
For advanced economies an index on bonds in advanced economies BRAE is used
from the Bank of America (BofA) Merrill lynch bond indices. The rationale for the
inclusion of the return variables is to capture the returns in alternate asset classes , with
advanced economies returns being representative of less risky alternative assets than
riskier emerging market assets. Unlike Raddatz and Schmukler (2012) and Cenedese
and Elard (2018), the data does not have the returns on each portfolio. Similarly,
96
following Hashem Pesaran and Smith (2016) and Cenedese and Elard (2018) push and
pull factors that may respond to monetary policy are not included.2
3.5.2 Empirical strategy
The main question of this analysis is estimating the determinants of institutional in-
vestors portfolio allocations. The chapter uses a macro panel with large N and large
T. The length and width of the time series permit the estimation of the long-run re-
lationship between variables. In this chapter, institutional investors firms domiciled
in 13 countries are observed over the period 1999Q4-2016Q4. Therefore, as both the
cross-sectional units and time series are large, there is possibility to use heterogeneous
regressions instead of the homogeneity implied in pooled regressions. Furthermore, the
analysis can use time series estimators and tests to handle both non-stationarity and
cointegration.3
Panel Dynamic OLS (DOLS) and Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) Estimators
Panel time series estimators have been proposed to account for concerns of non-
stationarity and cointegration in the data such as the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares
(DOLS) by Kao and Chiang (2000) and Fully Modified OLS(FMOLS) approach by Pe-
droni (2000). The estimator used in this analysis is the panel Dynamic OLS (DOLS)
by Kao and Chiang (2000) which assumes homogeneous cointegration parameters. The
estimator comprises of a co-integrating vector that restricts the long-run parameters to
be homogeneous across panel units. The DOLS model controls for short-run dynamics
by incorporating lags and leads of the first differences. On the basis of Monte Carlo
simulations, Kao and Chiang (2000) find that the DOLS performs better than the
FMOLS estimator as the FMOLS is more susceptible to small sample bias. The DOLS
estimator controls for endogenous feedback through the inclusion of lead and lagged
differences of the variables in the regression. The DOLS within-dimension (pooled)
estimator provides unbiased and asymptotically efficient estimates of the long-run re-
lationship of panel variables in the presence of endogenous variables.
The dynamic OLS estimator restricts long run coefficients to be the same and
2The portfolio selection problem for the investor will take into account risk preference, regulatory
and institutional considerations. However, Hashem Pesaran and Smith (2016) suggest that the esti-
mation of a structural model will be misspecified. As such a reduced model is implemented similar to
Cenedese and Elard (2018).
3To acquire more precise results, the analysis includes panel unit roots tests, cointegration tests
and estimation of the long run cointegrating vector. These results are detailed in section 3.A.
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permits the short run coefficients and error variances to vary across the cross-sectional
units. This methodology involves the estimation of the static long-run relationship
supplemented by leads and lags of the first-differenced control variables.
3.6 Results
This section discusses the main findings on the role of institutional investors in the in-
ternational transmission of monetary policy. This section describes whether and which
measures of unconventional monetary policy stance by the four major central banks
instigate portfolio rebalancing by institutional investors between the source country
conducting monetary policy and other advanced economies and emerging market and
developing countries. The results for allocation to two distinct asset classes equities
and bonds are presented. For each asset class, the relationship between the portfolio
weight and a distinct measure of the monetary policy stance measured as the size of
the central bank balance sheet (asset purchases), monetary policy surprises and the
shadow rate are used. The log of portfolio weight is regressed on a measure of mon-
etary policy, proxies for the return of similar assets classes in advanced and emerging
economies respectively and a measure of global risk sentiment.
3.6.1 Panel Dynamic OLS (PDOLS) Main Results
Considering the results of the panel unit root and panel cointegration tests suggests
the presence of non-stationarity and cointegration (see appendix 3.A), the analysis
estimates the co-integrating vector or long run relationship between portfolio weights
and the various explanatory variables. The long-run relationship between firm port-
folio weight, monetary policy, relative returns and global risk is estimated using the
dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) estimator, (Kao and Chiang, 2000). The re-
sults presented are obtained by estimating the main model specification using the panel
DOLS estimator to acquire the long-run parameters. The DOLS constrains the long-
run coefficients to be homogeneous between panel units in the long run. The panel
data cointegration analysis is conducted for 94 institutional investor firms domiciled in
13 countries is conducted using the DOLS approach.
The results show estimates of how monetary policy impacts the portfolio weights
of firm i in quarter t. The portfolio weight represents a firm’s portfolio allocation to
the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), the Euro-area (EU), Japan, other
advanced economies (OAE) excluding the four advanced economies that implemented
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unconventional monetary policy and emerging and developing countries (EM). This
portfolio weight is expressed in log levels and regressed on variables on the monetary
policy stance, relative returns of assets in advanced and emerging economies and global
risk sentiment.
The results for allocation to equities are presented followed by the results for alloca-
tion to bonds. In each section, the estimates for the relationship between the portfolio
weight and the different monetary policy measures used is presented. The results pre-
sented in the next section summarise the estimates for each equation estimated for each
respective central bank. The full estimation of the main results presented in the next
section are detailed in the appendix for allocation to equities (3.B.1) and allocations
to bonds (3.B.2).
Table 3.1: Summary of results
Proxy Equity Bonds
No. of positive coefficient
out of total [significant]
No. of negative coefficient
out of total [significant]
No. of positive coefficient
out of total [significant]
No. of negative coefficient
out of total [significant]
Shadow policy rates 11/20 [3] 10/20 [3] 10/20 [8] 10/20 [2]
Asset purchases 13/20 [5] 7/20 [2] 9/20 [5] 12/20 [4]
Monetary policy surprises 10/20 [3] 6/20 [1] 4/20 [3] 9/20 [3]
Notes: This table summarises results in tables 3.17 - 3.20 using asset purchases, tables 3.21 -3.24
(equities) for shadow policy rates and tables 3.25 -3.28 for monetary policy surprises. Situations are
excluded in which the home country (e.g. U.S. Fed) can influence home country portfolio allocation
(e.g. US)., focusing only on the impact of home country UMP (e.g. Fed) on foreign portfolio
allocation (e.g. UK, EU, Japan, OAE, EM). Number of possible combinations in the denominator in
ratio. Number of significant coefficients in square brackets[.]
3.6.2 Equities
In this section, the results of how monetary policy by four major central banks affects
the allocation of institutional investor to equities are summarised. For each major
central bank, the main results for equity allocations are reported for the different
measures of monetary policy in table 3.2. Additional tables with full estimation results
estimated separately for each central bank are detailed in the appendix 3.B. Table 3.2
provides a summary of results for each central bank using asset purchases to measure
monetary policy as detailed in appendix 3.B.1.
Column (1) of table 3.2, shows how central bank asset purchases by the Fed affect
equity allocation of institutional investors between the source country where the central
bank is domiciled (U.S.) compared to allocation in other advanced economies and
emerging markets and developing economies. In terms of the direction of rebalancing,
the cross-border spillover transmission of monetary policy through asset purchases by
the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) was statistically significant for allocation in the home
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Table 3.2: Asset purchases and allocation to equities (1999Q4-2016Q4)
U.S U.K. EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 0.00324*** 0.0003 -0.0015 0.0140 -0.0068** -0.0040
(0.0007) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0083) (0.0023) (0.0024)
BOE 0.849** 1.096 2.379*** 3.640 3.555*** 4.510***
(0.211) (0.697) (0.722) (1.981) (0.693) (0.960)
ECB -0.186 -0.290 0.318 2.522 0.832 1.736
(0.206) (0.678) (0.803) (1.743) (0.626) (0.900)
BOJ -0.158** 0.891*** 0.0409 1.103* 0.168 -0.406
(0.0558) (0.182) (0.219) (0.474) (0.169) (0.244)
PDOLS estimation results of the effect of monetary policy on the portfolio allocation of institutional
investors and employs the default setting of the xtdolshm stata command of two lags and one lead
for all specifications. Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The
dependent variable is log portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the size of the central bank
balance sheet scaled by the GDP in the respective economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels
of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
country (U.S.). Asset purchases by the Fed induced institutional investors to rebalance
away from other countries and increase the portfolio weight (allocation) towards U.S.
equities. This implies that U.S. monetary policy in the form of asset purchases are
associated with an increase in portfolio exposure to equities in the U.S. by 0.032pp.
This is contrary to the prior hypothesis that portfolio allocation by investors will induce
a shift from the source country where the central bank conducting monetary policy is
domiciled in search of substitute assets in other advanced economies or higher yielding
assets in riskier emerging market and developing economies. Therefore, the results do
not provide evidence in favour of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.4
In terms of spillovers across countries and regions, of the four major economies,
equity allocation to Japan increased following Fed asset purchases but was not signifi-
cant. In contrast, large-scale asset purchases by the Fed induced institutional investors
to rebalance away from other advanced economies (i.e. other developed economies ex-
cluding U.S., U.K, EU and Japan). This implies that the large-scale asset purchases
by the Fed equivalent to 1% of US GDP is associated with an increase in the exposure
to equities in other advanced economies by 0.0068pp. This is statistically significant
at the 5% level. Asset purchases by the Bank of England (BOE) show evidence of
4The full estimation results for Fed asset purchases on allocation to equities are presented in table
3.17 in the appendix section 3.B.1.
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the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. The expansion of the balance sheet by
the BOE through asset purchases is associated with institutional investors increasing
portfolio allocation to equities in other advanced economies (OAE) as well as emerging
markets and developing countries (EM).5 On the other hand, no significant effects are
found for asset purchases conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB).6 Finally,
asset purchases by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) yielded similar results to the rebalancing
effects found for the BOE. BOJ asset purchases prompted investors to increase alloca-
tion both in the source country (Japan) and in the U.K. Additionally, expansion of the
central bank balance sheet by the BOJ through asset purchases prompted institutional
investors to rebalance away from allocations to U.S. equities.7
In table 3.3, the results of how monetary policy by the four advanced economies
measured by the shadow policy rate affects the portfolio allocation of institutional in-
vestors to equities is presented.8 In column (1), the cross-border effects of monetary
policy proxied by the shadow policy rate show that investors increase their portfolio
allocation towards the U.S. equities when considering monetary policy of all the four
major central banks (Fed, BOE, ECB, BOJ) and these effects are statistically signifi-
cant. Furthermore, the results show that, there is strong evidence that monetary policy
( measured by the shadow policy rate) leads to institutional investors to reduce the
weight of the portfolio allocation to U.K. equities. These effects of decreased allocation
to U.K. equities are evident and statistically significant for all the major central banks
(Fed, BOE, ECB, BoJ). The strongest effect is for the BOJ shadow policy rate which
is associated with a lower portfolio exposure to U.K. equities. In terms of the overall
evidence of the direction of rebalancing, there is no evidence of a risk-taking channel
of monetary policy or investors increasing the portfolio weight to allocation to riskier
emerging markets and developing countries when the shadow policy rate is used to
proxy the monetary policy stance.
5Full estimation results for BOE asset purchases on allocation to equities are presented in table
3.18 in the appendix section.
6Full estimation results for ECB asset purchases on allocation to equities are presented in table
3.18 in the appendix section.
7Full estimation results for BOJ asset purchases on allocation to equities are presented in table
3.20 in the appendix section.
8Full results for the shadow policy rate are presented in tables 3.21 - 3.24
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Table 3.3: Shadow policy rate and allocation to equities (1999Q4-2016Q4)
U.S U.K. EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 0.0254** -0.0766* 0.0387 -0.123 -0.0287 0.0284
(0.0093) (0.030) (0.0366) (0.0790) (0.0283) (0.0408)
BOE 0.0259** -0.0672* 0.0560 0.0910 0.0278 0.0086
(0.0080) (0.0262) (0.0313) (0.0680) (0.02444) (0.0353)
ECB 0.0291** -0.0832** -0.0386 0.0313 -0.0490 -0.0523
(0.0097) (0.0318) (0.0384) (0.00834) (0.0293) (0.0422)
BOJ 0.0487*** -0.146** -0.0680 0.123 -0.0760 -0.0171
(0.0146) (0.0471) (0.0573) (0.124) (0.00441) (0.0642)
PDOLS estimation results of the effect of monetary policy on the portfolio allocation of institutional
investors and employs the default setting of the xtdolshm stata command of two lags and one lead
for all specifications. Specification: lshare =Shadow rate + CBOEV IX + MSCIEM + MSCIWD.
The dependent variable is log portfolio weight to equity Yit or lshare. Mt is the shadow policy rate.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.6.3 Bonds
Table 3.4 summarises the results for how monetary policy by the the four major central
banks measured by asset purchases affects the allocation of institutional investors to
bonds.9 Table 3.4 shows that Fed asset purchases led to a rebalancing away from bonds
in other advanced economies. Expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet prompted a reduc-
tion of 0.018pp which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is similar
to that obtained for equities in table 3.2 where institutional investors shifted allocation
away from equities of other advanced economies (OAE) following Fed asset purchases.
BOE expansion of the balance sheet through asset purchases leads institutional in-
vestors to increase their portfolio exposure to bonds in the U.K. and is statistically
significant at the 1% level. ECB asset purchases have no effect on allocation to Japan
bonds. ECB asset purchases induce investors to rebalance away from equities in the
U.K. and increase their portfolio weight of bonds in other advanced economies (OAE)
and emerging markets (EM). This provides support for the hypothesis that investors
will shift allocation from the source country conducting monetary policy to other ad-
vanced economies (OAE) in search of substitute assets. The ECB result, further lends
support to the hypothesis that investors may engage in risk-taking by shifting allocation
away from the source country implementing monetary policy and rebalance towards
riskier emerging markets (EM) in search of higher yields. For BOJ asset purchases,
9The full estimation results for the effects of asset purchases by each central bank in relation to
portfolio allocation to bonds is detailed in (3.B.2) of the appendix on tables 3.29 - 3.32
102
Table 3.4: Asset purchases and allocation to bonds (1999Q4-2016Q4)
U.S U.K. EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 0.00883 -0.0011 -0.0023 -0.00822 -0.0179*** -0.0168
(0.0063) (0.0006) (0.0051) (0.112) (0.0039) (0.0108)
BOE 0.420 1.245*** -0.416 0.000 -4.676 -3.290
(1.238) (0.151) (1.060) (26.34) (5.504) (2.905)
ECB -1.430 -0.280** 1,436 0 2.522*** 7.512**
(0.1031) (0.0910) (0.829) (10.70) (0.514) (2.441)
BOJ -0.966*** 0.359*** -1.763*** 25.41*** 1.905*** 1.902**
(0.268) (0.0407) (0.196) (4.737) (0.412) (0.673)
PDOLS estimation results of the effect of monetary policy on the portfolio allocation of institutional
investors and employs the default setting of the xtdolshm stata command of two lags and one lead
for all specifications. Specification: lshare = Mit + CBOEV IX + MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The
dependent variable is log portfolio weight to bonds Yit or lshare.Mt is the size of the central bank
balance sheet scaled by the GDP in the respective economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels
of significance: * p <0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
the results show that institutional investors lower the portfolio weight of U.S. and E.U.
bonds and increase allocation at home (Japan), other advanced economies (OAE) and
emerging markets (EM).
Table 3.5 summarises the results of how monetary policy measured by the shadow
policy rate of each central bank impacts institutional investor allocation to bonds.10
Following Fed monetary policy stimulus measured by the shadow rate, the results show
that the portfolio weight towards bond allocation to other advanced economies (OAE)
increased whereas allocation to bonds in Japan declined. In response to the BOE
shadow policy rate, institutional investors increase bond portfolio weight to Japan,
other advanced economies and emerging markets (EM). There is evidence of the risk-
taking channel. For the shadow policy rate of the ECB, bond allocations increase to
the U.S., E.U. and Japan. Whereas for BOJ shadow policy rate, there is evidence of an
increase in portfolio weights or bond allocations to the US., E.U. and other advanced
economies (OAE).
The results for the shadow rate of the Fed suggest that institutional investors re-
balance towards bonds in other advanced economies. The BOE shadow policy rate
10The full estimation results for the effects of the shadow policy rate of each central bank in relation
to portfolio allocation to bonds is detailed in (3.B.2) of the appendix on tables 3.21 - 3.24
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Table 3.5: Shadow policy rate and allocation to bonds (1999Q4-2016Q4)
U.S U.K. EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 0.0046 -0.0009 -0.00782 -1.089* 0.0862** 0.125
(0.0312) (0.0048) (0.0030) (0.510) (0.0311) (0.0839)
BOE -0.0490 -0.0036 -0.0354 2.727*** 0.0917*** 0.163*
(0.0352) (0.0042) (0.0289) (0.216) (0.0124) (0.0816)
ECB 0.268*** -0.0074 0.150*** 2.113*** -0.0397 -0.109
(0.0381) (0.0054) (0.0318) (0.382) (0.0585) (0.135)
BOJ 0.254*** -0.0172 0.207*** 2.114* −0.325∗ 0.0175
(0.0668) (0.0101) (0.0395) (0.650) (0.124) (0.180)
PDOLS estimation results of the effect of monetary policy on the portfolio allocation of institutional
investors and employs the default setting of the xtdolshm stata command of two lags and one lead
for all specifications. Specification: lshare= Mit + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The
dependent variable is log portfolio weight to bonds Yit or lshare. Mit is the shadow policy rate.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *p<0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
results suggest increased bond portfolio exposure to Japan, other advanced economies
and emerging markets. The ECB shadow rate is associated with an increase in the
exposure of investor’s portfolios to bonds in advanced economies, namely the U.S., the
EU, and Japan. Finally, the BOJ shadow policy rate indicates that monetary policy
will push away institutional investors to the home country, the E.U. and the U.S. Fur-
thermore, the Bank of Japan shadow rate has a negative significant effect on other
developed countries.
In summary, the analysis finds evidence for portfolio rebalancing towards substitute
advanced economies and riskier markets. This is similar to findings by Fratzscher et al.
(2016) and Cenedese and Elard (2018). However, the analysis further finds evidence
contrary to the hypothesis that, investors will rebalance away from the source coun-
try conducting monetary policy. The analysis finds that investors increase allocation
towards the home country. This is the case for Federal Reserve Bank and BOJ asset
purchases and equity allocation and BOE asset purchases and allocation to bonds.
In terms the proxy of monetary policy used and the comparative magnitude of the
spillover effects, asset purchases generate a larger effect in comparison to the shadow
policy rate. This is similar to findings by Buch et al. (2018) and emerging evidence that
demonstrates that the shadow measure of the monetary policy stance is more potent
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in identifying the international transmission of monetary policy particularly in periods
of unconventional monetary policy implementation. This highlights the nature of the
relationship of between monetary policy and portfolio allocation when the central bank
policy rate moves to the zero-lower bound.
3.6.4 Cross-border transmission of monetary policy and the
crisis
This section focuses on whether the evidence of the cross-border transmission of mon-
etary policy changes in the sub-period following the global financial crisis. To further
investigate this, the regressions are re-estimated in the post-crisis period. The period
from 20008Q4 onward is considered as the date to split the sample. The replication of
the previous analysis using the shadow policy rate and large-scale asset purchases to
capture the monetary policy stance are presented.
Shadow policy rate post-crisis period
In table 3.6 results of the transmission of monetary policy for a shorter post-crisis sub-
period indicates that overall, U.S. monetary policy induced an increase in allocation to
equities. Column (3) shows that monetary policy by the Fed captured by the shadow
rate triggered institutional investors to lower allocation to equities in the U.K. For
allocations to the U.K., the effect associated with U.S. monetary policy continues to
be negative. This reinforces prior results obtained for the whole sample in table 3.3.
There is a rebalancing away from the U.K. in response to monetary policy by the Fed
and a shift toward an increase in allocation to equities to the U.S. (home). Although,
equity allocation is found to increase in the U.S. (home) following Fed monetary policy,
this effect is insignificant compared to the results reported in the previous section
(table 3.3 )for the entire sample period. In terms of the direction of rebalancing across
the major countries and regions, the results for the shorter time period offer distinct
results. The shadow policy rate induces institutional investors to increase allocation
to other advanced economies (developed countries excluding the four major advanced
economies) and is statistically significant at the 5% level. The results also suggest
support for the proposition of an increase in allocation to substitute assets other than
the source country of the central bank conducting unconventional monetary policy (the
Fed). In this case, the shadow policy rate of the U.S. is associated with an increase
in portfolio exposure to other advanced economies (OAE) and to the the Euro area
by 0.056pp and 0.09pp respectively. Furthermore, estimates in column (7) provides
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evidence of the risk-taking channel, allocation to riskier assets in emerging markets
and developing countries (EM) is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that there
is a role for institutional investors in the cross-border transmission of monetary policy
conducted by advanced economies. Table 3.6.4 shows the results for the pre-crisis
period.
Table 3.6: Shadow policy rate and allocation to equities (2008Q4 -2016Q4)
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fed 0.0301∗∗∗ 0.00125 -0.0613∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0766 0.0559∗∗ 0.0487∗∗
(0.0103) (0.00800) (0.0282) (0.0271) (0.0574) (0.0263) (0.0236)
CBOEV IX 0.00319 0.000845 0.0156
∗∗ -0.00551 -0.000602 0.0160∗∗ -0.00684
(0.00251) (0.00194) (0.00684) (0.00658) (0.0139) (0.00639) (0.00573)
MSCIEM 0.000108 -0.0000187 -0.00114
∗∗∗ 0.0000728 0.00175∗∗ 0.00124∗∗∗ -0.0000186
(0.000132) (0.000102) (0.000359) (0.000344) (0.000731) (0.000335) (0.000300)
MSCIWD -0.0000134 -0.000111 0.00160
∗∗∗ -0.000597∗ -0.00176∗∗ 0.000264 -0.000557∗
(0.000127) (0.0000978) (0.000344) (0.000331) (0.000702) (0.000321) (0.000288)
N 7134.00 1624.00 1218.00 1305.00 348.00 1218.00 1421.00
R2 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.02 0.01
Specification: lshare= Mit + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equities Yit or lshare. Mit is the shadow policy rate. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: *p<0.1, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01
Large-scale asset purchases post-crisis period
In table 3.8, results using the large-scale asset purchases for the shorter sub-period
reinforce the prior evidence of the direction of rebalancing. Column (1) shows the
results for the overall allocation to equities. Column (2) shows a statistically significant
increase in allocation to assets at home is found following the Federal Reserve Bank
large-scale asset purchases at the 5% level. Large-scale asset purchases by the Federal
Reserve Bank equivalent to 1% of US GDP leads institutional investors to increase
their portfolio exposure to equities at home by 0.003pp. In terms of the spillovers
across major economies and regions, there are similar findings and larger effects for
allocation to other advanced economies (OAE) only. Large-scale asset purchases of the
Fed prompted institutional investors to rebalance away from other advanced economies
and the effects are significant at the 5% level. Table3.6.4 shows the results for the
impact of size of the central bank balance sheet in the pre-crisis period of 1999Q4-
2008Q3. Therefore, splitting the sample period into two periods encompassing the
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Table 3.7: Shadow policy rate and allocation to equities (1999Q4 -2008Q3)
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fed 0.0739∗∗∗ -0.00856 0.116 0.141∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.00880 0.173∗
(0.0271) (0.0210) (0.0769) (0.0695) (0.0964) (0.0612) (0.0887)
CBOEV IX -0.00887
∗∗ -0.00135 0.00393 -0.00117 -0.0212 -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0217
(0.00421) (0.00326) (0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0150) (0.00951) (0.0138)
MSCIEM 0.00137
∗∗∗ -0.000470∗ 0.000403 0.00234∗∗∗ 0.00423∗∗∗ 0.00102 0.00432∗∗∗
(0.000348) (0.000270) (0.000990) (0.000895) (0.00124) (0.000787) (0.00114)
MSCIWD -0.00144
∗∗∗ 0.000304 -0.00127 -0.00222∗∗ -0.00506∗∗∗ -0.000879 -0.00344∗∗
(0.000426) (0.000330) (0.00121) (0.00109) (0.00152) (0.000963) (0.00140)
N 2240.00 704.00 320.00 352.00 160.00 384.00 320.00
R2 0.04 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.36 0.11 0.30
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
period prior to the global financial crisis and afterwards suggests that the cross-border
transmission of monetary policy exerted a greater effect of investors rebalancing away
from other advanced economies in the period following the post-crisis period.
In summary, comparing the results for the post-crisis period to the entire sample
period yields small economic effects but results in allocation to the U.S. and the U.K.
of similar magnitudes. The shadow rate reinforces the evidence of rebalancing away
from the UK. Whereas, results using large-scale asset purchases as a proxy for mon-
etary policy reinforces findings found for the entire period, of institutional investors
rebalancing towards equities at home with similar magnitudes. Therefore, the empir-
ical analysis suggests that there are cross-border spillovers for U.S. monetary policy.
However, the mechanisms through which these spillover affect allocations across coun-
tries and regions varies depending on the time period under assessment and monetary
policy stance measure used.
3.6.5 Robustness
This section presents the robustness checks to assess whether the results obtained for
the main specification remain the same. The effects of solely the U.S. monetary policy
are examined using alternative measures of the monetary policy stance as controls.
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Table 3.8: Large-scale asset purchases and allocation to equities (2008Q4 -2016Q4)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equity (All) US UK EU Japan OAE EM
Fed -0.000992 0.00307∗∗ 0.000241 0.00595 -0.00656 -0.0108∗∗ -0.00327
(0.00183) (0.00141) (0.00497) (0.00478) (0.0101) (0.00464) (0.00416)
CBOEV IX 0.00220 0.00352
∗ 0.00486 0.00433 0.00571 0.00570 -0.00738
(0.00251) (0.00194) (0.00682) (0.00656) (0.0139) (0.00637) (0.00571)
MSCIEM -0.000144 -0.0000482 -0.000707
∗ -0.000768∗∗ 0.00145∗ 0.000736∗∗ -0.000342
(0.000136) (0.000105) (0.000369) (0.000355) (0.000753) (0.000344) (0.000309)
MSCIWD 0.0000937 -0.0000112 0.000905
∗∗∗ 0.0000692 -0.00128∗∗ 0.000288 -0.000289
(0.000113) (0.0000874) (0.000307) (0.000296) (0.000627) (0.000287) (0.000257)
N 7134.00 1624.00 1218.00 1305.00 348.00 1218.00 1421.00
R2 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the size of the central bank balance sheet scaled by
the GDP of the respective economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.9: Large-scale asset purchases and allocation to equities (1999Q4 -2008Q3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Equity (All) US UK EU Japan OAE EM
Fed -0.0790∗∗∗ 0.0344∗∗∗ -0.164∗∗∗ 0.00237 -0.121∗∗∗ -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.257∗∗∗
(0.00164) (0.00118) (0.00394) (0.00366) (0.00774) (0.00438) (0.00415)
CBOEVIX 0.0376∗∗∗ -0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0465∗∗∗ 0.0201 0.0512∗ -0.00149 0.138∗∗∗
(0.00657) (0.00472) (0.0158) (0.0147) (0.0310) (0.0176) (0.0166)
MSCI EM -0.00640∗∗∗ 0.00272∗∗∗ -0.0112∗∗∗ -0.00395∗∗∗ -0.00809∗∗∗ -0.00196∗ -0.0186∗∗∗
(0.000396) (0.000285) (0.000953) (0.000886) (0.00187) (0.00106) (0.00100)
MSCI WD 0.00641∗∗∗ -0.00247∗∗∗ 0.00972∗∗∗ 0.00504∗∗∗ 0.00761∗∗∗ 0.00286∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗
(0.000473) (0.000340) (0.00114) (0.00106) (0.00223) (0.00126) (0.00120)
N 3800.00 855.00 646.00 665.00 209.00 684.00 741.00
R2 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.24
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the size of the central bank balance sheet scaled by
the GDP of the respective economy. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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This is done by measuring the Federal Reserve Bank asset purchases expressed as a
percentage of total debt assets outstanding. This accounts for the extent of asset
scarcity created following central bank asset purchases similar to the robustness in
Cenedese and Elard (2018).
Table 3.10 shows the varied results obtained using central banks as a percentage
of total debt yields. Investors rebalance away from equity overall. Secondly, U.S.
monetary policy prompts investors to rebalance towards equities at home and away
from the E.U. and other advanced economies.
Table 3.12 introduces different episodes of quantitative easing included as binary
variables. This simple binary approach to consider unconventional monetary policy
using dummies for central bank actions has been used in prior literature (Rose, 2018;
Lim and Mohapatra, 2016; Bua and Dunne, 2017; Khatiwada, 2017). The coding
scheme used for the dates are based on identified key quarterly dates related to U.S.
quantitative easing policies taken from Rose (2018) and detailed in table 3.11. There
are statistically significant effects for allocations to equities in the U.S. following the
implementation of QE1 and QE2. In contrast, the first and second wave of quantitative
easing by the Federal Reserve Bank prompted investors to rebalance away from equities
in the U.K. and other advanced economies. This is similar to findings of the large-scale
asset purchases expressed as a percentage of GDP in the post-crisis period.
Table 3.10: Central Bank Assets as percentage of total outstanding debt and allocation
to equities (2008Q4 -2016Q4)
Equity (All) US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Debt -3.477∗∗∗ 3.779∗∗∗ -3.941 -5.475∗ -0.0420 -14.47∗∗∗ -0.952
(1.165) (0.901) (3.171) (3.046) (6.478) (2.959) (2.655)
CBOEVIX 0.00811∗∗∗ -0.00337 0.00964 0.0102 -0.00175 0.0319∗∗∗ -0.0000110
(0.00296) (0.00229) (0.00806) (0.00774) (0.0165) (0.00752) (0.00675)
MSCI EM -0.000115 0.0000233 -0.000820∗∗ -0.000568∗ 0.00145∗∗ 0.000571∗ -0.000223
(0.000130) (0.000101) (0.000355) (0.000341) (0.000724) (0.000331) (0.000297)
MSCI WD 0.000582∗∗∗ -0.000534∗∗∗ 0.00140∗∗∗ 0.000807 -0.00132 0.00231∗∗∗ -0.0000670
(0.000198) (0.000153) (0.000540) (0.000518) (0.00110) (0.000504) (0.000452)
N 7134.00 1624.00 1218.00 1305.00 348.00 1218.00 1421.00
R2 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is Debt defined as is central bank assets as percentage
of total outstanding debt. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.11: Key dates for unconventional monetary policies
Quantitative Easing Negative Nominal Interest Rates
US, QE1 2008Q4-2010Q1
US, QE2 2010Q4-2011Q2
US, QE3 2012Q3-2014Q4
UK, QE1 2009Q1-2010Q1
UK, QE1 2009Q1-2010Q1
Japan 2001Q1-2006Q1
Japan 2010Q4- 2016Q1-
EMU,CBBP 2009Q3-2010Q2
EMU,SMP 2010Q2-2012Q3
EMU,CBBP2 2011Q4-2012Q4
EMU,ABSPP,CBBP3 2014Q4-
EMU,PSPP 2015Q1- 2014Q2-
Switzerland 2011Q3-
Denmark 2012Q3-
Sweden 2015Q1-
Source Rose (2018). Dates for quantitative easing (QE) programs and nominal negative interest
rates (NNIR) in advanced economies.
Table 3.12: Quantitative easing episodes allocation to equities (2008Q4 -2016Q4)
Equity (All) US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
USQE1 -0.0445 0.148
∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗ 0.0101 0.278 -0.394∗∗∗ 0.130
(0.0566) (0.0437) (0.154) (0.148) (0.314) (0.144) (0.129)
USQE2 0.137
∗∗ -0.106∗∗ -0.308∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ -0.157
(0.0534) (0.0412) (0.145) (0.140) (0.296) (0.136) (0.122)
USQE3 -0.0797
∗∗ -0.00417 -0.154∗ -0.00574 -0.0963 -0.0890 -0.158∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0255) (0.0899) (0.0863) (0.183) (0.0838) (0.0752)
CBOEV IX 0.00200 0.00550
∗∗ -0.0153∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ -0.00503 -0.00823
(0.00280) (0.00216) (0.00763) (0.00732) (0.0156) (0.00711) (0.00639)
MSCIEM -0.0000129 0.000211
∗ -0.000360 -0.00176∗∗∗ -0.000263 0.000808∗∗ 0.000996∗∗∗
(0.000157) (0.000121) (0.000428) (0.000411) (0.000872) (0.000399) (0.000358)
MSCIWD 0.000307
∗∗∗ -0.0000269 0.000501 0.000467 -0.000438 0.000787∗∗∗ 0.000147
(0.000119) (0.0000917) (0.000323) (0.000310) (0.000659) (0.000301) (0.000271)
N 7134.00 1624.00 1218.00 1305.00 348.00 1218.00 1421.00
R2 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.03 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is QE episode as defined by the key dates for
unconventional monetary policies. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the international spillovers effects of monetary policy by ad-
vanced economies on portfolio investment allocation behaviour. The chapter focuses
mainly on the reallocation of assets by financial intermediaries, to the degree this is
the avenue through which monetary policy is transmitted across borders. The focus is
on the response of institutional investors to changes in monetary policy using micro-
level data of 94 firms domiciled in 13 countries. The research distinguishes between
two policy regimes, periods of conventional and unconventional monetary policy to
further analyse the relation between central bank monetary policy actions and finan-
cial intermediaries’ portfolio allocation. Using the investor asset allocation data, the
research makes several findings on the transmission of monetary policy. The chapter
finds evidence of significant and heterogeneous spillovers across non-bank financial in-
termediaries and periods prior to the crisis or conventional monetary policy and the
post-crisis period of unconventional monetary policy.
First, the international transmission of took place through global institutional in-
vestors. The results suggest that monetary policy prompted rebalancing into equity
allocations, with institutional investors increasing allocation particularly to US equi-
ties.
Second, the results show that the international transmission effect of monetary
policy is present and heterogeneous in the period prior to the global financial crisis
when conventional monetary policy was implemented and in the post-crisis period of
unconventional monetary policy implementation.
Third, among the proxies of the monetary policy stance used to identify the cross-
border spillovers of monetary policy, the shadow policy rate reveals more significant
effects. These significant effects from the shadow policy rate are exhibited both in the
overall sample period and in the post-crisis period compared to the size of the central
bank balance sheet as a proxy of the monetary policy stance. This lends further
support to evidence from prior literature on the capacity of the shadow policy short
rate as a viable alternate measure that can be used to effectively capture monetary
policy across periods of both conventional and unconventional monetary policy. It has
been suggested that this could be on account of large-scale asset purchases proxied by
the size of the central bank balance sheet omitting information content from central
bank communication such as forward guidance, (Buch et al., 2018).
Fourth, the cross-border spillovers of monetary policy dissimilar across the source
countries. Transmission of monetary policies from other advanced economies (the U.K.
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and Japan) other than the largest, the U.S., yields statistically significant effects.
Therefore, the transmission of monetary spillovers from the Non-US central banks
is relevant for into portfolio allocation activity of institutional investors.
Fifth, evidence of cross-border exposure to assets in other advanced economies and
emerging markets and developing economies is found. However, the pattern of the
geographical allocation to other countries other than the source country conducting
monetary policy is not as hypothesised. There is evidence of rebalancing towards
the source country particularly for U.S. equity assets. Furthermore, the results sug-
gest support for the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Institutional investors
respond to monetary policy by rebalancing toward riskier emerging market and devel-
oping economies. This suggests institutional investors have a role in the international
transmission of monetary policy. This offers support for the challenges policymakers
in small and open economies encounter due to changing financial conditions in major
systemic economies and capital flow surges. Principally, the evidence of this analysis
provides support for the economically significant link between the monetary policy ac-
tions of large systemic economies to financial intermediaries’ portfolio allocation. The
expansionary monetary policies induce institutional investors to undertake more risk
and rebalance to other economies.
The chapter contributes to the empirical literature by demonstrating that the in-
ternational transmission of monetary policy is varied in periods of conventional and
unconventional monetary policy. The relationship between monetary policy and finan-
cial markets is crucial on both macroeconomic and microeconomic fronts. A better
comprehension of the cross-border spillover effects of monetary policies implemented
by advanced economies will have implications for financial stability for other economies,
particularly small and open economies. On the microeconomic front, a better compre-
hension of the response of different economic agents (firms, households and financial
intermediaries) to changes in the monetary policy stance may affect credit growth, asst
prices and capital flows. In particular, this research focuses on how one specific group
of financial intermediaries; institutional investors, responds to the monetary policies in
advanced economies. Understanding the response of financial market participants is a
crucial to connecting the changes in asset prices and financial flows to the monetary
policy actions of large systemic economies. A better comprehension of this relation-
ship is beneficial for policy makers to acquire more knowledge distinguishing various
the transmission mechanisms and effects of monetary policy stimulus. Whereas, for
agents in the financial markets, more accurate determination of the response of asset
prices and financial flows to the monetary policy stance will be beneficial in devising
suitable investment choices. The approach of the analysis has some notable limitations.
It does not consider firm-specific characteristics related to balance sheet variables as
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additional sources of heterogeneity in the cross-border transmission of monetary pol-
icy. The lack of identification of the idiosyncratic frictions institutional investors face
does not permit further distinction that spillovers across firms may be varied. These
firm-level characteristics may also vary in importance in periods of conventional and
unconventional monetary policy.
The results have implications for policy makers. The monetary policy stance of
advanced economies’ is important for cross-border portfolio allocation decisions of fi-
nancial intermediaries. This relates the investment allocation behaviour or choices by
institutional investors to cross-border capital inflows received by emerging and devel-
oping economies in the post-crisis period. Both the effects of these policies were varied
across the global financial cycle and the transmission mechanism channels for the cen-
tral bank policy actions were distinct. Therefore, capital inflows as a result of policy
actions in systemic economies will necessitate vigilance in building up tools to bolster
resilience to external shocks by policy makers in emerging and developing economies.
Although the magnitude of the effect and the economic significance is small, there
is support for the role of institutional investors in the surge in capital flows to emerging
market and developing economies unlike Cenedese and Elard (2018) who find insignif-
icant effects for the risk-taking channel of the cross-border transmission of monetary
policy. Additionally, there is more evidence of investors rebalancing toward other de-
veloped economies other than the source country conducting monetary policy. This is
similar to Cenedese and Elard (2018).
The role of systemic economies monetary policies and financial instability, in the
unconventional monetary policy period specifically. Additionally, following the low
interest rate environment and the increased demand for emerging market and devel-
oping economies assets, the role of institutional investors can be investigated further.
Focusing on the portfolio investment in sovereign and corporate assets in emerging
and developing countries by institutional investors would be beneficial in assessing the
potential financial stability risks that may ensue due to balance sheet vulnerability to
external financial conditions.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Panel-unit root tests
Panel unit root tests can be classified as first-generation or second-generation tests. In
this section the panel unit root tests are used to determine the order of integration
of the variables. Non-stationary series may cause spurious regression results. The
hypothesis of the unit rot tests was tested using Fisher-type panel unit root tests to
check if the logarithmic portfolio weight in levels is non-stationary. The advantage of
the Fisher-type panel unit root tests is that they can be used with unbalanced panels
as is the case of the sample of institutional investor firms. Fisher-type tests do not
require strongly balanced data and series can have gaps unlike the panel unit root test
by Im et al. (2003) which requires no gaps in the series. Within the Fisher-type tests
the analysis implements the Phillips-Perron test rather than the Augmented Dickey
Fuller to acquire tests more robust to serial correlation and using a heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent estimator. The Phillips-Perron test uses Newey-West
standard errors taking serial correlation into consideration. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller implements the panel unit root test by using lagged values of the first differenced
variable in the regression.
The null hypothesis of the test is that the panels have unit roots against the alter-
native hypothesis that some panels are stationary. The panel unit root tests include 4
Newey-West lags. The Z-statistic and p-value results for each group are presented in
table 3.13. The panel unit root tests are applied to the unbalanced panel dataset and
strongly rejects the null hypothesis that the series has non-stationarity or all panels
contain unit roots. This suggests that at least one of the panel units is stationary or
at least one institutional investor firm’s portfolio weight in log levels is stationary. The
rejection of the null hypothesis permits the assumption that all portfolio weight in log
levels are stationary. Table 3.13 presents the Fisher unit-root test on the log portfolio
weight for equities. Since we reject the null hypothesis, some non-stationarity needs to
be addressed. Therefore, there is need to find some linear combination that produces
stationary error terms.
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Table 3.13: Panel Unit Root Tests for Institutional Investor Firms-(1999Q4-2016Q4)
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
Demean/trend (no/no) -7.4551 -10.8841 -13.8668 -3.1041 -8.8847 -9.3987
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Demean/trend (yes/yes) -12.6265 -11.1668 -13.7568 -3.1032 -11.5110 -11.5689
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Number of panels 76 62 68 26 65 69
Average number of periods 55.70 53.66 52.97 47.92 54.11 54.78
The Z statistic is reported and p values in parentheses. The null hypothesis is all series are
non-stationary or all panels contain unit roots. The series are demeaned and allow for
deterministic trends and constants.
3.A.2 Panel cointegration tests
Cointegration among the variables will be tested using the seven-test statistic proposed
by (Pedroni, 1999, 2004). Panel cointegration tests seek to provide more stable results
by testing for the existence of cointegration. This is to ascertain whether cointegra-
tion techniques will be suitable. These test statistics for the cointegration tests consist
of two approaches. One type is the group-mean statistics which average the results
of individual test statistics. The second type are the panel statistics which pool to-
gether statistics on within-dimension. These pooled or within-dimension tests assume
a common process or homogeneity of the autoregressive term. Whereas the grouped
or between-dimension tests assumes an individual process or heterogeneity of the au-
toregressive term. Panel cointegration tests are done using Pedroni’s parametric (ADF
and panel v) and non-parametric ( pp and rho) statistics. Table 3.14 presents panel
cointegration tests for the log portfolio weight of equities. They are presented with
the unit specific intercept and unit specific time trend and with only the individual
intercept.
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Table 3.14: Pedroni Panel Cointegration Tests
Within-dimension
Test Statistics Constant Constant and Trend
Panel v 29.3789 *** 34.1439 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Panel rho -21.2781*** -26.3287***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Panel pp -20.9231*** -29.1336***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Panel ADF -21.0471*** -29.3509***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Between-dimension
Group rho -30.7937 *** -30.0714 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Group pp -29.9767 *** -34.1799 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Group ADF -30.0029 *** -34.4677 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Null hypothesis: No cointegration. Common (same) AR parameters for within dimension.
Alternative hypothesis: individual (panel-specific) AR parameters for between-dimension.
Specification: lshare, Fed, CBOEV IX , MSCIEM , MSCIWD.
P-values in parentheses. Levels of significance. * p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.15 and table 3.16 present additional panel cointegration tests for the log
portfolio weight of equities. The results suggest strong evidence of cointegration be-
tween portfolio weight, the shadow short rate, global risk sentiment and returns in
advanced economies and emerging markets equities. All the test statistics are statis-
tically significant. Considering these results, it is possible to estimate the long-run
relationship using panel time series estimators.
Table 3.15: Westerlund ECM Panel Cointegration Tests
Constant Value Z-value p-value Constant and trend Value Z-value p-value
Gt -2.759 -18.480 0.000 Gt -3.601 -26.353 0.000
Ga -14.050 -21.484 0.000 Ga -21.560 -24.693 0.000
Pt -46.238 -20.898 0.000 Pt -58.752 -26.597 0.000
Pa -12.920 -31.729 0.000 Pa -19.963 -31.332 0.000
The null hypothesis of the Westerlund test is no cointegration. Specification: lshare, Fed,
CBOEV IX , MSCIEM , MSCIWD.
Table 3.16: Kao Residual Cointegration Test
Statistic p-value
Dickey-Fuller t -24.9255 0.000
Modified Dickey-Fuller t -43.6568 0.000
Augmented Dickey-Fuller t -19.2580 0.000
Unadjusted Dickey-Fuller t -24.9908 0.000
Unadjusted Modified Dickey-Fuller t -44.0142 0.000
The null hypothesis of the Kao test is no cointegration. Specification: lshare, Fed,
CBOEV IX , MSCIEM , MSCIWD.
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3.A.3 Long-run cointegration relationship estimation
Considering the cointegrating non-stationary variables as evidenced from unit root and
cointegration tests, it is possible to estimate the long-run relationship. Several estima-
tors have been proposed in the literature for the estimation of the long-run relationship.
Considering that our macro panel time series consists of a large N and large T, it intro-
duces additional issues for estimation. The long time series dimension brings about the
challenge of obtaining spurious regression results. Furthermore, the estimation of the
panel OLS estimator of a long-run static model will not provide consistent estimates
(Baltagi2008). In the presence of a large number of observations across time, there
is potential to use the heterogeneous regression rather than homogeneous or pooled
regressions. To address the concerns of a large panel where non-stationarity and coin-
tegration are a concern, several panel time series estimators have been proposed in the
literature.
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3.B Estimation Results
The tables below show the estimated effect of monetary policy by each advanced econ-
omy central bank (Federal Reserve, Bank of England, Bank of Japan and the European
Central Bank) and other explanatory variables on the portfolio weight of country or
region Yit in the portfolio of institutional investor firm i in quarter t :
Yit = α + βMt + λXt + εit (3.2)
Variable Yit denotes the log portfolio weight of institutional investor firm i in quar-
ter t of a country (e.g. U.S., U.K., Japan) or a group of countries (e.g. other advanced
economies, emerging markets and developing economies). Variable Mt captures differ-
ent monetary policy stance measures (asset purchases, shadow policy rate, monetary
policy surprises). The coefficient β should identify the effects of monetary policy on
the portfolio weights. The set of explanatory variables includes several factors. The
total returns index for equities captured by the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI). This is included as MSCIEM for emerging markets and MSCIWD for ad-
vanced economies. The CBOEV IX captures the Chicago Board Options Exchange
(CBOE) volatility index. This measures the implied volatility of the Standards and
Poor’s (S&P 500) index to capture the impact of risk appetite. The returns on bonds
are similarly captured separately for advanced and emerging market countries. The
JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI)is used. The EMBI tracks the per-
formance of hard currency bonds issued by emerging market economies. For advanced
economies, the Bank of America Meryll Lynch bond index is used and defined as
BRAE. The inclusion of these return variables is account for the returns in alternative
asset classes. Here, advanced economies’ returns will be representative of a less risky
alternate asset class than emerging market economies’ assets considered to be more
risky.
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Table 3.17: Federal Reserve Bank Asset Purchases and allocation to equities (1999Q4-
2016Q4)
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fed -0.000684 0.00324∗∗∗ 0.000269 -0.00148 0.0140 -0.00681∗∗ -0.00398
(0.000968) (0.000765) (0.00230) (0.00228) (0.00825) (0.00225) (0.00241)
CBOEV IX 0.00590
∗∗∗ -0.00345∗ -0.00328 0.00553 -0.00740 0.0111∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗
(0.00176) (0.00139) (0.00417) (0.00414) (0.0150) (0.00409) (0.00438)
MSCIEM 0.000405
∗∗∗ -0.000312∗∗∗ -0.000305 0.000792∗∗∗ 0.000237 0.000858∗∗∗ 0.00119∗∗∗
(0.000102) (0.0000803) (0.000241) (0.000240) (0.000866) (0.000236) (0.000253)
MSCIWD 0.000157 -0.000145 0.000695
∗∗ 0.000233 -0.00188∗ 0.000375 0.000325
(0.0000982) (0.0000775) (0.000233) (0.000231) (0.000836) (0.000228) (0.000245)
N 8,320.00 2,132.00 1,300.00 1,508.00 364.00 1,352.00 1,664.00
R2 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.13
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as Fed. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
3.B.1 Equities
Central bank asset purchases and portfolio allocation to equities
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Table 3.18: Bank of England Asset Purchases and allocation to equities (1999Q4-
2016Q4)
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BOE 1.785∗∗∗ -0.849∗∗∗ 1.096 2.379∗∗∗ 3.640 3.555∗∗∗ 4.510∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.211) (0.697) (0.722) (1.981) (0.693) (0.960)
CBOEV IX 0.00833
∗∗ -0.00478∗∗ 0.00310 0.0152∗ 0.00763 0.0168∗∗ 0.0224∗∗
(0.00254) (0.00176) (0.00581) (0.00602) (0.0165) (0.00578) (0.00800)
MSCIEM 0.000510
∗∗ -0.000582∗∗∗ -0.000313 0.00102∗∗ 0.00140 0.000318 0.00264∗∗∗
(0.000159) (0.000110) (0.000364) (0.000377) (0.00103) (0.000361) (0.000501)
MSCIWD 0.0000839 0.0000625 0.000356 0.000138 -0.00136 0.000499 -0.000149
(0.000136) (0.0000938) (0.000310) (0.000321) (0.000882) (0.000309) (0.000427)
N 4840.00 1540.00 660.00 825.00 220.00 770.00 825.00
R2 0.04 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.32
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as BOE. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.19: European Central Bank Asset Purchases and allocation to equities
(1999Q4-2016Q4)
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ECB 0.503 -0.186 -0.290 0.318 2.522 0.832 1.736
(0.286) (0.206) (0.678) (0.803) (1.743) (0.626) (0.900)
CBOEV IX 0.00232 -0.00113 0.00531 0.000515 -0.00344 0.00477 0.00940
(0.00272) (0.00196) (0.00647) (0.00766) (0.0166) (0.00597) (0.00859)
MSCIEM 0.000546
∗∗∗ -0.000540∗∗∗ -0.000310 0.00138∗∗ 0.00174 0.000842∗ 0.00204∗∗∗
(0.000158) (0.000114) (0.000376) (0.000445) (0.000967) (0.000347) (0.000499)
MSCIWD 0.000106 -0.00000590 0.000932
∗∗ 0.000177 -0.00171∗ 0.000103 0.000353
(0.000140) (0.000101) (0.000333) (0.000394) (0.000856) (0.000308) (0.000442)
N 4095.00 1430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R 2 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.24
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as ECB. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.20: Bank of Japan Asset Purchases and allocation to equities
Equity US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BOJ -0.0587 -0.158∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ -0.0409 -1.103∗ 0.168 -0.406
(0.0776) (0.0558) (0.182) (0.219) (0.474) (0.169) (0.244)
CBOEV IX 0.00367 -0.00108 0.000414 0.00406 0.00439 0.00401 0.0158
(0.00262) (0.00188) (0.00616) (0.00738) (0.0160) (0.00570) (0.00824)
MSCIEM 0.000515
∗∗ -0.000554∗∗∗ -0.000167 0.00132∗∗ 0.00153 0.000847∗ 0.00190∗∗∗
(0.000158) (0.000114) (0.000372) (0.000446) (0.000965) (0.000344) (0.000498)
MSCIWD 0.000203 0.0000633 0.000375 0.000273 -0.000846 0.000105 0.000809
(0.000138) (0.0000989) (0.000323) (0.000388) (0.000840) (0.000300) (0.000433)
N 4,095.00 1,430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R2 0.03 0.16 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.24
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as BOJ. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Shadow policy rate and portfolio allocation to equities
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Table 3.21: Federal reserve shadow policy rate and allocation to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 0.0254∗∗ -0.0766∗ -0.0387 0.123 -0.0287 0.0284
(0.00933) (0.0304) (0.0366) (0.0790) (0.0283) (0.0408)
CBOEV IX -0.00175 0.00749 -0.000253 0.0118 0.0103 0.0218
∗∗
(0.00187) (0.00611) (0.00736) (0.0159) (0.00568) (0.00821)
MSCIEM -0.000369
∗∗ -0.000881∗ 0.00100∗ 0.00267∗ 0.000583 0.00242∗∗∗
(0.000126) (0.000409) (0.000493) (0.00106) (0.000381) (0.000550)
MSCIWD -0.000138 0.00135
∗∗ 0.000451 -0.00213 0.000431 0.000257
(0.000134) (0.000438) (0.000528) (0.00114) (0.000408) (0.000589)
N 1,430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R2 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.25
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as Fed. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.22: Bank of England shadow policy rate and allocation to equities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
BOE 0.0259∗∗ -0.0672∗ -0.0560 0.0910 -0.0278 0.00859
(0.00800) (0.0262) (0.0313) (0.0680) (0.0244) (0.0353)
CBOEV IX -0.00215 0.00698 0.00585 0.00498 0.00714 0.0172
∗
(0.00194) (0.00637) (0.00760) (0.0165) (0.00593) (0.00858)
MSCIEM -0.000274
∗ -0.000921∗ 0.000663 0.00231∗ 0.000568 0.00194∗∗∗
(0.000116) (0.000380) (0.000453) (0.000984) (0.000354) (0.000511)
MSCIWD -0.000132 0.00114
∗∗ 0.000589 -0.00162 0.000282 0.000617
(0.000121) (0.000396) (0.000473) (0.00103) (0.000369) (0.000534)
N 1430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R2 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.23
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as BOE. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
123
Table 3.23: European central bank shadow policy rate and allocation to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECB 0.0291∗∗ -0.0832∗∗ -0.0386 0.0313 -0.0490 -0.0523
(0.00974) (0.0318) (0.0384) (0.0834) (0.0293) (0.0422)
CBOEV IX -0.00112 0.00678 0.00439 -0.00150 0.00555 0.00992
(0.00192) (0.00628) (0.00758) (0.0165) (0.00579) (0.00834)
MSCIEM -0.000516
∗∗∗ -0.000389 0.00129∗∗ 0.00175 0.000783∗ 0.00198∗∗∗
(0.000118) (0.000385) (0.000465) (0.00101) (0.000355) (0.000511)
MSCIWD 0.000151 0.000477 0.00000495 -0.00139 -0.000103 0.000142
(0.0000976) (0.000318) (0.000385) (0.000836) (0.000293) (0.000423)
N 1,430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R2 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.24
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as ECB. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.24: Bank of Japan shadow policy rate and allocation to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOJ 0.0487∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗ -0.0680 0.123 -0.0760 -0.0171
(0.0146) (0.0471) (0.0573) (0.124) (0.0441) (0.0642)
CBOEV IX -0.00322 0.0114 0.00430 -0.00136 0.00958 0.0150
(0.00198) (0.00640) (0.00779) (0.0169) (0.00599) (0.00872)
MSCIEM -0.000596
∗∗∗ -0.000175 0.00152∗∗∗ 0.00164 0.000910∗∗ 0.00204∗∗∗
(0.000114) (0.000370) (0.000450) (0.000973) (0.000346) (0.000503)
MSCIWD 0.000109 0.000543 0.0000500 -0.00110 0.00000229 0.000500
(0.0000989) (0.000320) (0.000389) (0.000843) (0.000299) (0.000436)
N 1,430.00 520.00 650.00 260.00 585.00 650.00
R2 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.23
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as BOJ. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.25: Federal reserve unconventional monetary surprise and allocation to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed -0.0286 1.018 -0.835 -1.333 1.189∗ -1.097∗
(0.178) (0.606) (0.632) (1.256) (0.587) (0.527)
CBOEV IX 0.000925 0.0133 0.00746 0.000281 0.0305
∗∗∗ -0.00720
(0.00216) (0.00737) (0.00768) (0.0153) (0.00713) (0.00641)
MSCIEM -0.0000860 -0.000505 0.0000792 0.00144
∗ 0.00150∗∗∗ -0.000378
(0.0000928) (0.000316) (0.000330) (0.000655) (0.000306) (0.000275)
MSCIWD -0.0000388 0.00100
∗∗∗ -0.0000445 -0.00121∗ 0.000372 -0.000255
(0.0000858) (0.000292) (0.000305) (0.000605) (0.000283) (0.000254)
N 1,550.00 1100.00 1,225.00 325.00 1,200.00 1,325.00
R2 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as Fed. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
Unconventional monetary policy surprise
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Table 3.26: Bank of England unconventional monetary policy surprise and allocation
to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOE 0 0 0 0 0 0
(0.212) (0.604) (0.617) (1.192) (0.534) (0.534)
CBOEV IX 0.000591 0.292
∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗
(0.00288) (0.00821) (0.00839) (0.0162) (0.00727) (0.00726)
MSCIEM -0.000909
∗∗∗ -0.0129∗∗∗ -0.00618∗∗∗ -0.0120∗∗∗ -0.00911∗∗∗ -0.00655∗∗∗
(0.000168) (0.000478) (0.000489) (0.000944) (0.000423) (0.000423)
MSCIWD -0.000157 0.000458 -0.000609
∗ -0.00207∗∗∗ -0.000572∗ -0.000564∗
(0.0000987) (0.000281) (0.000287) (0.000555) (0.000249) (0.000249)
N 828.00 672.00 720.00 204.00 720.00 768.00
R2 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.02
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as BOE. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
Table 3.27: European central bank unconventional monetary policy surprise and allo-
cation to equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECB 0.195 0.569 -0.321 1.003 -1.002 0.341
(0.222) (0.759) (0.790) (1.568) (0.733) (0.660)
CBOEV IX 0.0000435 0.00390 0.0126 0.00456 0.0232
∗∗∗ -0.00212
(0.00192) (0.00656) (0.00683) (0.0136) (0.00633) (0.00570)
MSCIEM -0.0000574 -0.000839
∗ 0.0000709 0.00163∗ 0.00115∗∗∗ -0.000264
(0.0000964) (0.000329) (0.000343) (0.000680) (0.000318) (0.000286)
MSCIWD -0.0000552 0.000916
∗∗ 0.0000447 -0.00113 0.000345 -0.000170
(0.0000867) (0.000296) (0.000308) (0.000612) (0.000286) (0.000258)
N 1,550.00 1,100.00 1,225.00 325.00 1,200.00 1325.00
R2 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as ECB. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
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Table 3.28: Bank of Japan unconventional monetary policy surprise and allocation to
equities
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOJ 2.892∗∗∗ -4.229 3.250 4.711 -1.802 5.995∗
(0.808) (2.755) (2.872) (5.705) (2.667) (2.396)
CBOEV IX 0.00384
∗ 0.000320 0.0151∗ 0.0124 0.0159∗ 0.00330
(0.00193) (0.00660) (0.00688) (0.0137) (0.00639) (0.00574)
MSCIEM 0.000144 -0.00101
∗∗ 0.000313 0.00209∗∗ 0.000950∗∗ 0.0000670
(0.0000940) (0.000320) (0.000334) (0.000663) (0.000310) (0.000279)
MSCIWD 0.0000439 0.000777
∗∗ 0.0000888 -0.000926 0.0000851 -0.0000522
(0.0000852) (0.000291) (0.000303) (0.000602) (0.000281) (0.000253)
N 1,550.00 1,100.00 1,225.00 325.00 1,200.00 1325.00
R2 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.01
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ MSCIEM + MSCIWD. The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to equity Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as BOJ. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
127
Table 3.29: Federal reserve bank asset purchases and allocation to bonds
Bonds US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Fed 0.00301 0.00827 0.00114 -0.00225 -0.0822 -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.0168
(0.00596) (0.00634) (0.000650) (0.00510) (0.112) (0.00390) (0.0108)
CBOEV IX -0.00676 -0.0184 0.00371
∗∗ 0.00484 0.0306 0.0259∗∗ -0.0171
(0.0102) (0.0108) (0.00127) (0.00871) (0.234) (0.00886) (0.0219)
JPMEMBI -0.0115
∗∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ 0.000372 -0.00379∗ -0.0743∗∗ 0.00812∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗
(0.00222) (0.00236) (0.000225) (0.00190) (0.0282) (0.00180) (0.00535)
BRAE 0.0171
∗∗ 0.0392∗∗∗ -0.00157∗ -0.00498 0.123 -0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0420∗∗
(0.00576) (0.00613) (0.000652) (0.00493) (0.0870) (0.00468) (0.0140)
N 104.00 52.00 38.00 52.00 16.00 27.00 36.00
R2 0.75 0.89 0.27 0.75 1.00 0.92 0.55
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as Fed. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
3.B.2 Bonds
Central bank asset purchases and portfolio allocation to bonds
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Table 3.30: Bank of England asset purchases and allocation to bonds
Bonds US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
BOE 0.00160 0.420 1.245∗∗∗ -0.416 0 -4.676 -3.290
(0.926) (1.238) (0.151) (1.060) (26.34) (5.504) (2.905)
CBOEV IX -0.00451 0.00202 -0.00503
∗∗ -0.0110 0 0.218∗∗∗ 0.0850∗∗
(0.00803) (0.0107) (0.00195) (0.00920) (0.284) (0.0411) (0.0263)
JPMEMBI -0.00738
∗∗∗ -0.0118∗∗∗ -0.00109∗∗ -0.00297 -0.0443∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.000121
(0.00193) (0.00259) (0.000367) (0.00221) (0.0156) (0.00841) (0.00680)
BRAE 0.00827 0.0196
∗∗ 0.00286∗∗ -0.00304 0.0751 -0.0864∗∗∗ -0.00319
(0.00478) (0.00639) (0.00107) (0.00547) (0.0750) (0.0251) (0.0169)
N 110.00 55.00 30.00 55.00 8.00 48.00 48.00
R2 0.67 0.76 0.53 0.68 1.00 0.45 0.31
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as BOE. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.31: European Central Bank asset purchases and allocation to bonds
Bonds US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ECB 0.00287 -1.430 0.280∗∗ 1.436 0 2.522∗∗∗ 7.512∗∗
(0.891) (1.031) (0.0910) (0.829) (10.70) (0.514) (2.441)
CBOEV IX -0.0127 -0.00834 -0.000673 -0.0170
∗ 1.229∗∗∗ -0.0174∗ 0.0852∗∗∗
(0.00833) (0.00964) (0.00125) (0.00775) (0.157) (0.00711) (0.0253)
JPMEMBI -0.0116
∗∗∗ -0.0167∗∗∗ -0.000146 -0.00646∗∗∗ -0.155∗∗∗ 0.00557∗∗∗ 0.00344
(0.00187) (0.00217) (0.000220) (0.00174) (0.0190) (0.00141) (0.00642)
BRAE 0.0184
∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.000393 0.00532 0.430∗∗∗ -0.0203∗∗∗ -0.0130
(0.00461) (0.00534) (0.000625) (0.00429) (0.0435) (0.00367) (0.0160)
N 128.00 64.00 38.00 64.00 16.00 27.00 48.00
R2 0.76 0.88 0.43 0.77 1.00 0.95 0.33
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as ECB. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.32: Bank of Japan asset purchases and allocations to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Bonds US UK EU Japan OAE EM
BOJ -1.364∗∗∗ -0.966∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ -1.763∗∗∗ 25.41∗∗∗ 1.905∗∗∗ 1.902∗∗
(0.227) (0.268) (0.0407) (0.196) (4.737) (0.412) (0.673)
CBOEV IX -0.00511 -0.00485 -0.00110 -0.00537 0.535
∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.0672∗
(0.00817) (0.00964) (0.00133) (0.00707) (0.246) (0.00893) (0.0270)
JPMEMBI -0.00810
∗∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗ -0.000954∗∗∗ -0.00152 -0.113∗∗∗ 0.00722∗∗∗ -0.00742
(0.00189) (0.00224) (0.000243) (0.00164) (0.0307) (0.00193) (0.00700)
BRAE 0.0112
∗ 0.0272∗∗∗ 0.00148∗ -0.00484 0.127 0.0431∗∗∗ 0.0125
(0.00459) (0.00541) (0.000699) (0.00397) (0.0687) (0.00507) (0.0172)
N 128.00 64.00 38.00 64.00 16.00 27.00 48.00
r2 0.78 0.87 0.40 0.81 1.00 0.89 0.30
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is asset purchases denoted as BOJ. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.33: Bank of England shadow policy rate and allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOE -0.0490 -0.00361 0.0354 2.727∗∗∗ 0.0917∗∗∗ 0.163∗
(0.0352) (0.00417) (0.0289) (0.216) (0.0124) (0.0816)
CBOEV IX -0.0241
∗ 0.00633∗∗∗ -0.00508 0.0300 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.00946) (0.00118) (0.00777) (0.142) (0.00371) (0.0259)
JPMEMBI -0.0176
∗∗∗ 0.000785∗∗∗ -0.00594∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗ 0.00723∗∗∗ 0.00356
(0.00212) (0.000212) (0.00174) (0.0179) (0.000740) (0.00653)
BRAE 0.0312
∗∗∗ -0.00329∗∗∗ 0.00588 -0.190∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗∗ -0.00495
(0.00530) (0.000773) (0.00436) (0.0392) (0.00205) (0.0165)
N 64.00 38.00 64.00 16.00 27.00 48.00
R2 0.90 0.32 0.77 1.00 0.96 0.34
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as BOE. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Shadow policy rate and portfolio allocation to bonds
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Table 3.34: European central bank shadow policy rate and allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECB 0.00461 0.000857 0.00782 -1.089∗ 0.0862∗∗ 0.125
(0.0312) (0.00484) (0.0306) (0.510) (0.0311) (0.0839)
CBOEV IX -0.0443
∗∗∗ 0.00454∗∗∗ -0.0147 0.600∗∗ 0.00405 0.106∗∗∗
(0.00815) (0.00122) (0.00800) (0.193) (0.00686) (0.0272)
JPMEMBI -0.0181
∗∗∗ 0.000600∗ -0.00647∗∗∗ -0.0910∗∗∗ 0.00528∗∗∗ 0.0000455
(0.00178) (0.000236) (0.00175) (0.0272) (0.00135) (0.00647)
BRAE 0.0363
∗∗∗ -0.00253∗∗ 0.00618 0.122 -0.0128∗∗ 0.00114
(0.00463) (0.000827) (0.00455) (0.0752) (0.00423) (0.0162)
N 64.00 38.00 64.00 16.00 27.00 48.00
R2 0.92 0.35 0.78 1.00 0.94 0.35
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as ECB. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
Table 3.35: Bank of Japan shadow policy rate and portfolio allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOJ 0.254∗∗∗ -0.0172 0.207∗∗∗ 2.114∗∗ -0.325∗∗ 0.0175
(0.0668) (0.0101) (0.0395) (0.650) (0.124) (0.180)
CBOEV IX -0.0110 0.00361
∗∗ 0.00562 -0.0181 0.0360∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.00867) (0.00132) (0.00513) (0.166) (0.00891) (0.0263)
JPMEMBI -0.0129
∗∗∗ -0.0000599 -0.000462 -0.00641 0.00503∗ 0.00464
(0.00202) (0.000234) (0.00120) (0.0216) (0.00229) (0.00703)
BRAE 0.0231
∗∗∗ -0.000503 -0.00795∗∗ 0.000536 -0.0128∗∗ -0.0149
(0.00483) (0.000691) (0.00286) (0.0448) (0.00472) (0.0168)
N 64.00 38.00 64.00 16.00 27.00 48.00
R2 0.90 0.31 0.85 1.00 0.89 0.41
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the shadow policy rate denoted as BOJ. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p <0.01
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Table 3.36: Federal reserve monetary policy surprise and allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fed 5.895∗∗∗ 0 0.231 0 -12.60∗∗∗ -4.666
(1.510) (0.254) (0.976) (11.34) (1.227) (2.687)
CBOEV IX -0.0132 0.0311
∗∗∗ 0.0439∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.0635∗∗∗ -0.0250
(0.0150) (0.00328) (0.00970) (0.207) (0.0148) (0.0288)
JPMEMBI -0.0170
∗∗∗ -0.00268∗∗∗ -0.00730∗∗∗ -0.0708∗ 0.00944∗∗∗ -0.00592
(0.00275) (0.000525) (0.00178) (0.0294) (0.00264) (0.00596)
BRAE 0.0335
∗∗∗ 0.0148∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.120 -0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0111
(0.00956) (0.00188) (0.00618) (0.117) (0.00922) (0.0198)
N 100.00 16.00 25.00 8.00 18.00 60.00
R 0.70 1.00 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.20
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as Fed. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
Unconventional monetary policy surprise
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Table 3.37: Bank of England monetary policy surprise and allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOE 0 0 0 0 0 0
(1.724) (0.000421) (0.705) (12.34) (1.900) (3.135)
CBOEV IX -0.0763
∗∗∗ 0 0.0354∗∗∗ 0 0 0.0544
(0.0205) (0.00000547) (0.00837) (0.150) (0.00946) (0.0425)
JPMEMBI -0.0203
∗∗∗ -0.000000294 -0.00316∗ -0.0191 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0124
(0.00376) (0.000000757) (0.00154) (0.0220) (0.00190) (0.00955)
BRAE 0.0341
∗∗ 0 -0.00333 0 -0.0680∗∗∗ -0.0434
(0.0132) (0.00000281) (0.00538) (0.0640) (0.00704) (0.0314)
N 48.00 7.00 12.00 4.00 8.00 45.00
R2 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.19
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as BOE. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
Table 3.38: European central bank monetary policy surprise and allocation to bonds
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ECB -13.27∗∗∗ 3.151∗∗∗ -1.121 0 58.70∗∗∗ -6.257
(1.804) (0.328) (1.340) (6.653) (1.406) (5.121)
CBOEV IX -0.00926 -0.00900
∗∗ 0.0454∗∗∗ -0.114 0.229∗∗∗ 0.0175
(0.0131) (0.00304) (0.00971) (0.168) (0.0127) (0.0258)
JPMEMBI -0.0169
∗∗∗ -0.00161∗∗ -0.00752∗∗∗ -0.0708∗∗ 0.0193∗∗∗ -0.00487
(0.00272) (0.000512) (0.00202) (0.0259) (0.00255) (0.00590)
BRAE 0.0201
∗ 0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0142∗ 0.120 0.294∗∗∗ 0.00388
(0.00948) (0.00179) (0.00704) (0.0991) (0.00882) (0.0195)
N 100.00 16.00 25.00 8.00 18.00 60.00
R2 0.72 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.19
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as ECB. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
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Table 3.39: Bank of Japan monetary policy surprise and allocation to bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
US UK EU Japan OAE EM
BOJ -29.18∗∗∗ 0 -1.586 0 102.3∗∗∗ -12.52
(6.792) (1.300) (4.637) (31.37) (5.975) (15.15)
CBOEV IX -0.0387
∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0393∗∗∗ -0.114 -0.181∗∗∗ -0.00366
(0.0133) (0.00335) (0.00905) (0.154) (0.0129) (0.0263)
JPMEMBI -0.0205
∗∗∗ 0.000581 -0.00735∗∗∗ -0.0708∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ -0.00711
(0.00277) (0.000566) (0.00189) (0.0239) (0.00263) (0.00595)
BRAE 0.0458
∗∗∗ 0.00953∗∗∗ 0.0147∗ 0.120 -0.134∗∗∗ 0.0165
(0.00954) (0.00202) (0.00651) (0.0780) (0.00909) (0.0197)
N 100.00 16.00 25.00 8.00 18.00 60.00
R2 0.72 1.00 0.94 1.00 0.99 0.21
Specification: lshare = Mt + CBOEV IX+ JPMEMBI + BRAE . The dependent variable is log
portfolio weight to bonds Yit or (lshare). Mt is the monetary policy surprise or monetary policy
shock denoted as BOJ. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: * p <0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p <0.01
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Table 3.40: List of Countries
Firm Domicile Countries Destination Countries
Australia Algeria Hong Kong Peru
Belgium Argentina Hungary Philippines
Canada Australia Iceland Poland
Denmark Austria India Portugal
France Bahrain Indonesia Qatar
Germany Bangladesh Iraq Romania
Italy Belgium Ireland Russia
Japan Belize Israel Singapore
Netherlands Bermuda Italy Slovakia
South Africa Brazil Ivory Coast Slovenia
Switzerland Bulgaria Jamaica South Africa
United Kingdom Canada Japan South Korea
United States Chile Jordan Spain
China Kazakhstan Sri Lanka
Colombia Kenya Switzerland
Costa Rica Kuwait Taiwan
Croatia Lebanon Tanzania
Cyprus Luxembourg Thailand
Czech Rep Macao Togo
Denmark Malaysia Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Malta Turkey
Ecuador Mauritius United Arab Emirates
Egypt Mexico United States
El Salvador Morocco Uruguay
Estonia Netherlands Venezuela
Euro Area New Zealand Vietnam
Finland Nigeria Zambia
France Norway
Gabon Oman
Georgia Pakistan
Germany Panama
Ghana Papua New Guinea
Greece Paraguay
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Chapter 4
Uncertainty and Foreign Direct
Investment
4.1 Introduction
Emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) have experienced a significant
increase in capital flows, enhancing financial integration with the rest of the world.
While this has facilitated easier access to global financial markets, it has also resulted in
challenges emanating from shifts in external financial conditions especially for countries
where the volume of capital flows in proportion to economic size is considerably large.
For these economies, fluctuations in capital flows generate significant effects. While part
of the expansion and contraction in flows is due to shocks in macroeconomic variables,
however much of the sources of this variation are still unaccountable (Gourio et al.,
2016). Fluctuations in flows compelled by macroeconomic factors or fundamentals such
as productivity could be an indication of the redistribution of capital across countries
in search for higher yields. Conversely, fluctuations caused by non-economic factors
such as investor sentiment or herding behaviour may compel policy intervention to
inhibit the macroeconomic and financial instabilities that may arise from the volatility
of capital flows (Choi and Furceri, 2019; Ahmed and Zlate, 2014).
Uncertainty shocks exert a significant negative effect on macroeconomic activity
(Bloom, 2009). Assessed using various proxies in the literature, an increase in eco-
nomic uncertainty adversely affects consumption, investment, production and employ-
ment (Bloom, 2009; Baker et al., 2016). While evidence of this unfavourable effect
of economic uncertainty has been shown for macroeconomic activity and equity mar-
kets, the effects of uncertainty on cross-border capital flows remains limited. Empirical
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studies analysing the sensitivity of different types of cross-border capital flows to un-
certainty shocks reveal negative significant effects. This evidenced from examining the
effects of uncertainty on aggregate capital flows (Gourio et al., 2016). Other studies
have used the sub-components of capital flows in explaining the sensitivity of flows to
uncertainty. The negative influence of uncertainty has been found for foreign direct
investment flows (Julio and Yook, 2016), portfolio flows (Gauvin et al., 2014) and bank
flows (Wang, 2018; Choi and Furceri, 2019).
I extend the literature by examining the effects of economic uncertainty on foreign
direct investment to emerging market and developing economies. While the negative
influence of uncertainty on capital flows has been found in various empirical studies,
limited evidence exists on the degree to which this effect differs across various kinds of
uncertainty. Choi and Shim (2019) highlight that the empirical literature has focused
more on general rather than specific types of uncertainty. Moreover, they emphasise
that although the impact of various types of uncertainty on the economy will vary
depending its source, the focus of empirical studies has been on the homogeneous
rather than heterogeneous impact of uncertainty owing to the high correlation between
proxies of uncertainty. In this chapter, the impact of different kinds of uncertainty on
foreign direct investment is analysed. Using various proxies, I estimate the impact of
macroeconomic, financial, political and policy uncertainty on bilateral foreign direct
investment flows using a gravity model.
There has been a substantial increase in direct cross-border investment in the global
economy. Numerous studies examine the push and pull factors driving foreign direct in-
vestment flows. Through providing foreign investors with ownership and management
control over assets, foreign direct investment provides a more stable and long-term
investment (Cai et al., 2018). Moreover, in destination countries, foreign direct invest-
ment promotes the transfer of technology among countries and the opportunity to sell
products on the international market.
Given that direct cross-border investment activity was adversely affected during the
global financial crisis (GFC) along with heightened uncertainty globally, it is relevant
to assess the role of uncertainty in explaining the pattern of capital flows. Nevertheless,
the literature has progressively concentrated on the effects of uncertainty on macroe-
conomic activity (Baker et al., 2016). On the other hand, fewer studies examine the
effects of uncertainty on international capital flows on a global level. It has been shown
that global uncertainty or global risk aversion measured by the VIX is a significant sup-
ply side driver of cross-border capital flows (Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Rey, 2015).
Limited studies use country-specific uncertainty to investigate the role of uncertainty
in cross-border capital flows (Gourio et al., 2016; Gauvin et al., 2014; Julio and Yook,
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2016). However, these studies are conducted at the aggregate level using Balance of
Payments (BOP) statistics data.
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the effects of higher uncer-
tainty on foreign direct investment flows. Divergent from prior studies undertaken on
an aggregate level, this chapter exploits bilateral flow data, an identification strategy
adopted in Wang (2018) and Choi and Furceri (2019) in their analysis of the effects
of heightened uncertainty on cross-border bank flows. Using a similar identification
strategy, this chapter contributes to the limited studies that use cross-country het-
erogeneity in uncertainty to explain the movement in capital flows. Specifically, this
chapter examines how multinational corporations adjust their foreign direct investment
in response to higher uncertainty in both the origin and destination economies. This is
done by using data on bilateral cross-border foreign direct investment from the OECD
database to identify the role of country-specific uncertainty in determining foreign
direct investment flows. Only Kellard et al. (2018) use country-specific uncertainty
analyse the pattern of foreign direct investment flows. Moreover, while their analysis
uses similar bilateral level foreign direct investment data, it is limited to uncertainty
measures related sovereign risk and financial system (banking) risk and their empir-
ical strategy estimates the impact on inward and outward foreign direct investment
separately. This analysis does not distinguish between the effects from the source and
destination country. Contrastingly, the analysis considers the effects of different types
of uncertainty on foreign direct investment flows by estimating a gravity equation using
the Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood estimator with fixed effects with the inclusion
of both origin and host countries. The dyadic structure of bilateral-level data permits
for the control for fixed effects and improved identification of uncertainty effects (Choi
and Furceri, 2019).1
I contribute to the literature by examining whether the effects of uncertainty re-
garding financial markets, economic policy and about the political and macroeconomic
environment have different impact on foreign direct investment. The focus of this
chapter is on emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) and the role of
country-specific uncertainty in driving foreign direct investment flows. This chapter
contributes to the literature analysing the effects of high uncertainty on cross-border
capital flows in a bilateral setting. Therefore, I extend the literature by using bilateral
level foreign direct investment flows to emerging market and developing countries and
1This strategy is similar to Julio and Yook (2016) in their investigation of the role of higher
uncertainty arising from presidential elections in the host country on foreign direct investment inflows
into the host country. However, this analysis is restricted to foreign direct investment flows coming
solely from the United States. This implies that they only control for the supply-side of foreign
direct investment and examine how cross-country heterogeneity in uncertainty explains foreign direct
investment inflows into host countries.
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country-specific measures of uncertainty. Using bilateral data, this chapter examines
how variation in uncertainty across countries impacts foreign direct investment flows to
emerging market and developing countries. This is a similar to Wang (2018) and Choi
and Furceri (2019) who examine the role of uncertainty for bilateral bank flows and
Kellard et al. (2018) on the role of risk on bilateral foreign direct investment. The main
difference from these empirical studies is the consideration of the impact of different
kinds of uncertainty in driving bilateral capital flows.
Four specific measures of uncertainty are used in this chapter are (i) stock market
volatility to measure financial uncertainty (ii) economic policy uncertainty index from
Baker et al. (2016) to measure economic policy uncertainty (iii) exchange rate volatil-
ity and price volatility to capture macroeconomic uncertainty and (iv) political risk
indicators to capture political uncertainty. These measures are used to capture the
different dimensions of uncertainty in the economy.
This chapter relates to work on foreign direct investment and the role of economic
and political factors in both source and host countries as drivers of foreign direct
investment. The literature has focused more on the economic factors (e.g. GDP,
market size, level of development, etc.) and non-economic factors (e.g. institutional
and political risk, investment environment etc.) of the host country as determinants
of foreign direct investment. However, there is limited coverage of on the role of both
economic and non-economic determinants of source countries (Feng, 2017). Although,
the extant literature on the determinants of foreign direct investment focus on the host
country economic and non-economic determinants there is also relevance in contrasting
the role of home versus host country factors. Feng (2017) suggests that the assumption
in the literature that home country conditions are constant or the same across countries
is incorrect. 2
Uncertainty may detrimental for the multinational corporation’s investment activ-
ities and this effect may vary depending on whether it arises in the home country or
host country. On the one hand, uncertainty at home may affect the capacity of the
multinational corporation to venture abroad. Similarly, uncertainty in the host country
may affect the profitability. It has been argued that the economic and political situa-
tion in the source country may also be relevant. For example, policy change following
2For example, political change in a source country may influence the volume of outward foreign
direct investment if the political outcomes result in a policy shift toward investment in the domestic
economy through more penalties or taxes on multinational corporations engaged in foreign direct
investment activities abroad. Similarly, political or policy changes in the host country may encourage
or deter capital flows. If the former this may be the case if the country is leaning toward making
enhancing its attractiveness as a destination for foreign direct investment. Contrastingly, policy or
political changes that favour more control and restrictions on the withdrawal of capital by non-residents
from the domestic economy may induce outflows or alternatively result in the host country receiving
less outflows.
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an election may result in new incentives or conversely barriers for outward investment
resulting in reduced outflows. Similarly, economic interests in the host country may
be more receptive and encouraging toward foreign investment. Therefore, changes in
the business environment in both source and host countries may be relevant for the
foreign direct investment decision. The literature has focused more on the economic
and non-economic(e.g. political risk) factors of host countries as determinants of for-
eign direct investment with limited literature focusing on the role of economic and
non-economic determinants of This chapter examines the role of both as determinants
of foreign direct investment flows.
The findings from the analysis of how multinational corporations adjust their cross-
border direct investment in response to elevated uncertainty in the both the origin and
recipient country are varied. The results using four measures of uncertainty regarding
various aspects of the economy show that the different forms of uncertainty do not move
in the same direction. Higher uncertainty regarding financial markets in the host coun-
try lowers foreign direct investment coming into the economy. This response is present
for advanced economies and not emerging market recipient countries. Furthermore,
political uncertainty is a significant determinant for foreign direct investment flows
when the role of government stability is considered for host countries. For developed
market recipients, heightened government instability induces multinational corpora-
tions to curtail foreign direct investment flows into the economy whereas for emerging
market economies this matters less. For macroeconomic uncertainty, source country
conditions are more relevant in driving bilateral foreign direct investment flows. Multi-
national corporations increase outward foreign direct investment in response to higher
macroeconomic uncertainty at home. This effect is evident for foreign direct investment
flows towards advanced economy and not emerging market recipients. Furthermore,
multinational corporations’ lower outflows in response to heightened economic policy
uncertainty both at home and abroad. An increase in economic policy uncertainty
in the source country discourages multinational corporations from engaging in risky
foreign direct investment abroad resulting in lower outflows overall. Furthermore, ad-
vanced economies with higher policy uncertainty attract less foreign direct investment.
In addition, greater economic policy uncertainty in the source country of the multina-
tional firm, makes it less attractive for cross-border direct investment going to emerging
market recipients. Economic policy uncertainty matters more for foreign direct in-
vestment to emerging market recipients. Therefore, advanced economies with greater
uncertainty regarding financial, political, macroeconomic and economic policy attract
less foreign direct investment flows. On the other hand, multinational corporations
invest less in emerging market host countries with high economic policy uncertainty.
The other aspects of uncertainty matter less for emerging market recipient countries.
141
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 reviews recent empirical
literature on uncertainty and its effects on different aspects of macroeconomic activities
and capital flows. Section 4.3 describes the data on cross-border direct investment
flows, uncertainty and other macroeconomic control variables. Section 4.4 provides the
empirical framework and proposes the empirical strategy used. Section 4.5 presents
the main results and robustness checks. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Risk and Uncertainty
The difference between risk and uncertainty initially identified by Frank Knight in 1921
(Guerron-Quintana, 2012; Bloom, 2014). He distinguished risk as the unknown out-
comes whose probability of occurring can be approximated or at least informed about.
Knight characterised risk as a set of events for which the probability distribution is
known. Within the literature this has been described as Knightian risk or subjective
uncertainty (Guerron-Quintana, 2012). In contrast, Knight identified uncertainty as
the unknown outcomes or unanticipated events for which the probability of occurrence
cannot be measured or for which there is no information on the possible outcomes.
Knight alternatively identified uncertainty as the incapacity of people to predict the
probability of events occurring (Bloom, 2014). This inability to ascertain the likelihood
of events occurring is alternatively referred to as Knightian uncertainty or subjective
uncertainty (Guerron-Quintana, 2012). Due to the lack of information, probabilities
of the potential outcomes cannot be assigned or there is no knowledge of all the po-
tential outcomes that could occur. Uncertainty refers to the notion of the ambiguity
pertaining to future macroeconomic outcomes as perceived by managers, consumers
and policymakers but also to the indeterminacy of macroeconomic and microeconomic
developments and occurrence of exogenous events (Bloom, 2014).
4.2.2 Transmission channels of uncertainty effects
There are several probable channels through which uncertainty may dampen output.
Within the components of aggregate demand, investment is the most responsive to
uncertainty, followed by much lesser sensitivity in consumption and no effect on gov-
ernment expenditure, (Bloom, 2017). Bloom’s observation implies that the dampening
effect of uncertainty shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) manifests through the
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investment channel and to a lesser extent through consumption. This suggests that
fluctuations in uncertainty impact on behaviour. According to Haddow et al. (2013),
the role of uncertainty in affecting economic activity is identifiable through demand
side and supply side channels detailed in table 4.1.
Investment This component of aggregate demand may be more responsive to
uncertainty shocks due to the irreversibility of investment. First, the effect of risk on
economic agents may manifest through its implications on decisions related to invest-
ment. For example, in a situation of heightened risk, firms and households may be
opt do delay investment activities until the outlook improves. The potential of an un-
favourable outcome prompts firms and households to wait. Alternatively, uncertainty
about potential outcomes impels firms and households to consider the appropriate time
to undertake investment. Firms are more probable to respond to an environment of
uncertainty by delaying irreversible investment (Bernanke, 1983; McDonald and Siegel,
1986). Therefore, this indicates that uncertainty has a detrimental impact on invest-
ment. similarly, from the perspective of the multinational firm, the incentive to make
the decision to undertake major risky foreign direct investment abroad is likely to be
negatively influenced in times of elevated uncertainty. In addition, it has also been
suggested that the credit constraints of firms and the cost of external finance may rise
with uncertainty for the reason that uncertainty increases risk premia. (Bloom, 2014).
Consumption This component of aggregate demand responds to uncertainty
shocks through household’s inclination to increase precautionary savings in periods
of elevated uncertainty. A change in risk will have an effect on the decision to consume
or save. For example, household and firms facing a sudden change in interest rate costs
will have to decide on whether to pursue consumption or saving options. Similarly,
a country issuing debt to supplement investment or support government expenditure
will be affected by a prospective hike in interest rates. In this case, the prospect
of higher interest rates, may compel the country to opt to repay the debt early to
avoid a higher interest rate cost burden in the future. The option for early debt
repayment may necessitate an increase in production in order to generate adequate
revenues. However, generating an increase in production such as hiring more workers
or building factories within a limited time frame may not be feasible. Alternatively,
the country may opt to lower government expenditures by decreasing consumption and
investment to achieve early debt repayment. Put differently, this implies increasing
exports and lowering imports which may result in reduced production in some sectors
of the economy. Consequently, this reduced production may lead to less hiring or
increased unemployment.
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4.2.3 Uncertainty and the business cycle
Three stylised facts related to the measures used to approximate uncertainty have
emerged within the literature. First, the measures of uncertainty are correlated with
real economic activity factors. Second, the measures of uncertainty are countercyclical.
Third, the measures of uncertainty rise rapidly in periods of recession. Furthermore,
uncertainty can be viewed as either the source or result of fluctuations in the business
cycle. These three stylised facts convey that uncertainty may be either a relevant
independent determinant of the business cycle or the result of other shocks but can
also be a combination of both external sources of deviations as well as the reaction to
changes in the business cycle (Castelnuovo et al., 2017).
Bloom (2014) identifies four theoretical mechanisms why recessions may elevate
uncertainty. First, the active trading by firms in good times generates and spreads
information in contrast to bad times when activity is slower, and the transmission of
information declines hence elevating uncertainty. Second, forecasting is more difficult
in bad times as the recessions is unknown to people. Third, when public policy is
viewed as ambiguous, dynamic or both it could heighten uncertainty. Fourth, in pe-
riods of recession when business is slow, it is less costly to implement novel ideas and
deploy unemployed resources to research and development. In turn this raises micro
uncertainty which may translate to greater macro uncertainty. 3
4.2.4 Measurement
Considering the difficulty in obtaining an objective measurement parameter for un-
certainty, several subjective measurement proxies have been used within the empirical
literature. Uncertainty is frequently used interchangeably with risk or in reference to
a combination of both risk and uncertainty as a broader term. Predictably, this exten-
sive definition has resulted in several alternative proxies of uncertainty (Bloom, 2014).
This has resulted in the use of alternative definitions to carry out empirical estimations
on the causal effects of uncertainty. Therefore, uncertainty as defined in this analy-
sis takes the broader definition and refers to a combination of risk and uncertainty
measures that have been recently used in the literature.
3At the micro-level, individual industries, firms and plants also respond to uncertainty. In this case
the effect of effects of microeconomic uncertainty have been measured for example using dispersion of
productivity shocks to firms
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4.2.5 Capital flows and uncertainty: empirical evidence re-
view
This section discusses the findings of empirical studies that investigate the role of un-
certainty in determining different types of capital flows. Distinct concerns by policy
makers, firms and consumers that will generate uncertainty and induce changes in
risk aversion. This may concern uncertainty about future economic activity and the
state of the economy (macroeconomic and financial) or prospects for the economic
outlook. Alternatively, it may be concern about the evolution of economic policy or
public policy within a country. For example, this could be related to concerns that will
affect institutions, the legal and regulatory framework, political risks-elections, gov-
ernment stability, corruption, expropriation- macro-prudential policy-capital controls,
macroeconomic policy stance-monetary policy (interest rate changes) or fiscal policy
(tax changes).
A summary of analysis of the link between aggregate capital flows and its different
components with uncertainty is presented in Table 4.2. This table presents an overview
of various empirical studies in terms of country samples, time periods, type of capital
flow, aspects of uncertainty considered and the main results. The majority of the
empirical studies analysing the effect of uncertainty on capital flows provide supportive
evidence of uncertainty having significant effects on capital flows. This implies that
uncertainty in its different aspects, as defined by various proxies, is a relevant driver for
capital flows. However, a limited number of studies do not find uncertainty to matter
for capital flows.
Bianco and Loan (2017) conclude that macroeconomic uncertainty proxied by price
volatility does not have a significant effect on foreign direct investment with exchange
rate volatility having a negative and significant effect. Similarly, Cai et al. (2018)
find that investors are not deterred from investing in developing countries with higher
risk as proxied by sovereign credit ratings. Investors exhibit less risk aversion when
investing in riskier developing countries. Their findings suggest that greater inflows go
to developing countries with lower credit ratings. However, Kellard et al. (2018) argue
that sovereign risk is a more appropriate measure as it is based on a broad range of
macroeconomic vulnerabilities and not only financial market risk captured through the
sovereign credit ratings. Alternatively, foreign direct investment flows could potentially
be driven by other factors in the host country such as natural resource endowments
that would provide the incentive for multinational corporations to invest.
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Global and country-specific uncertainty
Distinguishing between country-specific and global uncertainty, empirical studies show
that idiosyncratic uncertainty is more relevant than aggregate uncertainty (Noria and
Fernandez, 2018; Schmidt and Zwick, 2015). Noria and Fernandez (2018) investigate
the effect of uncertainty on foreign direct investment flows for the manufacturing sector
in Mexico between 2007-2015. Using uncertainty proxied based on the expectations of
entrepreneurs and forecasters regarding manufacturing sub-sectors and the economic
outlook for Mexico they show that uncertainty deters foreign direct investment going
into the manufacturing sector in Mexico. This idiosyncratic measure of uncertainty
performs better than the proxy for aggregate uncertainty , underscoring the importance
of country-specific uncertainty. Moreover, these findings align with the theoretical
proposition and empirical evidence of irreversibility of investment. Although, global
uncertainty-measured by the VIX-has been shown to be a relevant push factor for cross-
border capital flows, limited studies assess the role of country-specific uncertainty on
cross border capital flows Choi and Furceri (2019).
Owing to its greater coverage and availability for advanced economies compared to
emerging markets, studies focusing on source country uncertainty effects such as Gau-
vin et al. (2014), largely make use of news-based measures to measure uncertainty. A
prevalent news-based measure often used within the empirical literature to proxy uncer-
tainty about economic policy is the Economic Policy uncertainty (EPU) index by Baker
et al. (2016). On the other hand, studies on emerging market and developing countries
use proxies for country-specific risk based on observable measures of uncertainty. In
these studies, idiosyncratic risk has been approximated using measures encompassing
financial uncertainty (stock market volatility, financial stability risks), political-related
risk (expropriation, corruption, rule of law, elections),fiscal-related uncertainty (tax
rate volatility).
Aggregate capital flows and subcomponents
The examination of individual types as well as aggregate capital flows concur and pro-
vide evidence supportive of the negative and significant effects of uncertainty. Specifi-
cally, this has been found for on gross inflows, gross outflows and net inflows (Gourio
et al., 2016). Similar detrimental effects are confirmed by Schmidt and Zwick (2015)
for aggregate capital flows to 12 Euro area countries. Furthermore, the relevance of the
distinct characteristics of each type of capital flow in responding to economic shocks
has also been found. Hlaing and Kakinaka (2019), find that in periods of heightened
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global uncertainty (measured by the VIX), the likelihood of a contraction in portfolio
investment is high for both advanced and developing countries whereas the probabil-
ity of a sudden stop in foreign direct investment to developing countries is less likely.
They opine that this corroborates with prior evidence from the literature which asserts
that portfolio investment and bank flows are more easily reversible in comparison to
foreign direct investment flows which tend to be more stable and long-term in nature.
Therefore, this distinct response may arise because the determinants of foreign direct
investment are not the same as those the other two type of cross-border capital flows
(portfolio and bank flows). This further aligns with literature on the investment deci-
sion for multinational corporations’ engagement in foreign direct investment identified
as being driven by different incentives including trade, corporate taxation, bilateral
relations, exchange rate and other gravity variables.
Bilateral Flows
It has been argued that using aggregate-level capital flows does not permit the proper
identification of country-specific uncertainty effect (Choi and Furceri, 2019). The use
of a subset of aggregate level capital flows such as foreign direct investment flows
recorded at the bilateral level, enable the disentangling of the effects of country-specific
uncertainty (risk aversion) from source and host countries. Owing to the structure of
these bilateral datasets, a strand of the empirical literature explores the dual effects of
uncertainty and risk from origin and destination countries. Recent studies use bilateral
data on foreign direct investment and bank flows to investigate the response of these
flows to uncertainty and risk.
Empirical studies using bilateral data reveal a negative effect of uncertainty on
foreign direct investment flows. Kellard et al. (2018) finds a negative effect of risk
(identified as sovereign and financial stability) on bilateral foreign direct investment.
Similarly, Wang (2018) and Choi and Furceri (2019) find evidence of negative effects
of uncertainty-proxied by stock market volatility-on bilateral bank flows.
Notably, while these studies use bilateral data, there are variations in the empirical
strategy. For example, Kellard et al. (2018) use bilateral foreign direct investment
data to estimate equations for the effects of (country and financial stability) risks on
foreign direct investment for source and host countries in two separate specifications
and not simultaneously. Whereas, Choi and Furceri (2019) use bilateral data but
only control for host country time fixed effects and use time-varying determinants
for the supply conditions in the source country only. Choi and Furceri (2019) opt
for the choice to solely control for recipient country time fixed effects and argue that
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it maximises the sample coverage overcoming the challenge arising from the limited
availability of macroeconomic control variables for the host countries (largely emerging
markets)in the sample, at a quarterly frequency. On the other hand, to control for
unobserved country-specific characteristics, Wang (2018) controls for both source and
host country fixed effects. Cai et al. (2018) take a similar approach to Wang (2018) and
find that multinational corporations have different risk attitudes regarding investing
in developed and developing countries. Source countries with better credit ratings
have lower outward foreign direct investment. While OECD countries with better
ratings receive higher inflows, non-OECD countries with lower ratings also receive
higher inflows. This may suggest that investors prefer the high-risk environment in
developing countries or alternatively multinational corporations are less risk averse and
enter developing countries in search of high yields. This may be due to other factors
providing incentives or more favourable conditions to multinational corporations such
as tax breaks making them more attractive for foreign direct investment.
Developed and developing countries
Uncertainty has different effects on capital flows based on the perceived riskiness or
country risk when countries are distinguished based on the level of development. Specif-
ically, while a majority of the empirical studies find that uncertainty deters capital
flows, it has been found that higher risk in developing host countries does not deter
investors from undertaking foreign direct investment (Cai et al., 2018). This evidence
suggests that investors are not deterred by the environment of higher risk present in
developing countries. On the other hand, source country results indicate contrasting
results with investors exhibiting greater risk aversion toward investing in high income
countries. Similarly, political-related uncertainty has been found to have a differential
effect on developed and developing countries. This has led to the development of a
strand of literature using elections as a measure of uncertainty. It has been shown that
elections influence capital flows by creating uncertainty about the future government
policies. This uncertainty in turn affects the decision-making of forward-looking agents.
Honig (2019) finds that uncertainty arising from elections is more relevant for foreign
direct investment going to developing countries than developed countries. Conversely,
elections have no significant effects on portfolio equity and debt flows in both developed
and developing countries. This result suggests that foreign direct investment is more
sensitive to uncertainty regarding future government policy considering it is the most
irreversible form of capital flow among the three.
Similar evidence has been found regarding macroeconomic uncertainty. The fore-
going findings align with evidence showing that developing countries having greater
149
uncertainty than developed countries. Countries in regions with lower incomes expe-
rience greater volatilities in stock markets, exchange rates and GDP growth rates and
are exposed to higher macroeconomic uncertainty which can be explained by three
mechanisms (Bloom, 2014). First, the lack of diversification and reliance on exports of
limited goods in developing countries makes them more susceptible to changes in out-
put and price. Second, the main exports of developing countries such as commodities
have highly variable prices. Third, developing countries tend to have more political dis-
turbances such as coups, wars and revolutions; are more vulnerable to natural disasters
such as floods and epidemics and have weaker fiscal and monetary policies.
Extreme waves of capital flows
Empirical evidence has also shown the role of uncertainty in generating fluctuations
in capital flows. Extreme waves of capital or episodes of capital flows namely surges,
stops, retrenchment and capital flight have been linked to uncertainty. Moreover,
the sensitivity of the different capital flows varies. Due to their distinct nature and
behaviour, some types of capital flows are more responsive to uncertainty. Hlaing
and Kakinaka (2019) find that uncertainty elevates the probability of a sudden stop
in portfolio investment whereas foreign direct investment is more stable and less re-
versible in periods of heightened global uncertainty. Both global and country-specific
uncertainty are relevant for sudden stops and retrenchment in gross capital flows in the
12 Euro Area countries and uncertainty elevated home bias among investors (Schmidt
and Zwick, 2015). Fluctuations in financial flows have been linked to the risk aversion
of foreign investors. The attitudes of investors or lenders tend to trigger risk-on and
risk-off episodes which may induce waves of extreme capital flows. Therefore, underly-
ing fluctuations in capital flows may be the result of the shifting attitudes of investors
responsiveness to information asymmetry and other factors influencing the decision to
engage with the destination countries. Accordingly, investors aversion to uncertainty
has been shown to be a driver of major shifts in capital flows especially portfolio and
debt flows. Rey (2015) highlights the relevance of global uncertainty and risk aversion
in driving capital flows, asset prices and credit growth. Furthermore, factors driving
both uncertainty and risk aversion include macroeconomic fundamentals, funding con-
ditions, risk attitudes of lenders and foreign investors and the monetary policy stance
in financial centre economies (Cerutti et al., 2014).
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4.3 Data and descriptive statistics
Foreign direct investment bilateral flows
Data on cross-border direct investment from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) is the main source for bilateral foreign direct investment
outflows used in the analysis. The data used covers bilateral foreign direct investment
flows for the period 2000 to 2013. The country sample selection is based on data avail-
ability. If a source country contains no record of data for a specific host country in
any period, the bilateral foreign direct investment is assumed to be zero. Furthermore,
entries of negative foreign direct investment between country-pairs in the sample are
set to zero. Unlike Choi and Furceri (2019) who drop flows of less than $5 million
and negative observations and control for outliers by winsorising the dependent vari-
able. The study assumes that bilateral foreign direct investment flows depends on the
economic uncertainty in both the source and host country. Throughout the analysis,
offshore financial centres or tax havens are excluded.
Uncertainty
Financial Uncertainty
Stock market volatility is used to proxy for uncertainty following Choi and Furceri
(2019) and Wang (2018). This proxy is obtained from the World Bank Global Finan-
cial Development Database (GFDD) and is measured on an annual basis. It is the
average of the 360-day standard deviation of the country stock market index. Stock
market volatility can be viewed as realised volatility. Since implied volatility consists
of forward-looking information it is preferred to realised volatility. However, Choi et al.
(2018) suggests that when measured on an annual basis the variation between implied
and realised volatility is small. Often used in the literature, stock market volatility is
viewed as a feasible observable market based and real-time measure for economic un-
certainty (Bloom, 2009; Gourio et al., 2016; Choi et al., 2018). Furthermore, this proxy
for economic uncertainty is chosen owing to its availability over a long time period and
for a large number of countries (Wang, 2018). Consequently, it provides a proxy for
country-specific uncertainty for a large number of countries. 4
4Measures of uncertainty based on data obtained from consumer or firm surveys are inevitably
not equivalent across countries, while cross-sectional proxies capturing dispersion of firm-level sales,
employment and productivity tend to be available for a shorter timespan (Choi and Furceri, 2019).
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While the global financial crisis led to a decline in foreign direct investment inflows,
it led to increasing recognition of financial sector vulnerability (e.g. systemic banking
crisis) and sustainability of government debt (e.g. Euro Debt crisis) issues by investors
(Kellard et al., 2018). The stability of the financial sector may also be relevant for the
foreign direct investment choices by multinational corporations (Kellard et al., 2018).
Following Kellard et al. (2018) I evaluate the role of a fragile banking sector for foreign
direct investment. This is done using three banking risk measures commonly used in
the literature to measure the stability of the banking sector. All three banking risk
measures are obtained from the World Bank Global Financial Development database.
Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets measures the core capital allocated by
a country’s banking sector to buffer risky assets. This measure reflects the efforts by
policymakers to tackle risk-taking by banks by requiring higher capital buffers (Kellard
et al., 2018).
Additionally, the Bank Z-score is used to measure bank risk. The Bank Z-score has
been used to account for financial distress in banks and is used to forecast the likelihood
of banking system default in a country. The Bank Z-score is computed as the ratio of
country’s banking system (capitalization and returns) to the volatility of those returns.
5 The greater the Bank Z-score, the greater the volume of capital available to banks
to manage market risk and the lower the default risk.
Lastly, another measure of the outstanding risk of banks used is the non-performing
loans over total gross loans (NPL ratio). Non-performing loans impact the bank lend-
ing to the private sector through three channels; profitability, capital and funding
costs. Profitability of banks is affected as non-performing loans result in less income
generation and more provisions and therefore lower bank net income. In terms of cap-
ital, the existence of non-performing loans necessitates a greater capital allocation by
banks. Whereas, funding costs increase owing to banks’ impaired balance sheets. The
effect of high non-performing loans on lending to the private sector is more pronounced
in countries more dependent on bank financing as credit becomes less accessible and
costlier.
Political Risk and Political Uncertainty
The investment profile is used to proxy expropriation risk. This is obtained from the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The underlying components of this com-
5It is estimated as (ROA+(equity/assets))/sd(ROA); sd(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA.
Return on assets(ROA), equity, and assets are country-level aggregate figures calculated from under-
lying bank-by-bank unconsolidated data from Bankscope.
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posite variable capture country risk related to contract viability, expropriation, profits
repatriation and payment delays. It takes values between 0-12, where higher values
indicate lower risk. The international country risk guide contains data on 140 countries
commencing from 1984. Local and foreign investors will have heterogeneous exposure
to risks due to government policies that will implicitly or explicitly differentiate be-
tween resident and non-resident investors (Gourio et al., 2016). A probable factor
that may explain the movements of flows is expropriation risk. Gourio et al. (2016)
highlight that foreign investors in comparison to their domestic counterparts are more
susceptible to expropriation risk. This is risk posed by government policies that either
directly or indirectly make a distinction between foreign and domestic investors. Such
policies may comprise the imposition of capital controls, taxation on foreign transac-
tions, delayed payments, partial defaults or any form of expropriation risk the foreign
investor could potentially encounter when engaging in cross-border investment. There-
fore, host country economic uncertainty (or volatility) may be relevant for a country
as it increases the probability of an improper political (policy) reaction (Gourio et al.,
2016). Therefore, country (policy)risk may have a role in the pattern of bilateral flows.
Macroeconomic Uncertainty
Macroeconomic uncertainty proxied by the real exchange rate and price volatility.
Macroeconomic instability as a result of uncertainty in the foreign exchange market
may be relevant for motivations of the multinational corporation investing abroad. The
exchange rate may deter multinational corporations from undertaking investment to
avert changes in the terms of trade. A negative association between foreign direct
investment and the exchange rate may occur if the motive of the multinational cor-
poration is to provide for alternative markets or to export products back to the home
country. The hysteresis and real option value theories suggest that uncertainty will have
a negative impact on foreign direct investment, leading to multinational corporations
postponing entry because uncertainty raises the option value of waiting (Bianco and
Loan, 2017). According to the production flexibility theory, uncertainty will enhance
foreign direct investment. This will result in uncertainty having a positive effect on
foreign direct investment. A positive response of foreign direct investment to exchange
rate uncertainty may arise if the motive of the multinational corporation is to enhance
its market share by entering other locations and to have the opportunity of production
flexibility (Solomon and Ruiz, 2012). On the other hand, macroeconomic stability re-
sulting from domestic price volatility or inflation uncertainty will affect foreign direct
investment (Bianco and Loan, 2017).
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Policy Uncertainty
In line with previous empirical literature, the newspaper-based measures Economic
policy uncertainty (EPU) created by Baker et al. (2016) is used to account for policy
uncertainty. The index captures uncertainty concerning ”who will make economic pol-
icy decisions, what economic policy decisions will be undertaken and when they will be
enacted, the effects of past, present and future policy actions, and uncertainty induced
by policy inaction.” (pp.1598). Using the EPU index which covers mostly advanced
economies and a limited number of emerging market economies the role of policy uncer-
tainty has been investigated in various spheres. For mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
type of FDI, Bonaime et al. (2018) find that economic policy uncertainty about gov-
ernment policies exerts a negative impact on the mergers and acquisitions activity of
multinational corporations both at the aggregate and firm-level. A similar conclusion
is drawn from the empirical analysis of Nguyen and Phan (2017) who find that multi-
national corporations take longer to finalise mergers and acquisitions deals when there
is greater uncertainty. Therefore, aligning with this prior literature this analysis exam-
ines the effects of policy uncertainty on aggregate foreign direct investment data which
includes both greenfield and mergers and acquisitions.
Other determinants of Foreign Direct Investment
Bilateral factors are used to account for information frictions between a pair of source-
host countries. Distance between countries is used to measure information costs (Portes
and Rey, 2005b). Distance is captured as the geographical distance between capital
cities in source and host countries. On the assumption that information asymmetries
will be more enhanced the more distant countries are flows would be more fickle, the
greater the distance between countries. Hence, it is expected for distance to exert a
negative effect. Common border is included as an additional measure to account for
the inherent cost of information asymmetry is whether or not source country i and host
country j shares a common border. The contiguity variable represents how proximity
between country-pairs may determine whether vertical or horizontal foreign direct in-
vestment takes place. Similarly, sharing of a common language between country source
i and host country j to capture the ease of doing business between country-pairs is
included. It is anticipated that the cost of doing business will be less between countries
that share a common language. Therefore, common language is anticipated to have a
positive effect on bilateral flows. This common language variable accounts for the in-
formation frictions or asymmetries between external and local investors. The existence
of a common currency between source country i and host country j is controlled for
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to further account for transaction costs. The presence of a common currency between
source country i and host country j is anticipated to be advantageous for bilateral
flows as it signifies that external investors do not encounter exchange rate risk. Dummy
variables are used to model whether a pair of source and host countries share a common
border, a common language and common currency. The bilateral factors distance, con-
tiguity, common language and common currency are bilateral time-invariant variables
obtained from the Gravity database.6
Gross Domestic Product to capture the size of the economy is included. This is
measured using gross domestic product (GDP). Motivated by previous literature the
specification includes the logarithm of GDP for country and market size. A positive ef-
fect would suggest that higher levels of GDP in source country i would enhance foreign
direct investment seeking to expand into new markets as it reflects high income and
greater capacity of firms to invest abroad. Conversely, lower GDP in source country
i would signify restricted domestic markets which could compel firms to enter exter-
nal markets (Hattari and Rajan, 2009; Jongwanich et al., 2013). Alternatively, higher
levels of GDP in host country j may suggest greater income and purchasing power
of customers in the host country. Wang (2018) argues that higher income may also
infer the extent of information frictions, on the premise that, the ease with which in-
vestors from source country i can access information will be better for larger economies
comparative to smaller ones.
Bilateral trade flows for trade between country-pairs is controlled for as it may
affect foreign direct investment flows at the bilateral level. It captures the influence
of trade on foreign direct investment. This is also important because the financial
account and the current account are closely related due to the accounting identity,
(Choi and Furceri, 2019). This data is obtained from the IMF Direction of Trade
(DOT) Statistics.
Tax at the corporate level in the host country is included. This is included as the log
of corporate income tax. Corporate tax represents the host country average corporate
tax rate. This may be relevant for foreign direct investment as it affects profits of
foreign firms’ investments. Higher corporate income tax is expected to deter foreign
direct investment. The relevance of lower corporate tax rates in driving foreign direct
investment has been found for emerging markets, (Arbatli, 2011). This implies that
the motive of firms to invest in host countries is impacted by the level of the corporate
income tax rate in the host country. For this reason, lower corporate income tax
rates in destination countries will provide more incentive for multinational corporations
6Available from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII):
www.cepii.org
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to invest (Di Giovanni, 2005). Host country corporate tax data are obtained from
KPMG corporate tax survey, augmented with data from Ernst and Young Worldwide
Corporate tax guide.
Infrastructure in the host country is an important determinant for attracting foreign
direct investment to countries, (Asiedu, 2002; Kinda, 2010). Infrastructure quality in
the host country is proxied by the sum of fixed-line telephone and mobile subscribers
per 1,000 population, obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI). It is
anticipated that the quality of physical infrastructure in the host country will have
a positive effect on foreign direct investment. The efficiency of investments will be
enhanced with better infrastructure and this drive efficiency-seeking foreign direct in-
vestment to host countries.
Table 4.3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI 25367 547.493 3121.368 0 172210.1
Stock vol Source 27742 3.007 .412 1.927 4.595
Stock vol Host 27742 3.007 .489 .873 4.953
ln GDP Source 23029 23.334 1.811 18.66 30.553
ln GDP Host 19765 22.873 1.899 17.23 30.523
ln Distance 27407 8.395 1.013 4.742 9.88
Common Border 27407 .04 .197 0 1
Common Language 27407 .062 .241 0 1
Common Currency 27407 .01 .099 0 1
ln Trade 14429 18.684 2.566 -19.408 25.573
ln Infrastructure 27716 4.429 .963 -1.004 5.795
ln Tax 26390 -1.285 .348 -2.408 -.483
ln Population 17016 2.733 1.582 -2.94 7.222
Non-performing loans source 11036 1.095 .919 -2.503 3.147
Non-performing loans host 9996 1.295 .878 -2.503 3.618
Regulatory capital source 23571 2.568 .198 1.946 3.431
Regulatory capital host 21753 2.647 .241 .562 3.431
Bank Z-score source 25328 2.289 .82 -4.109 3.638
Bank Z-score host 25158 2.415 .753 -4.109 4.557
Table 4.3 provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the empirical
analysis. Table 4.4 provides the correlation matrix of the independent variables to be
used in the regressions. Pair-wise correlations among the variables are small.
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4.4 Methodology
The empirical analysis uses the gravity model which has been used in the literature
in examining international trade and capital flows. The empirical investigation of de-
terminants of foreign direct investment considers that the magnitude in investment
reflect both push (supply-side) and pull(demand-side) factors as investment responds
to changes in macroeconomic developments including changes in uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, the expected return and risk of investment project will be influenced by
uncertainty.
This investigation uses the bilateral structure of the foreign direct investment flow
data to account for unobserved time-variant factors. This strategy provides a way to
identify the role of uncertainty in the source and host country as drivers (push and
pull factors) of cross-border direct investment flows. Therefore, unlike Kellard et al.
(2018) who estimate a separate equation for the source and host country respectively,
the dual effects of source and host country uncertainty are estimated for each proxy.
Considering the dual effects of source and host country uncertainty is similar to the
strategy adopted in Wang (2018) who investigates the role of stock market volatility
on cross-border bank flows and Cai et al. (2018) on the role of sovereign credit ratings
on foreign direct investment flows.
To examine the effect of higher uncertainty in both the origin and destination
country in determining cross-border foreign direct investment flows the following is
estimated:
FDIi,j,t = αUncti,t−1 + βUnctj,t−1 + γXi,j,t−1 + λi + λj + φt + εi,j,t (4.1)
where i is the source (origin/reporting) country of the multinational corporation
and j denotes the host (destination/counterpart) country and t indicates time.
FDIi,j,t is the dependent variable and denotes the level of annual bilateral foreign
direct investment flow from source country i to host country j in levels in year t
following Cai et al. (2018). FDIi,j,t can be explained as an outflow from country i or
inflow into country j.
Uncti and Unctj are proxies the origin country i and host country j uncertainty
respectively. The estimated effects of Uncti and Unctj on FDIi,j,t represent the out-
flow and inflow movement in response to economic uncertainty concurrently in both
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origin and recipient country. 7 Domestic investors (multinational corporation in origin
country) may respond to local and external uncertainty differently. Therefore, α and
β estimates described in equation (4.1) may take the following signs:
α > 0 An increase in the uncertainty in source country i increases outflows to
host country j by α. Local investors in source country i respond to higher domestic
uncertainty by increasing exposure to host country j. This characterises the response
of local investors in source country i to the domestic shock at home. This implies an
increase in outflows or flight. 8
α < 0 An increase in the uncertainty in source country i reduces outflows to
host country j by α. Local investors in source country i respond to rising domestic
uncertainty by reducing exposure to host country j. This characterises the response
of local investors in source country i to the domestic shock at home. This implies a
reduction in outflows or retrenchment.
β > 0 An increase in uncertainty in host country j increases inflows to country
j by β. Local investors in source country i respond to heightened uncertainty in host
country j by increasing exposure to country j. This characterises the response of local
investors in source country i, to the external shock in host country j. This implies an
expansion or surge in inflows.
β < 0 A rise in the uncertainty of host country j reduces inflows to country j by
β. Local investors in source country i respond to elevated uncertainty in host country
j by reducing exposure to country j. This characterises the response of local investors
in source country i, to the external shock in host country j. This implies a reduction
or stops in inflows.
Xi,j,t−1 is a set of macroeconomic, bilateral factors capturing different aspects of
7In Wang (2018) cross-border bank flows and uncertainty are considered and it is hypothesised
that since empirical evidence illustrates a positive correlation and pro-cyclical movement in capital
inflows and outflows (Broner et al., 2013; David et al., 2015) domestic investors respond to heightened
domestic and foreign by taking the same signs α < 0 and β < 0. An increase in source country
i uncertainty decreases outward flows while an increase in recipient country j ’s uncertainty reduces
inflows to country j. A retrenchment in outflows is accompanied by a stop in inflows in response to
heightened uncertainty at home and abroad respectively.
8Forbes and Warnock (2012) identify four distinct episodes concerning the movement of cross-
border capital flows. Flight : a sharp increase in gross capital outflows; Retrenchment : a sharp
decrease in gross capital outflows; Surge: a sharp increase in gross capital inflows and Stops: a sharp
decrease in gross capital inflows.
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foreign direct investment choices by multinational corporations as previously described
in section 4.3.
λi and λj represent the source country and host country fixed effects. The λi,j
represents the country-pair fixed effects. Whereas, φt represents year fixed effects to
control for global factors and general economic trend. Alternative variations of the
model will be estimated considering the various fixed effects with year fixed effects φt
included in all the various specifications. The bilateral feature of the data makes it
possible to assess the distinct effects of source country and host country factors and
to control for observed and unobserved country-specific and country-pair factors. In
comparison to conventional approaches employed in the literature, this bilateral aspect
of foreign direct investment data allows for an improved determination in the effects,
(Kellard et al., 2018).
4.5 Empirical Findings
4.5.1 Main Results
This section provides the key empirical findings. Although a few studies examine
the effects of uncertainty and risk in driving bilateral bank flows (Choi and Furceri,
2019; Wang, 2018) and bilateral foreign direct investment flows (Cai et al., 2018; Kel-
lard et al., 2018) none of them considers the effects of different types of uncertainty.
More specifically, these studies consider the role of uncertainty and risks using prox-
ies pertaining to financial aspects including stock market volatility (Choi and Furceri,
2019; Wang, 2018), sovereign risk and financial stability risk (Kellard et al., 2018) and
sovereign credit ratings (Cai et al., 2018).
Financial Uncertainty
The result from the estimation of equation (4.1) using uncertainty and risk measures
regarding financial markets are presented. Uncertainty is captured by stock market
volatility and bank-related risk measures along with standard determinants of foreign
direct investment are presented. Equation (4.1) is estimated using time, source country
and host country fixed effects. In the first column of table 4.5 reports the main financial
uncertainty proxy variable, stock market volatility. In subsequent columns (2)-(5),
other measures of bank-related risk namely non-performing loans (NPL), regulatory
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capital to risk weighted assets and the bank Z-score are presented. Finally, the results
from an index of financial uncertainty derived from principal component analysis of
the four are presented in the last column.
Results obtained by estimating equation 4.1 using stock market volatility in col-
umn (1) reveal that higher uncertainty in the source country measured by stock market
volatility has no effect on foreign direct investment outflows. This result does not sup-
port the proposition that multinational corporations reduce outflows abroad when it
becomes more risky at home. Contrastingly, there is a negative impact of host coun-
try stock market volatility on foreign direct investment inflows. This shows evidence
that higher financial uncertainty is statistically significant and has a negative effect for
destination country foreign direct investment inflows. Heightened uncertainty in recip-
ient countries results in multinational corporations reducing investment flows. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that more stable countries will attract more inflows.
However, considering other proxies measuring risk in financial markets, the host
country effect maintains a negative effect although this result is not always statisti-
cally significant across the specifications. The banking sector related risk proxies are
presented in column (2)-(4). Using the non-performing loans ratio as a financial stabil-
ity risk measure provides similar results to stock market volatility proxy in column (1).
The host country financial stability risk proxied by non-performing loans shows strong
evidence of reduction in capital inflows at the 1% level. An increase in non-performing
loans ratio is associated with lower foreign direct investment flows. Whereas, the source
country does not appear to affect bilateral foreign direct investment.
On the other hand, the coefficient for regulatory capital in table 4.5 has a negative
sign however it is not statistically significant in both origin and destination country.
This does not support the hypothesis that an increase in the regulatory capital holding
by banks will translate into a reduction in the availability of credit in the source country
to multinational corporations investing abroad where there is a higher incidence of
imperfect knowledge as established by Kellard et al. (2018).
The bank z-score provides a contrasting result, higher bank risk in the source coun-
try results in an increase in foreign direct investment outflows. This suggests that the
source country risk environment is more important than the host country.
Finally, Finindex represent indices (source and host country) obtained from a princi-
pal component analysis of the prior financial uncertainty and risk variables in columns
(1)-(4). In contrast to prior results, only the source country coefficient is statistically
significant and has a negative sign. This suggests risk and uncertainty regarding finan-
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cial markets in source countries is more relevant for firms’ decisions to invest abroad
and gives evidence of the role of the financial sector in cross-border investment.
Considering table 4.5, among the gravity variables only distance, the common lan-
guage variable is statistically significant. Aligning with previous literature, common
language and distance as proxies for information and transaction costs are important
determinants of financial flows (Portes and Rey, 2005b). Distance lowers bilateral
flows significantly whereas the existence of common language facilitates bilateral flows
between country-pairs.
Overall the results for uncertainty regarding financial markets provide varied re-
sults. Host country uncertainty regarding financial markets appears to have a larger
impact on bilateral foreign direct investment flow than source country uncertainty in
most specifications. However, this outcome is not statistically significant across spec-
ifications, the host country coeficient is larger than source country coefficient when
proxied by stock market volatility, non-performing loans and regulatory capital. The
source country financial situation is relevant for foreign direct investment decisions
when the Bank Z-Score and the financial uncertainty index are used as proxies albeit
with contrasting signs. The latter is partly consistent by the conclusion made by Kel-
lard et al. (2018) that source country risk matters more and will exert a negative effect.
Therefore, the results for uncertainty and risk regrading financial markets suggest that
the financial situation in the host country is relevant in attracting foreign direct invest-
ment and contrasts with the proposition that financial institutions in the host country
are irrelevant to multinational corporations.
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Political Uncertainty
In this section, the results on effect of political uncertainty on bilateral foreign direct
investment are presented. This is done through the estimation of equation 4.1 using
proxies for uncertainty regarding the political and regulatory environment focusing on
aspects such as government stability, corruption, business environment among others.
In column (1) of table 4.6, the Political composite index or the overall political risk
assessment index from ICRG is used. This has no significant effects on bilateral foreign
direct investment for both countries. Column (2) suggests that law and order and
government stability in the host country matter for foreign direct investment. Law
and order in the host country has a beneficial effect which suggests it provides an
enabling environment for foreign direct investment inflows. The uncertainty variable
using this proxy is positive and significant at the 10% level. Whereas, the investment
profile which captures the risk to investment is relevant for the source country only in
column (3).
However, in column (4) uncertainty proxied using government stability suggests
that for the host country this may adversely affect foreign investment. Higher uncer-
tainty concerning government stability reduces foreign direct investment inflows and
this negative effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This corroborates with
Brunetti and Weder (2007) who view the concept of institutional uncertainty as cover-
ing different types of uncertainties generated by the political environment in a country
namely; government stability, political violence, policy uncertainty and enforcement
uncertainty. They suggest that government instability or significant changes to gov-
ernment brings in uncertainty concerning the institutional framework in a country.
The estimation result for the host country in column (4) confirms the adverse effect of
government instability on the regulatory and business environment in the host country.
Column (5) corruption is used to assess the effects on foreign direct investment and
shows that there are no significant effects in both estimation coefficients. In column
(6) a political uncertainty index for the origin and destination country is used. This is
derived as are indices from principal component analysis of the following risk compo-
nents of the ICRG political risk index: law and order, investment profile, government
stability and corruption. The estimates for the indices are insignificant.
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Macroeconomic Uncertainty
In this section estimation results of equation 4.1 using uncertainty regarding the macroe-
conomic environment measured by inflation and exchange rate variables are presented
in table 4.7. In column (1) the results of macroeconomic uncertainty proxied by in-
flation reveal there is a heterogeneous response to domestic and foreign uncertainty.
Higher macroeconomic uncertainty in the source country proxied by inflation has a
positive effect on bilateral foreign direct investment. Higher uncertainty in the origin
country is associated with greater foreign direct investment outflows. On the other
hand, heightened macroeconomic uncertainty in the host country lowers foreign di-
rect investment inflows and this effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. This
negative effect is consistent with the robust finding by Solomon and Ruiz (2012) that
multinational corporations may not invest in countries with high inflation as it gener-
ates more uncertainty about the net present value of long-term investment.
When the exchange rate uncertainty measure is used in in column (2), positive
coefficients are observed for both domestic and foreign uncertainty. Domestic investors
(multinational corporations) reduce exposure to locally and increase investment abroad
when uncertainty at home is heightened. This positive effect is significant at the 5%
level and lends support to the proposition that macroeconomic uncertainty should
bolster foreign direct investment through the production flexibility hypothesis. This
suggests that exchange rate uncertainty in source country boosts foreign direct invest-
ment outflows. A larger positive response of foreign direct investment flows to foreign
uncertainty is observed at the 10% significance level. This is inconsistent with the
proposition that multinational corporations will withhold investment owing to height-
ened volatility in the exchange rate. An increase in foreign direct investment flows in
response to heightened macroeconomic uncertainty is consistent with the findings of
The positive relationship may arise if the objective of foreign direct investment is
diversification of location of production to enhance market share and achieve produc-
tion flexibility (Solomon and Ruiz, 2012). In column (3) a macroeconomic index for
the source and host country from a principal component analysis of the price and ex-
change rate variables is used. A similar pattern to the results in column (2) emerges
for domestic and foreign uncertainty. The coefficients for both source and host country
are still positive and significant, supportive of an expansion in bilateral foreign direct
investment flows following greater uncertainty.
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Table 4.7: Bilateral foreign direct investment and macroeconomic uncertainty
Inflation Exchange rate Macroeconomic Uncertainty Index
(1) (2) (3)
UncertaintySource 1.992*** 0.901** 0.345**
(0.632) (0.357) (0.116)
Uncertainty Hot -0.494*** 1.138* 0.191*
(0.142) (0.625) (0.110)
ln GDPSource -0.172 -0.150 -0.176
(0.113) (0.123) (0.117)
ln GDPHost 0.207 0.170 0.209
(0.163) (0.176) (0.167)
ln Distance -0.435*** -0.428*** -0.434***
(0.0947) (0.0932) (0.0935)
Common Border 0.138 0.158 0.154
(0.240) (0.238) (0.238)
Common Language 0.687*** 0.669*** 0.689***
(0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Common Currency -0.754* -0.689 -0.746*
(0.435) (0.449) (0.440)
ln Trade 0.135*** 0.145*** 0.131***
(0.0496) (0.0528) (0.0502)
ln Infrastructure 0.557** 0.396 0.356
(0.238) (0.250) (0.229)
ln Tax -1.122* -1.166 -1.028*
(0.615) (0.721) (0.602)
ln Population -0.291 -0.257 -0.247
(0.749) (0.776) (0.759)
Constant -9.670*** -9.148 -6.835
(3.025) (6.646) (4.879)
Observations 5,916 5,863 5,844
R-squared 0.553 0.544 0.552
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Economic Policy Uncertainty
This section presents the estimation results of equation 4.1 using the economic policy
uncertainty (EPU) index of Baker et al. (2016) to measure uncertainty regarding eco-
nomic policy. The economic policy uncertainty index captures uncertainty concerning
”who will make economic policy decisions, what economic policy actions will be under-
taken and when they will be enacted, the economic effects of past , present and future
policy actions, and uncertainty induced by policy inaction.” (pp1598) 9
In table 4.8 the sample coverage is reduced as the database is focused on advanced
economies (AEs) and a few emerging market economies (EMEs). The countries in the
reduced sample used include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia France,
Germany, India, Italy, Mexico, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Therefore, the sample excludes financial
centres including Hong Kong, Ireland and Singapore for which economic policy uncer-
tainty data is available. Unlike Choi and Furceri (2019) observations in the dependent
variable with negative values are not dropped and instead the estimation is carried out
using the Poisson estimator.
The estimation results in table 4.8 suggest that bilateral foreign direct investment
flows are negatively correlated with economic policy uncertainty in both the origin and
destination country. This suggests that multinational corporations in source country
i lower investment to a foreign country when it becomes more risky. Alternatively,
with heightened uncertainty at home, multinational corporations increase investment
at home or lower outflows in bad times. This is consistent with recent empirical findings
by Wang (2018) who finds a negative response to uncertainty in both the source and
host country using bilateral cross-border bank flows data. Wang (2018) concludes that
inflows to the foreign country reduces with greater uncertainty and outflows from the
home country of investors retrench in response to heightened domestic uncertainty.
This links to prior literature which asserts the pro-cyclical pattern in the movement of
capital inflows and outflows (Broner et al., 2013; Davis, 2015). An increase in policy
uncertainty lowers foreign direct investment inflows. The negative significant effect
of economic policy uncertainty is larger for the host country than the source country
effect.
9The economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index of Baker et al. (2016) is obtained from:
www.policyuncertainty.com
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Table 4.8: Bilateral foreign direct investment and economic policy uncertainty
Economic Policy Uncertainty
UncertaintySource -0.529*
(0.297)
UncertaintyHost -0.845***
(0.301)
ln GDP Source 0.412
(0.285)
ln GDP Host -0.633*
(0.365)
ln Distance -0.492***
(0.190)
Common Border -0.126
(0.386)
Common Language 1.456***
(0.267)
Common Currency -0.410
(1.074)
ln Trade 0.0558
(0.100)
ln Infrastructure 0.639*
(0.347)
ln Tax -0.0490
(0.986)
ln Population 1.477
(1.055)
Constant 10.69*
(5.917)
Observations 864
R-squared 0.579
Time FE Yes
Source Country FE Yes
Host Country FE Yes
Country-Pair FE No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.5.2 Robustness
If uncertainty in the source country prompts multinational corporations to reduce
outward foreign direct investment when domestic uncertainty heightens, it can be an-
ticipated that this effect will be stronger for firms considering foreign direct investment
into countries perceived as risky. Specifically, the comparative attractiveness of cross-
border investment owing to uncertainty may vary as multinational corporations may
be circumspect to invest in a risky host country. To test this conjecture, equation (4.1)
is estimated on a sub-sample of two groups based on the income level of the destination
countries. The countries are split into advanced and emerging market economies using
the IMF definition. Table 4.9 presents the result of estimation of equation (4.1) for the
advanced and emerging market destination countries respectively. This is done for the
four different aspects of uncertainty.
Column (1) and column (2) in Table 4.9 display the results for economic policy
uncertainty for advanced and emerging market economies respectively. The sign for
the uncertainty coefficient for uncertainty in column (1) remains negative for source
and host country however the coefficient for domestic policy uncertainty changes and is
no longer significant from table 4.8. This finding implies that, for advanced economies,
cross-border direct investment reduces in response to greater economic policy uncer-
tainty in the recipient country. On the other hand, economic policy uncertainty in the
source country of the multinational corporation is irrelevant. Interestingly, for emerg-
ing market recipient countries in column(2), the negative response to economic policy
uncertainty found in table 4.8 only exists for the source country uncertainty. When
multinational corporations are faced with greater domestic uncertainty, they reduce
outward foreign direct investment to emerging market economies.
Column (3) and column (4) of table 4.9 present the estimation results for macroe-
conomic uncertainty proxied by inflation. The response of for uncertainty regarding
the macro economy in both source and host country maintains the signs similar to
those found in Table 4.7. The positive sign of the uncertainty coefficient for the source
country implies that multinational corporations increase outward cross-border invest-
ment and counters the proposition that inflows and outflows are pro-cyclical (Davis,
2015) and therefore investment will likely be more biased towards the home country
when conditions become unfavourable domestically. Contrastingly, in column(4) there
are no significant impacts on the estimates for emerging market recipient countries.
Column(4) and column(5) in Table 4.9 show the results for uncertainty regarding
financial markets measured as stock market volatility for advanced and emerging mar-
ket economies respectively. Similar to Table 4.5, the estimated coefficients suggest a
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negative response of bilateral foreign direct investment flows to higher financial uncer-
tainty. However, the coefficients are no longer statistically significant except when the
host country is an advanced economy. This finding suggests that higher uncertainty in
the host country reduces bilateral foreign direct investment inflows.
Column(7) and column(8) in Table 4.9 show the results for uncertainty regarding
the political environment measured using the government stability variable from the
international country risk guide (ICRG) index. The results are split for advanced and
emerging market economies respectively. The estimated coefficients switch signs from
initial results presented in Table 4.6. The estimated coefficients suggest a negative
response of bilateral foreign direct investment flows in response to higher political un-
certainty. However, this effect is statistically significant for recipient countries that are
advanced economies. This suggests that higher political uncertainty owing to govern-
ment uncertainty will deter foreign direct investment flows to advanced economies. On
the other hand, no significant effects are found for emerging market recipient countries.
Overall, for advanced recipient countries, economic policy uncertainty, macroeco-
nomic uncertainty, financial uncertainty and political uncertainty in the local econ-
omy curtails cross-border foreign direct investment flows into the economy. On the
other hand, for emerging market recipient countries, economic policy uncertainty in
the source country reduces foreign direct investment flows coming into the economy.
This finding suggests that multinational corporations’ decisions to invest in emerging
market recipient countries are largely independent of certain types of uncertainty and
may be driven by other factors. Alternatively, this may suggest that uncertainty may
not be a major determinant for foreign direct investment flows owing to the greater
relevance of host country factors (e.g. geographical location, natural resource endow-
ments, institutional environment) as important drivers of foreign direct investment
flows. In this scenario, it is anticipated that uncertainty will have an insignificant
effect on foreign direct investment flows. This finding corroborates with Cai et al.
(2018) who finds that investors more risky or lower rated countries were recipients of
greater foreign direct investment flows suggestive of investors inclination to high-risk
investment environment.
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4.6 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the literature linking uncertainty and cross-border capital
flows. Following the global financial crisis, the role of uncertainty for macroeconomic
outcomes has increased in prominence. Distinct from previous studies focusing on
uncertainty as a global supply factor of financial flows, this chapter uses the bilateral
structure of the foreign direct investment flow data from the OECD database to control
for both source and host country effects and thereby to assess the role of different types
of country-specific uncertainty as a push and pull factor for cross-border foreign direct
investment flows.
The results suggest that the different forms of uncertainty do not move in the same
direction. The response of foreign direct investment flows depends on the type of un-
certainty. Heightened uncertainty and risk regarding financial markets in the recipient
country, measured by country-specific stock market volatility, reduces foreign direct
investment inflows into the economy. This effect occurs only for foreign direct invest-
ment towards advanced economies and not emerging market economies as recipient
countries.
Furthermore, this finding of the relevance for the host country conditions in attract-
ing foreign direct investment inflows is further confirmed when uncertainty regarding
the political and regulatory environment, measured by government stability is con-
sidered. Higher uncertainty measured by country-specific government stability in an
economy reduces cross-border direct investment flows into this economy. Multinational
corporation’s lower foreign direct investment inflows in response to heightened political
uncertainty in the host country.
Whereas higher country specific macroeconomic uncertainty in the source country
encourages foreign direct investment outflows. These effects are significant for advanced
economies and not emerging market economies.
Furthermore, multinational corporations’ lower outflows in response to heightened
economic policy uncertainty both in the source and host country. Higher economic
policy uncertainty in the source country discourages multinational corporations from
engaging in risky investment abroad resulting in lower outflows. Furthermore, advanced
economies with higher policy uncertainty attract less foreign direct investment. In ad-
dition, greater economic policy uncertainty in the source country of the multinational
firm, makes it less attractive for cross-border direct investment going to emerging mar-
ket recipients. Economic policy uncertainty matters more for foreign direct investment
to emerging market recipients. Therefore, advanced economies with greater uncertainty
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regarding financial, political, macroeconomic and economic policy attract less foreign
direct investment flows. On the other hand, multinational corporations invest less
in emerging market host countries with high economic policy uncertainty. The other
aspects of uncertainty matter less for emerging market recipient countries. These find-
ings suggest that foreign direct investment flows to emerging market recipient countries
are broadly independent of certain types of uncertainty and could be driven by other
factors.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Additional analytical results
Table 4.10 suggests the evidence on foreign direct investment flows responds to uncer-
tainty in the domestic and foreign country in an asymmetric manner. Only the period
after 2008 in column (2) confirms the negative effects of source and host uncertainty
proxied by country-specific stock market volatility.
p.191
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Table 4.10: Bilateral foreign direct investment, financial uncertainty-robustness
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-Crisis Post-Crisis Country-pair
Stock volSource -0.187 -1.353* -0.376
(0.368) (0.807) (0.335)
Stock volHost -0.596* -2.292*** -0.581**
(0.334) (0.574) (0.266)
ln GDPSource -0.216 0.131 -0.0607
(0.289) (0.160) (0.131)
ln GDPHost 0.256 -0.117 0.0430
(0.359) (0.207) (0.159)
ln Distance -0.597*** -0.603***
(0.128) (0.116)
Common Border -0.342 0.0512
(0.276) (0.339)
Common Language 0.889*** 0.487*
(0.172) (0.276)
Common Currency -0.0417 -1.102 0.336
(0.437) (0.972) (0.399)
ln Trade 0.198** -0.0505 0.0484
(0.0783) (0.0632) (0.0857)
ln Infrastructure 0.979*** -0.666 0.707***
(0.347) (0.762) (0.209)
ln Tax -1.354* -1.068 -0.262
(0.708) (1.042) (0.591)
ln Population -0.0522 -0.314 -0.191
(1.020) (0.568) (0.633)
Constant -8.022** 20.68***
(4.087) (5.939)
Observations 2,573 2,220 4,179
R-squared 0.587 0.679
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Source Country FE Yes Yes No
Host Country FE Yes Yes No
Country-Pair FE No No Yes
Number of pair-id 593
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4.11: Bilateral foreign direct investment and economic uncertainty 2001-2012
(1) (2) (3)
FDI FDI FDI
Uncertainty Source -0.936*** -0.192** -0.219***
(0.130) (0.0749) (0.0724)
Uncertainty Host 0.570*** 0.0822 0.108**
(0.142) (0.0583) (0.0528)
Constant 8.245*** 5.992***
(0.666) (0.732)
Observations 10,047 10,028 9,642
R-squared 0.022 0.665
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Source Country FE No Yes No
Host Country FE No Yes No
Country-Pair FE No No Yes
Number of pair-id 1,045
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable is bilateral FDI in levels from source country i to host country j in year
t. Uncertainty Source and Uncertainty Host are the one period lagged stock market
volatility in source country and host country in log levels. All regressions are carried out
using Poisson. foreign direct investment data from UNCTAD for the period 2001-2012.
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Table 4.12: Bilateral foreign direct investment, uncertainty and information asymmetry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI FDI FDI FDI
Uncertainty Source -0.436*** -0.432*** -0.423*** -0.438***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.107)
Uncertainty Host -0.263 0.0903 0.174** -0.00662
(0.586) (0.0799) (0.0798) (0.134)
ln Distance -0.988*** -0.822*** -0.826*** -0.831***
(0.250) (0.0839) (0.0845) (0.0852)
Contiguity 0.264 0.263 0.262 0.262
(0.163) (0.161) (0.163) (0.163)
Common Language 1.071*** -0.689 1.067*** 1.116***
(0.210) (0.691) (0.210) (0.215)
Common Currency 1.422*** 1.498*** 2.509*** 1.464***
(0.332) (0.325) (0.915) (0.350)
Corporate Tax Host -0.731*** -0.771*** -0.737***
(0.186) (0.193) (0.189)
ln GDP Source 0.0802* 0.0770* 0.0805* 0.0853**
(0.0427) (0.0425) (0.0426) (0.0435)
ln GDP Host -0.0525 -0.0496 -0.0536 -0.0632
(0.0400) (0.0399) (0.0397) (0.0404)
Distance*Uncertainty Host 0.0502
(0.0686)
Common Language*Uncertainty Host 0.560**
(0.225)
Common Currency*Uncertainty Host -0.369
(0.319)
Population Host -0.286**
(0.116)
Population Host*Uncertainty Host 0.0775**
(0.0347)
Constant 8.521*** 7.187*** 7.285*** 9.585***
(1.926) (1.019) (1.034) (1.111)
Observations 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,694
R-squared 0.820 0.821 0.819 0.818
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE No No No No
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable is bilateral FDI in levels from source country i to host country j in year
t. Uncertainty Source and Uncertainty Host are the one period lagged stock market
volatility in source country and host country in log levels. All regressions are carried out
using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML). Bilateral FDI data from advanced
economies to emerging market and developing host countries from UNCTAD for period
2001-2012.
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Table 4.13: Bilateral foreign direct investment, uncertainty and institutional risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI FDI
Uncertainty Source -0.431*** -0.422*** -0.415*** -0.418*** -0.427*** -0.422***
(0.107) (0.103) (0.102) (0.101) (0.106) (0.105)
Uncertainty Host 0.164** 0.169** 0.163** 0.161** 0.141 0.161**
(0.0809) (0.0738) (0.0820) (0.0801) (0.0874) (0.0805)
ln Distance -0.827*** -0.829*** -0.826*** -0.829*** -0.826*** -0.826***
(0.0845) (0.0846) (0.0845) (0.0845) (0.0845) (0.0844)
Contiguity 0.259 0.262 0.260 0.261 0.267 0.265
(0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163) (0.163)
Common Language 1.066*** 1.074*** 1.068*** 1.069*** 1.068*** 1.070***
(0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.210)
Common Currency 1.427*** 1.424*** 1.422*** 1.425*** 1.425*** 1.424***
(0.331) (0.332) (0.331) (0.332) (0.332) (0.332)
Corporate Tax Host -0.713*** -0.620*** -0.708*** -0.739*** -0.728*** -0.713***
(0.190) (0.188) (0.183) (0.182) (0.191) (0.187)
ln GDP Source 0.0821* 0.0861** 0.0830** 0.0824* 0.0839** 0.0792*
(0.0428) (0.0415) (0.0422) (0.0434) (0.0427) (0.0427)
ln GDP Host -0.0553 -0.0593 -0.0554 -0.0548 -0.0578 -0.0515
(0.0397) (0.0386) (0.0392) (0.0405) (0.0397) (0.0396)
Govt Effectiveness Host 0.137
(0.411)
Govt Effectiveness Host*Uncertainty Host 0.00973
(0.114)
Regulatory Quality Host 0.692**
(0.315)
Regulatory Quality Host*Uncertainty Host -0.0781
(0.0809)
Control of Corruption Host 0.590
(0.363)
Control of Corruption Host*Uncertainty Host -0.0454
(0.0906)
Rule of Law Host 0.513*
(0.310)
Rule of Law Host*Uncertainty Host -0.00613
(0.0785)
Political Stability Host 0.308
(0.269)
Political Stability Host*Uncertainty Host -0.0807
(0.0799)
Voice and Accountability Host 0.297
(0.240)
Voice and Accountability Host*Uncertainty Host -0.0437
(0.0565)
Constant 7.420*** 6.694*** 7.514*** 7.321*** 7.434*** 7.270***
(1.062) (0.962) (1.058) (1.049) (1.048) (1.014)
Observations 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777 5,777
R-squared 0.819 0.821 0.823 0.824 0.819 0.819
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Host Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-Pair FE No No No No No No
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dependent variable is bilateral FDI in levels from source country i to host country j in year
t. Uncertainty Source and Uncertainty Host are the one period lagged stock market
volatility in source country and host country in log levels. All regressions are carried out
using Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML). Institutional risk and political
environment indicators taken from World Governance Indicators(WGI).
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The outcome of the global financial crisis and its implications for financial stability
have highlighted the influence of investor sentiment or risk aversion for the movement
of cross-border financial flows. The behaviour of cross-border investors in the context
of shifting external financial conditions has significance for policy makers concerned
about financial stability. Consequently, risks for multinational corporations’ foreign
direct investment activities arising from contextual factor such as political, regulatory,
and financial environment have been considered in the literature, the latter having less
evidence (Kellard et al., 2018).
The analysis of this thesis is motivated by the enhanced financial integration across
countries and the evolution of external financial conditions in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis including the monetary policy response by the major advanced
economies. Chapter 2 examines the degree to which financial development in source and
host countries influence the foreign direct investment activities of multinational corpo-
rations. Results from chapter 2 indicate that the development of financial markets has
a positive impact on cross-border direct investment. This corroborates with the advan-
tageous effects found for both source and host country financial development in prior
empirical studies by Desbordes and Wei (2017) and Donaubauer et al. (2016). Fur-
thermore, the global financial crisis exerted an adverse effect on bilateral foreign direct
investment. Similarly, considering the idiosyncratic financial constraints in the form of
a local systemic banking crisis in the home country resulted in multinational corpora-
tion reducing the magnitude of outward foreign direct investment. This suggests that
multinational corporation were financially constrained during a local systemic banking
crisis which in turns limits the availability of external finance for investment at home.
On the other hand, financial conditions in the host country following a domestic sys-
temic banking crisis are found to increase bilateral foreign direct investment. The main
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policy implications of chapter 2 relates to the both source and host countries. Countries
seeking to enable the entry and growth of multinational corporations should execute
policies that will enhance financial development. Secondly, these countries ought to
put in place policies to sustain access to external financing for firms in periods of se-
vere financial distress. Furthermore, better developed financial system are important
as they will safeguard the access to external financing by local firms as domestic bor-
rowing by multinational corporations expands (Desbordes and Wei, 2017). Therefore,
chapter 2 of this thesis shows evidence that having a well-developed financial system
will be advantageous for both domestic and external investors.
Chapter 3 examines how unconventional monetary policy implemented by central
banks in major advanced economies affected the assets allocation choices of global insti-
tutional investors across countries. The impact of the unconventional monetary policies
of advanced economies on the geographic portfolio allocation choices is identified using
data on large private institutional investors from 1999Q4 to 2016Q4. The analysis
focuses on two asset categories, equities and bonds. The empirical analysis finds that
the monetary policy actions of central banks in advanced economies had significant ef-
fects on institutional investor’s portfolio allocations. Furthermore, consistent with the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the results suggest that the international trans-
mission effects of monetary policy induced institutional investors to rebalance towards
emerging markets and developing economies. Although the magnitude and economic
significance is small, this is divergent from prior evidence, a significant effect for the
role of institutional investors in the large magnitude of capital flows going to emerging
market and developing economies is found. Therefore, the results found in chapter 3
are divergent from Cenedese and Elard (2018) who find no evidence of the risk-taking
channel in the international transmission of monetary policy on portfolio allocation.
Chapter 3 finds that the international transmission effects of monetary policy on
portfolio allocation were heterogeneous in the conventional and unconventional mone-
tary policy period. The results show evidence of home bias for U.S. equities in response
to domestic monetary policy. Among the different proxies used, the shadow policy rate
exerted greater effects on portfolio allocation compared to other proxies of monetary
policy used. This result is consistent with the prior evidence which confirms the propo-
sition that large-scale asset purchases proxied by the size of the central bank balance
sheet may exclude information content when central bank communication is used as a
tool, for example forward guidance (Buch et al., 2018). Additionally, chapter 3 finds ev-
idence suggesting rebalancing of portfolio allocations toward other advanced economies
other than the home country conducting monetary policy consistent with Cenedese and
Elard (2018). Overall, the contribution of chapter 3 to the literature in the analysis of
portfolio weights is that private institutional investors shifted their portfolio weights
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to emerging markets and developing economies. Another related implication of this
result is that these capital flows could potentially be a source of financial instability
for the emerging market and developing economies depending on the type of asset
institutional investors reallocate given that some asset classes are by their inherent
nature less stable than others. The evidence supports the economically significant link
between the monetary policy actions of major economies to the portfolio allocation
choices of non-bank financial intermediaries. The monetary policy expansion by sys-
temic economies induced institutional investors to take greater risk and rebalance to
other economies. The results in chapter 3 have implications for policy makers. The
monetary policy stance of advanced economies’ is important for cross-border portfolio
allocation decisions of financial intermediaries. The chapter specifically relates to the
policy issue addressing the role of institutional investors in the surge in capital flows
going to emerging markets and developing economies in response to the expansionary
monetary policies implemented central banks of major advanced economies. The find-
ings lend support to the proposition that institutional investors engaged in portfolio
allocation choices that led to the surge in capital flows to emerging markets and de-
veloping economies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. There is significant
evidence for this hypothesis suggestive of the shift in institutional investors’ portfolio
allocation toward assets in emerging markets and developing economies. Gaining a bet-
ter comprehension of how institutional investors respond to monetary policy changes
can have considerable implications for the transmission of monetary policy through
institutional investors and more broadly the real economy. The central bank may be
interested in identifying the unexpected consequences of unconventional monetary pol-
icy to better comprehend where risks in the non-bank financial sector could stem from.
This finding relates the investment allocation behaviour or choices by institutional in-
vestors to cross-border capital inflows received by emerging and developing economies
in the post-crisis period. The effects of these policies were varied across the global
financial cycle and the monetary policy transmission mechanism channels for the cen-
tral bank policy actions were distinct. Therefore, capital inflows as a result of policy
actions in systemic economies will necessitate vigilance in building up tools to bolster
resilience to external shocks by policy makers in emerging and developing economies.
There are several potential avenues for future research from the analysis in chapter
3. Specifically, the role of systemic economies monetary policies and financial insta-
bility, in the unconventional monetary policy period. Additionally, following the low
interest rate environment and the increased demand for emerging market and devel-
oping economies assets, the role of institutional investors in driving capital to these
markets can be investigated further. For example, the response of investors to uncon-
ventional monetary policy focusing on adjustments in the currency denomination of
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assets in their portfolio holdings rather than asset class or volumes only. This chapter
is unable to delve deeper into the currency compositions of portfolio holdings owing to
data limitations. This could be done to assess whether investors lower the allocation of
assets in the domestic country conducting monetary policy and rebalance toward other
foreign currencies. This would contribute to the literature on the rebalancing behaviour
of institutional investors in response to monetary policies of advanced economies. Fo-
cusing on the portfolio investment in sovereign and corporate assets in emerging and
developing countries by institutional investors would be beneficial in assessing the po-
tential financial stability risks that may ensue due to balance sheet vulnerabilities to
external financial conditions. This could provide insights into both public and corpo-
rate sector balance sheet vulnerabilities given the concerns about financial stability and
spillover risks with the recent growth in non-financial corporate sector debt of emerg-
ing markets and developing economies after the global crisis; which has been largely
attributed to the easing global financing conditions induced by monetary policies of
advanced economies.
Chapter 4 examines the response of foreign direct investment to domestic and for-
eign uncertainty. The main findings show that multinational corporations’ cross-border
direct investment respond heterogeneously to domestic and foreign uncertainty. More-
over, the response of foreign direct investment varies by the type of uncertainty. Addi-
tionally, there are differences in the role of country-specific uncertainty depending on
whether the host countries are advanced or emerging market and developing economies.
Greater uncertainty and risk regarding financial markets, measured by stock market
volatility in the host country deters foreign direct investment. The empirical evidence
highlights that this negative significant effect of financial uncertainty exists for devel-
oped destination countries and not for emerging market and developing economies.
On the other hand, with political uncertainty, host country uncertainty particularly
government stability has a negative impact on foreign direct investment flows into the
economy. The results suggest that uncertainty related to the political environment
leads to multinational corporations to delay direct investment abroad. Interestingly,
this effect is present when the recipient countries are advanced economies and absent for
emerging market and developing economies. Similarly, higher country specific macroe-
conomic uncertainty in the domestic economy leads to multinational corporations to
retrench or reduce outward direct investment. This result suggests that the volume of
outflows by multinational corporations declines in response to heightened uncertainty
in the home country. Nevertheless, this negative repercussions of heightened macroe-
conomic uncertainty in the source country on foreign direct investment is only evident
for advanced economies and not developing countries.
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Contrastingly, the results with respect to the role of economic policy uncertainty
confirm the relevance of both source and host country uncertainty for bilateral foreign
direct investment flows. The findings based on economic policy uncertainty provide the
insight that greater economic policy uncertainty in the home country deters multina-
tional corporations from investing in foreign markets. For both advanced and emerging
market recipient, greater economic policy uncertainty makes them less attractive des-
tinations for multinational corporations’ foreign direct investment. On the whole, for
advanced economy destination countries, the results in chapter 4 provide some support
for the hypothesis that a retrenchment or reduction in capital flows will occur during
bad times. The empirical evidence highlights that when there is greater uncertainty
at home, multinational corporations respond to greater uncertainty regarding finan-
cial, political, macroeconomic and economic policy aspects of the economy by reducing
outward foreign direct investment flows going to advanced destination countries. In
contrast, among the different types of uncertainty, only economic policy uncertainty
provides evidence of a significant response of foreign direct investment flows to emerg-
ing markets and developing economies. Higher economic policy uncertainty in the
source country deters multinational corporation’s foreign direct investment outflows to
emerging market host countries.
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